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ABSTRACT 
The European banking industry experienced an era of profound restructuring in the 1990s, 
manifested by an unprecedented wave of mergers and acquisitions (M&As). The creation of 
banking giants on the domestic scale, the development of cross-border and cross-sectoral 
transactions and thus the emergence of a few large pan-European financial groups have been the 
principal features of this latest consolidation wave in banking.  Financial globalisation, 
deregulation and market integration, the adoption of a single currency, technological and 
financial advances and shareholder value have been the main driving forces behind the wave of 
M&As over the past few years. Yet, despite the slowdown of the M&A activity since 2001 due 
to the world economic downturn and the collapse of financial markets, banking consolidation in 
the European Union will continue. Indeed, the progress made in the Financial Services Action 
Plan (FSAP) towards the integration of European financial markets including the new rules-
setting envisaged by the new capital adequacy directive 3 will be a real impetus to further 
banking restructuring.  
Against this background and after providing an economic explanation of the recent banking 
consolidation wave, this report raises two fundamental questions: If the race to a larger scale 
leads to the homogenisation of banking behaviour and to the emergence of a European banking 
model, what prospects remain for small- and medium-sized banks? And if large pan-European 
financial groups dominate the financial scene, what will be the response of the supervisory 
authorities to ensure the stability of the European financial system? 
 
 
 
Keywords: Banking consolidation, mergers and acquisitions, shareholder value, efficiency, 
collective welfare, financial stability, market structure, banking model, e-banking, Basel II, 
banking supervision.   
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Banking Consolidation in the EU 
Overview and Prospects 
Rym Ayadi & Georges Pujals 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
he European banking sector experienced a rapid process of consolidation during the 
1990s. The main characteristics of this process were the emergence of ‘mega-banks’ at 
the national level, the increase of cross-border and cross-sectoral transactions and the 
constitution of broad European financial conglomerates. The deregulation of banking activities, 
the progress made towards the completion of an integrated European financial market, financial 
globalisation, technological and financial innovations, the imperative of value creation and the 
introduction of the euro are some of the principal forces that fuelled the process of banking 
consolidation in Europe.  
Nevertheless, the worldwide economic downturn experienced since 2001 has brought merger 
and acquisition (M&A) activity to its lowest level compared to the level in the mid-1990s. As 
we argue, this break in the trend is rather cyclical and we expect that worldwide M&A activity 
will continue as soon as the economy picks up. Indeed, faced with increased risks, uncertainty 
and enhanced competition, banking institutions will adopt the most economic strategic means to 
cut their costs and enhance their revenues. Moreover, the progress made in the Financial 
Services Action Plan (FSAP) towards complete integration of European financial markets and 
the new rules-setting envisaged by the new Capital Adequacy Directive 3 will act as a real 
impetus to accelerate banking consolidation in the coming years. Amongst others, M&As would 
be a preferred response to preserve a stable equilibrium for banking institutions. Alliances and 
partnerships could be a temporary means whereby a bank could establish itself in a new market 
or activity and prepare for a likely acquisition.  
Many studies of the M&A wave of the 1990s, however, found that M&As are far from having 
proved their economic effectiveness. Consequently, one can question the real motives behind 
these operations for managers and shareholders and the effects on the collective welfare and 
financial stability. Finally, as big financial groups emerge, this might raise competition concerns 
when the concentration threshold in a relevant market is reached.  
By accelerating the pace of strategic responses, the recent consolidation wave within the 
European banking industry might lead to the homogenisation of banking behaviour. This raises 
the possible emergence of a dominant banking business model in Europe on which the majority 
of the banking and financial groups might have to converge. One could question the drivers of 
success of such a model. The evidence shows that customer satisfaction and value creation will 
remain the objectives of any strategic action to come.  
Moreover, in the medium term, the acceleration of cross-border and cross-sectoral transactions 
is inevitable, envisioning a more integrated European banking market. A priority is to target a 
more effective and efficient way to perceive the role of European supervisory authorities in the 
years to come. In order to ensure a sound and safe financial system in Europe, there is a pressing 
need to go beyond the ‘shared subsidiarity’ and the multilateral cooperation alternatives that 
characterise the current situation. The combination of geographical centralisation and 
institutional opening up could be an appropriate response to a future increased integration in the 
financial services sector in Europe. 
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Banking Consolidation in the EU 
Overview and Prospects 
Rym Ayadi and Georges Pujals 
Introduction 
During the last decade, the financial services sector has been subject to an unprecedented wave 
of restructuring operations.
1 In particular, the banking sector has recorded a certain delay in 
restructuring in comparison with other sectors due to restrictive national regulations and to 
competition reasons. In 2001, the banking sector accounted for almost 23% of the total value of 
M&A transactions in Europe, making it one of the most active in M&A activity worldwide.  
After a period of intense domestic concentration since the mid-1990s aiming to create strong 
domestic players, many banks are seeking to expand across border and sectors announcing the 
beginning of a second phase, characterised by the acceleration of pan-European and cross-
sectoral transactions (involving banking, insurance, securities firms and/or financial groups 
within the European Union), which will certainly lead to the emergence of leading cross-border 
banking groups at EU level.  
Despite a collapse in worldwide M&A activity following the global economic and financial 
downturn in 2001, banking consolidation in Europe should continue. Indeed, besides 
deregulation, technological and financial innovation, value creation and the imperative to 
increase market share and to reduce over-capacity will continue to give impetus to the 
consolidation process in the coming years.  
Moreover, two other factors will also play an important role in the process. Indeed, cross-border 
transactions have been constrained for a long time by a number of cultural, regulatory, fiscal 
and political obstacles. The introduction of the euro and the progress achieved towards the 
completion of an integrated European financial market
2 will trigger pan-European consolidation 
as soon as market conditions allow for it.  
Finally, the new Basel Capital Accord seems to be beneficial for large institutions, which will 
now be able to adopt the most sophisticated credit risk models to efficiently assess their 
portfolios and allocate capital. As a consequence, the drive to reach a larger size will be a 
comparative advantage in the post-Basel era, which will probably accelerate the consolidation 
wave. 
The banking sector in Europe is at a turning point in its history. This report aims to provide a 
complete and up-to-date picture of the banking consolidation process in Europe during the last 
decade. It offers a structural, economic and strategic analysis of the European banking sector 
and identifies the new challenges facing supervisory authorities and their likely responses to 
ensure financial stability. The report is structured as follows:  
 
                                                 
1 Restructuring operations in the banking sector can take various forms. The most common are mergers 
and acquisitions (M&As), but there are also different possible strategic options, such as forming a 
strategic alliance, a joint venture or cross-shareholding. In this research report, we are particularly 
concerned with contemporary M&As. 
2  See Annex 1 on the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP), a series of policy objectives and specific 
measures adopted by the European Commission in 1999 to improve the Single Market for financial 
services. 2 | AYADI & PUJALS 
The first chapter shows briefly the main trends and characteristics of the banking consolidation 
wave in Europe during the 1990s. Chapter 2 reviews the principal ‘drivers’ of the current 
process, with a particular focus on value creation. A third chapter highlights the economic, 
social and structural effects of the recent banking consolidation wave. Finally, the fourth and the 
fifth chapters examine the prospects for the future of the European banking sector and the 
supervisory responses to the challenges created by a more integrated European financial market.  
Undoubtedly, the consolidation process has contributed to a more integrated financial market 
thanks to the blurring of the traditional frontiers between financial activities, and even more, to 
an increased interest in cross-sectoral and cross-border transactions, leading to the emergence of 
multi-specialised financial groups operating across borders. One could wonder if these 
developments imply a more uniform banking practice and growth strategies across Europe. And 
if this is the case, how will the European supervisory authorities respond to ensure a safe and 
sound banking system in Europe? 
 | 3 
Chapter 1 
The Main Characteristics of the Recent Wave 
of Banking Consolidation in the EU 
1.1  Mergers and acquisitions: A worldwide and multi-sectoral phenomenon 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are considered as consolidation strategies where a change of 
control takes place through a transfer of ownership. For the purposes of this study, M&A 
activity is defined as the transfer of ownership by one firm to another from less than 50% to 
more than 50%. Such a change generally results in an unambiguous transfer of corporate 
control.  
1.1.1  A recurring phenomenon having specific characteristics... 
The pace of M&A activity has been heating up internationally, not only in developed countries 
but also in the majority of the emerging economies (Levasseur, 2002). Although the current 
phenomenon may seem to be new, it should be borne in mind that important waves of 
consolidation have already occurred in the past. Since the beginning of industrialisation, the 
world experienced four periods of consolidation: 1) 1897-1904, 2) 1916-29, 3) 1965-69 and 4) 
1984-89. Consequently, the current wave would only constitute the fifth one during the 20
th 
century. Unlike the M&A wave of the 1980s, however, the recent wave focused on strategic 
growth options based on the imperative of strengthening the competitiveness of the companies 
in their core business, rather than simply registering quick financial gains. Its main 
characteristic has been an overall increase in the number and the total value of transactions. 
Precisely, the latest wave seems to have experienced two considerable accelerations since the 
beginning of the 1990s: the first between 1994 and 1995 and the second and more pronounced, 
since 1997 (see Figure 1). Between 1998 and 2000, however, it appears that the total value of 
the transactions recorded a tremendous increase never observed in the past. 
Figure 1. Global M&A activity in value (1991-2002) 
Sources: SDC Platinum database on M&As and Dealogic (2003). 
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According to Thomson financial data, the total transaction value of M&As reached almost 
$3,500 billion in 2000 (distributed among 37,000 transactions), compared to less than $500 
billion recorded at the beginning of the 1990s. Hence, the total value of the M&A operations 
multiplied seven-fold during a decade, in nominal terms. Since 2001, however, the volume of 
worldwide M&A operations seems to have slowed down sharply.  
A survey by Dialogic in 2003 showed that the total value of worldwide M&A deals has 
registered an annual decrease of 47% between 2000 and 2001, and 24% between 2001 and 2002 
(see Figure 1). This is a drop in value comparable to the levels reached in 1996.  
The total number of transactions registered a decrease of 12%, bringing the total to 23,611 
transactions in 2002, compared to 26,359 transactions in 2001. Besides the decrease of the 
overall transaction number including ‘mega deals’, the drop in value could also be attributed to 
the low valuation of the acquired firms following the overall downturn in the financial markets. 
Figure 2. Total value of M&A transactions in the US vs the EU (1995-2002) 
Source: Dialogic (2003). 
 
A breakdown between the EU and the US firms involved in M&A activity shows that they both 
displayed an upward trend between 1997 and 1999. But US firms remained significantly more 
active than European firms. In Europe, the M&A wave started to heat up in 1998. By 1999, the 
value of deals was almost comparable to the US.  
The drop in transaction values between 2001 and 2002 has affected both the US and the EU, but 
was sharper in the US (41%) than in the EU (5%) and for the first time, the total value of 
European M&As exceeded that in the US (see Figure 2).  
A second distinctive feature of the latest M&A wave is that it is more pronounced in some 
sectors of the economy than in others. In the past few years, an increasing proportion of 
worldwide M&A transactions concerned TMT sectors (technology, media and 
telecommunications) and financial services (banking, insurance and securities) (see Figure 3). 
Since the burst of the technological and financial bubble, the ‘old economy’ sectors
3 have 
dominated the M&A market.  
                                                 
3 The energy sector has registered 23% of the total amount of the operations carried out in 2002, followed 
by the industrial sector with 12%. Controversially, the most affected sectors were retail trade, which saw 
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Figure 3. Sectoral distribution of M&A transactions in 2000 
Source: SDC Platinum database on M&As (2001). 
 
1.1.2  … and which particularly affects the European financial sector 
The level of M&A activity involving European financial firms increased during the 1990s, with 
a strong growth in total value. The number, however, has fluctuated from one year to the next 
without the emergence of a real trend since 1992 (see Figure 4). After a sharp decline in 1993 
due to the economic slowdown in the European Union, a slight increase was registered until a 
peak was reached in 1998, after which an overall downward trend was experienced.  
Figure 4. Importance of the financial services sector in the M&A wave in the EU (1992-2001) 
Source: SDC Platinum database on M&As (2002). 
 
Controversially, according to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS, 2001), the total value 
of transactions has shown a remarkable increase reaching $147 billion in 1999, compared to $23 
billion at the beginning of the decade. And roughly two-thirds of the transactions’ volume was 
concentrated between 1997 and 1999, when the average value had increased substantially. 
Despite  the recent overall decline in global M&As, the financial services sector in the EU 
continued to be engaged in these activities up to 2001. By the following year, however, the 
number of M&As had declined by 43%. In Europe, financial firms have been among the most 
involved in the M&A wave following the energy sector (see Figure 5).  
                                                                                                                                               
a 40% decline in the number of deals compared to the same period in 2001, and information technology 
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More particularly, the banking sector has accounted for two important deals valued at more than 
$10 billion: the transaction in the UK between HSBC and Household International and the 
transaction between Crédit Agricole SA and Crédit Lyonnais in France.  
Figure 5. Sectoral distribution of European M&A transactions, 2002 
Source: SDC Platinum database on M&As (2002). 
 
Even though the financial services sector has been strongly involved in the M&A wave in recent 
years, it is useful to recall that it recorded a certain delay in the restructuring process compared 
to other industries (manufacturing, energy, distribution, pharmaceutical, chemical, automobile, 
TMT...). This situation can be partially explained by the restrictive national regulations found in 
Europe, which initially aimed to protect the domestic financial sectors from foreign competition. 
1.2  Banking consolidation in the EU  
According to the BIS (2001), most of the worldwide M&A activity in the financial services 
industry during the 1990s involved banking firms (60% of transactions). Interestingly, banking 
transactions accounted for about 70% of the value of all the deals. In Europe, this has resulted in 
a substantial change in the ranking of the major banking institutions (see Table 1). 
Table 1. Change in ranking (by total assets) of the major European banking institutions, 
1992 and 2001 
Rank in 
1992 
Bank  Total assets  
(€ billion) 
Rank in 
2001 
Bank  Total assets  
(€ billion) 
1  Crédit Lyonnais  272  1  Deutsche Bank  918 
2 Deutsche  Bank  235  2  UBS  829 
3  Crédit Agricole  232  3  BNP Paribas  825 
4 BNP  220  4 HSBC  776 
5 Société  Générale  200  5  BHV  728 
6 HSBC  199 6  Crédit  Suisse  Group  677 
7  ABN Amro  199  7  ABN Amro  597 
8 Barclays  174  8  RBoS  593 
9 Natwest  168  9 Barclays  573 
10  Dresdner Bank  158  10  Crédit Agricole  563 
Source: Caisse des dépôts et des consignations (CDC), 2002. 
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To characterise the banking consolidation wave in the EU, a targeted statistical analysis
4 was 
carried out on a sample of the main M&A transactions announced and completed involving 
exclusively banking institutions, over the period 1994-2000 (see Annex 2 for methodological 
details). Statistical analysis was performed on the number, total value
5 and average value of the 
transactions. The results show the following characteristics:  
•  an acceleration of M&A operations since 1996 with a sharp decline in 2001, 
•  the emergence of ‘mega banks’ at national level since 1999, 
•  the timid development of cross-border transactions at Community level and 
•  the constitution of European financial conglomerates.  
1.2.1  Acceleration of M&A activity since 1996  
The annual breakdown in the number of the transactions seems to confirm a significant upward 
trend since 1996 to reach a peak in 1998, before a slight decrease in 1999 and 2000 (see Figure 
6). 
Figure 6. National vs. pan-European banking M&As, by number (1994-2000) 
Source: SDC Platinum database on M&As (2001). 
 
The aggregate value of all transactions over the period amounted to €262 billion. Since 1996, 
the annual value has grown much more rapidly than the number, to reach its peak in 2000 (see 
Figure 7). Globally, the number of M&A and the annual value of the transactions have followed 
different trends. The average transaction value,
6 which takes into account both the number and 
the annual transaction value, has increased steadily over the period (see Figure 8). 
Consequently, these developments confirm the strong growth of M&A activity in the EU 
banking industry. 
Nevertheless, the slowing down of global M&A activity has strongly affected the banking 
sector, despite several large transactions that have taken place in Europe since 2001.
7 
 
 
                                                 
4 The analysis was complemented by external observations as regards the evolution of M&A activity in 
banking since 2000.  
5 Total value is based on the acquisition value. 
6 Average transaction value = total amount/number of operations. 
7 See Annex 3, which lists the principal banking M&A operations within the European Union over the 
period 1995-2002.   
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Figure 7. National vs. pan-European banking M&As, by value (1994-2000) 
Source: SDC Platinum database on M&As (2001). 
1.2.2  The emergence of ‘mega-banks’ at national scale since 1999  
The evolution of the average transaction value is very interesting. After a steady growth 
between 1994-99, it jumped to reach a peak in 2000 (see Figure 8). As a consequence, the 
transaction value was especially large at the end of the decade.  
In practice, this is reflected by the emergence of ‘mega-banks’ operating at a national scale in 
the major EU countries (BNP Paribas in France, SCH and BBVA in Spain, IntesaBCI and 
Unicredit in Italy, RBoS Group in UK and Bayerishe HypoVereinsbank in Germany…). These 
developments indicate that a growing M&A activity will lead in the medium to long term to the 
co-existence of a few large actors at the domestic level, which will result in more concentrated 
banking markets. 
Figure 8. National vs. pan-European banking M&As by average value (1994-2000) 
Source: SDC Platinum database on M&As (2001). 
 
Two hypotheses can be mentioned to explain the significant increase in the average value of 
these transactions in 1999 and 2000: either this increase is attributable to a few large 
transactions within the banking industry or it is the consequence of a widespread consolidation 
process affecting the whole banking industry.  
In the first case, it would be a specific and prompt process of reconfiguration in which only the 
large-sized European banking institutions would take part. In the second case, however, it would 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
National Pan-European Total
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
€
 
b
i
l
l
i
o
n
s
National Pan European TotalBANKING CONSOLIDATION IN THE EU | 9 
reflect a major and a lasting restructuring process, since all the European banking institutions 
would be involved. The latter interpretation could be favoured if the banking domestic M&A 
distribution in Europe over time would show an overall distortion towards the right side, 
implying that the majority of the transactions would involve higher transaction values.  
In order to analyse the national concentration process of the European banking industry 
throughout the period, the distribution of M&A transactions
8 is successively represented (see 
Table 2) per year and then per sub-period by considering the following intervals based on the 
annual transaction values: 
•  small transactions (less than €500 million), 
•  medium-sized transactions (between €500 and €5,000 million) and 
•  large-sized transactions (€5,000 million and more).  
 
Table 2. Distribution of domestic M&A transactions per year 
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Number  of  M&As  22 15 15 20 23 18  7 
Intervals  (€ millions)  % of M&A transactions 
<100  50% 27% 40% 25% 39% 11%  0% 
100-500  23% 47% 20% 20%  9%  6%  14% 
500-1000  5%  7%  20% 15% 13% 28% 14% 
1000-2000  14% 13% 13% 15%  9%  17%  0% 
2000-5000 9%  0%  7%  20%  22%  17%  43% 
5000-10000  0% 0% 0% 5% 4%  11%  14% 
+10000  0% 7% 0% 0% 4%  11%  14% 
 
Figures 9a and 9b show the results of the statistical analysis. The distribution per period 
indicates that the banking consolidation process within the EU has experienced two successive 
stages over the period 1994-2000. The first one, completed in 1998, was dominated by small- 
and medium-sized transactions.
9 Indeed, these transactions accounted for more than 90% of the 
total. Over the period 1999-2000, a major change occurred and a second stage was started. 
Indeed, large-sized transactions accounted for more than 50% of the operations, with the 
persistence of medium-sized transactions (35%).  
The distribution per year confirms these results. Whereas in 1994, the majority of the 
transactions were mainly motivated by the desire to reduce excess capacity and entailed less 
than €500 million, an apparent and progressive shift towards larger transactions has been 
experienced since 1997. These results confirm an overall shifting of the M&A transaction 
distribution towards the right side, implying higher transaction values. Hence, the small, 
medium and large banking institutions have successively taken part in the global consolidation 
process. 
To conclude, the recent consolidation process has been structural, profound and dynamic. 
Moreover, the same tendency is likely to continue towards the creation of both national and pan-
European mega-banking groups. Indeed when the possibilities for acquisition are exhausted in a 
domestic market and the concentration threshold is attained, banking institutions will look for 
                                                 
8 The analysis was carried out on a sample of 120 domestic transactions in which the values were made 
available. 
9 The size of the transaction depends on its value (market value). The transaction value could be amplified 
by the stock market valuation following the announcement of the M&A, but we do not consider that this 
would have an important effect on the analysis.  10 | AYADI & PUJALS 
other potential external growth opportunities in other markets. Consequently, cross-border 
consolidation could offer adequate growth opportunities without damaging competition. 
Figure 9a. Changes in domestic M&A banking distribution per year 
 
Figure 9b. Changes in domestic M&A banking distribution per period 
1.2.3  The timid development of cross-border transactions at EU level 
Cross-border consolidation activity was fairly modest in the first half of the 1990s. Domestic 
deals constituted the majority of M&A activity, accounting for 87% in number, and 90% in total 
value over the period 1994-2000 (see Figures 10 and 11). This evolution has clearly contributed 
to increased levels of concentration within individual European banking markets. As shown 
previously, the domestic consolidation process is advancing to the point at which the domestic 
markets are starting to reach a saturation level, encouraging banking institutions to move 
beyond their national frontiers to seek new growth opportunities.  
The statistical results show the predominance of domestic consolidation throughout the entire 
period, but a marked increase can be observed in cross-border transactions starting in 1999 to 
reach 42% in number and 30% in value in 2000. This modest growth of cross-border 
consolidation could be partly attributed to the elimination of the currency barriers stemming 
from the creation of the economic and monetary union (EMU) in 1999 and the introduction of 
the euro.  
Also several country-specific factors influenced cross-border consolidation in Europe. The 
Scandinavian and Benelux countries were indeed very active in cross-border transactions – not 
only as acquirers but also as targets (see Figure 12). Due to their small and rapidly saturated 
domestic markets and the relatively advanced domestic consolidation process, the main banking 
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actors have been compelled to quickly develop their activities outside of the strictly national 
field more than elsewhere. 
Figure 10. Comparison of national vs. pan-European banking M&As, by number (1994-2000) 
Source: SDC Platinum database on M&As (2001). 
 
Figure 11. Comparison of national vs. pan-European banking M&As by total value (1994-2000) 
Source: SDC Platinum database on M&As (2001). 
 
Figure 12. Value of European M&A transactions within the financial industry by country 
(in %, 1990-99) 
Source: BIS (2001). 
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Nevertheless, we have not yet witnessed large-scale cross-border transactions in the European 
Union. Indeed, in the past few years, European banking institutions have shown more interest in 
deploying to emerging areas offering high potential growth and new opportunities for 
development, such as Eastern Europe and Latin America, or to the United States in order to 
benefit from the know-how and the technological advances made in various activities, such as 
investment banking or asset management (see Table 3).  
Table 3. M&A transactions completed in 2001-03 involving European banks 
  Domestic European  cross-border International  cross-border 
Within- 
sector 
BoS-Halifax (UK) 
DG Bank-GZ Bank(Ger) 
Dexia-Artésia (Be) 
SanPaoloIMI-Cardine (It) 
BPVerona-BPNovara (It) 
Banca di Roma-Bipop Carire (It) 
CCF-Banque Hervet (Fr) 
Banco Sabadell-Banco Herrero (Sp) 
Banca di Roma-Bipop Carire (It) 
BP di Bergamo-BPCI (It) 
Crédit Agricole-Crédit Lyonnais (Fr) 
BP di Vicenza-Cassa di Risparmio di Prato 
(It) 
DnB-Nordlandsbanken (Nor) 
BP di Lodi-Banco di Chiavari e della 
riviera Ligure (It) 
SanPaoloIMI-BP Adriatico (It) 
 
DeutscheBank-Scudder(Ger-Sw) 
SocGen-Komercni (Fr-Cze) 
KBC-Nova LjubljanskaBanka  
(Be-Slovenia) 
Unicredit/Allianz-
ZagrebackaBanka  
(It-Ger-Croatia) 
Erste Bank-Ceska Sporitelna 
(Au/Croatia)  
Unicredit-Zivnostenska Banka 
(It/Cze) 
SanpaoloIMI-Inter europabank 
(It/Hung) 
Barclays-Zaragozano (UK/Sp) 
SCH-Banespa (Sp/Mex) 
SCH-BancoSantiago(Sp/Chile) 
ING-Seguros(NL/Mex) 
BNPParibas-BancWest (Fr/US) 
BNPParibas-UnionCaliforniaBank 
(Fr/US) 
RBoS-Medford Bancorp (UK/US) 
Rabobank-VIBC(NL/US)  
HSBC-GF Bital (UK/Mex) 
HSBC-Household International 
(UK/US) 
RBoS-Cambridgeport Bank (UK/US)
ABN AMRO-Sudameris (NL/Brazil) 
SocGen-SSB Bank (Fr/Ghana) 
 
Cross-
sectors 
Allianz-Dresdner (Ger) 
CDC-Caisse d’Epargne Group (Fr)  
Natexis Banques Populaires-Coface (Fr) 
Crédit Agricole-Finaref (Fr) 
BNP Paribas-Facet (Fr) 
ABN AMRO-KBC Private Banking (NL) 
RBoS-Churchill Insurance (UK) 
SCH-AKB (Sp/Ger) 
BNP Paribas-Cogent (Fr/UK) 
BNP Paribas-Consors (Fr/Ger) 
DnB-Skandia AM (Nor/Swe) 
ING-Entrium (NL/Ger) 
SocGen-HertzLease (Fr/US) 
Deutsche Bank-Rud Blass 
(Ger/Swi) 
Crédit Mutuel CIC-Van Moer 
Santerre (Fr/Lux) 
Dresdner Bank-Wasserstein Perella 
(Ger/US) 
Société Générale-TCW (Fra/US) 
Deutsche Bank-RREEF (Ger/US) 
SCH-Origenes (Sp/Argentina) 
 
1.2.4  Towards the constitution of European financial conglomerates 
Traditionally, universal banking has been the prevailing reference model in Europe thanks to the 
provisions introduced by the second banking directive in 1989. As their name suggests, banks 
may engage in a full range of investment services in addition to commercial banking activities.
10 
This trend is expected to continue after the implementation of the revised investment services 
directive (ISD) of 1996 and the new capital adequacy directive, which applies to credit 
institutions and investment firms.  
Moreover, it is interesting to note that in some countries,
11 the universal banking principle has 
been extended to insurance activities owing to the historical link between both industries and the 
increased interest on the part of some banking institutions to expand into insurance activities. In 
other countries, however, restrictive rules at the national level still exist aimed at separating 
banking and insurance activities. The adoption of the conglomerate directive in 2002 provided a 
                                                 
10 These activities should be undertaken in a direct way rather than through separately incorporated 
subsidiaries and banks may closely link themselves to non-banks by either equity holding or board 
participation (BIS, 2001). 
11 In the Netherlands, the insurance industry has historically had a close relationship with the banking 
industry, explaining the early emergence of the bancassurance model there as compared to other 
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suitable regulatory framework for financial groups operating in banking, insurance and 
investment services.  
The regulatory reforms undertaken in recent years have been the main accomplishments of the 
vast programme of the FSAP which started in 1999 and aims to remove most of the regulatory 
barriers to a single integrated financial market and to create a level playing field. Nevertheless, 
it is too early to draw a full picture of the most developed form of financial integration: the 
financial conglomerate. Indeed, reality shows that a majority of the M&A transactions were 
carried out within the same sector accounting for almost 67% against 33% across sectors in 
1999 (see Table 4).  
Table 4. Sectoral and geographical breakdown of M&As in the European financial sector 
(1999) 
 
 
National Cross-border    Total 
320 11 331  Within banks     66.60% 
94 72  166  Cross-sector     33.40% 
414 83 497  Total     100% 
Source: ECB (2000b). 
 
In the past few years, however, a distinguishing feature in Europe has been the relative 
importance of cross-industry transactions in the insurance field (see Table 5). Indeed, various 
banking institutions sought to develop new sources of income by widening the range of their 
supply through the development of insurance activities (life and non-life products). 
Table 5. The distribution of targets and acquirers industries in 1999 ($ billion) 
Targets 
Acquirers 
 
Banks Securities  Insurance 
companies    Total 
89 9 20  118  Banks 
36.03% 3.64%  8.10%  47.77% 
23 19 24  66  Securities  9.31% 7.69% 9.72%  26.72% 
11 6 46  63  Insurance companies  4.45% 2.43%  18.62%  25.51% 
123 34  90  247  Total  49.80% 13.77% 36.44%  100% 
Source: Thomson Financial (2000).  
 
Among European countries, Belgium and the Netherlands were home to a few but important 
domestic cross-industry transactions during the last decade. Indeed, in both countries, the 
aggregate value of domestic cross-industry transactions exceeded the value of domestic within-
industry transactions (see Figure 13). These developments enabled the emergence of 
conglomerates that paired banking concerns with insurance companies (Fortis and KBC in 
Belgium and ING in the Netherlands). 
Since 2000, several mergers between banking groups and insurers have come to light. Among 
the most significant have been the mergers of Fortis Group and ASR Verzekeringsgroep in the 
Benelux, Sampo with Leonia in Finland, but especially the latest acquisition of the Dresdner 
Bank by the German insurer Allianz. Since then, the bancassurance model has attracted 
considerable attention in European business circles. 14 | AYADI & PUJALS 
Figure 13. Share of different models of banking M&A transactions, by country (1990-99) 
Source: BIS (2001). 
In sum, the overall picture of the recent wave of financial consolidation initially showed an 
intensification of domestic M&A activity within the banking industry in the EU during the last 
decade. The rapid growth in the total transaction value, which was accompanied by an increase 
in the average transaction value, contributed to a change in the overall consolidation process 
towards larger-scale transactions. Accordingly, it seems that the recent M&A wave aims to 
finalise the domestic banking consolidation and is triggering cross-border consolidation.  
Furthermore, as shown, banking institutions are now searching for new opportunities in external 
markets to replace or supplement declining domestic growth possibilities. The removal of 
regulatory barriers in the European financial services industry will give an additional impetus to 
cross-border and cross-industry consolidation and particularly to the emergence of the 
bancassurance model. 
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Chapter 2 
The Key Drivers of Banking Consolidation 
The wave of M&As in European banking is not over. In order to explain and assess the extent 
and the pace of future consolidation in Europe, it is helpful to consider the various factors likely 
to further stimulate the banking consolidation process. According to the academic literature in 
banking and industrial economics, there are a variety of motivations driving consolidation, 
ranging from value maximisation (including cost reduction and revenue growth) to other 
external and managerial goals. 
2.1  Various but convergent factors 
The key factors that have driven the recent consolidation wave in the European banking sector 
are in general those already observed in other industries. In any given industry, more than one 
motive may underlie the decision to engage in a merger or an acquisition. Motives may also 
vary with firm characteristics, such as size, organisational structure or strategy, over business 
cycles, across countries and/or across industry segments.  
This paper explains the recent consolidation process on the basis of two sets of basic factors: 1) 
maximisation of shareholder value and other managerial motives and 2) external environmental 
forces that currently govern the sector (deregulation, financial globalisation and new 
technologies) and that have forced European banking institutions to adapt in order to remain 
competitive.  
2.1.1  The ‘leading’ role of the environment  
Many ‘external’ factors have played a crucial role in fuelling the consolidation process in the 
EU: deregulation, privatisation, financial globalisation, the increasing integration of capital 
markets and the introduction of the euro. Moreover, technological innovations
12 have generated 
very high fixed costs which can only be profitably recuperated from large-volume activities. 
Hence, these factors have not only reduced the entry barriers (in a geographical and functional 
sense) but have also provided market opportunities to new entrants, thus intensifying 
competition. In response to these environmental changes, European banking institutions have 
been obliged to attain a critical size by increasing their sphere of activity, in order to 
compensate for the erosion of their margins and to restore their revenues to remain competitive 
in the marketplace. 
Two other ‘external’ forces have created further pressures for change. Firstly, confronted with 
increasing globalisation of their activities, banking institutions have had to make greater 
financial commitments in order to satisfy their growing clientele of ‘corporate customers’. 
Secondly, the economic situation in Europe at the end of the 1990s – characterised by strong 
growth and low interest rates – was very favourable to financial markets and generated strong 
acquisition capabilities.
13 As noted by Perthuis (2000): “Over a long period, it seems that the 
M&A activity was not developed in a linear way. The overall trend took the form of a cycle 
which has generally been accompanied by strong economic growth and financial markets 
prosperity” (authors’ translation).  
                                                 
12 De Perthuis (2003). 
13 Owing to the high increase of M&A operations financed by stock-to-stock takeover bids, the stock 
exchange inflation has increased the ‘purchasing power’ of the potential purchasers. In 1998, almost two 
out of every three operations were financed by the exchange of shares, compared to only 10% in 1995. 16 | AYADI & PUJALS 
2.1.2 Value-maximising  motives 
In addition to its contribution to reducing overcapacity,
14 banking consolidation has tended to be 
justified in the economic literature on the ground that it created shareholder value. Indeed, the 
strengthening of the shareholders’ role, the increasing importance of institutional investors in 
banking capital (pension funds, mutual funds...), the pressures from the financial markets and 
the new corporate governance rules have encouraged managers to orient their business 
objectives towards value-maximisation. 
The traditional argument that M&As increase shareholder value is based on the assumption that 
the anticipated value of the entity created by the merger of two groups will exceed, in terms of 
potential wealth creation, the sum of the respective values of the two separate groups. That is, 
1+1 = 3. Two main types of synergies are achieved: operating synergies and financial synergies. 
The former takes the form of either revenue enhancement or cost reduction. The latter refers to 
the possibility that the cost of capital may be lowered by combining one or more companies. 
In theory, M&A operations in the banking sector could create value by obtaining gains either in 
terms of market power or in terms of efficiency. 
2.1.2.1  Enhanced market power 
Theoretically, market power is defined as the capacity to fix market prices as a result of a 
dominant position in a certain market. The economic literature
15 concludes that prices are 
positively correlated to local market shares in general, but this position is not justified in the 
context of international markets (inter-banking activities, multinational companies...). 
Therefore, increased market power can be gained through a merger or an acquisition of two 
competing institutions operating in the same local market.  
Thus, value creation through market power would seem more likely to explain mergers at the 
local level and within the same activity (especially in retail banking), which appears to be 
coherent with the theoretical evidence noted above, in particular in the European Union, where 
the majority of the operations are within sectors and national.
16 
In practice, banking institutions can influence supply (as a supplier) or demand prices (as a 
client). In the first case, the size obtained following a merger or an acquisition might create a 
dominant position which enables the bank to manipulate price levels in a certain market either 
by: a) decreasing prices (by pre-emption and/or predation
17) to evict some non-competitive 
existing banking institutions and/or new entrants, or b) increasing prices in the absence of 
effective competition in the marketplace. In the second case, the size obtained will enable the 
new group to reduce its refinancing costs thanks to reputation, size or diversification effects.  
Nevertheless, some recent studies
18 have shown that the previous correlation between 
concentration levels and market power diminished during the 1990s. This could be attributed to 
                                                 
14 ‘Overcapacity’ or ‘excess capacity’ is mentioned when supply exceeds demand in a given sector (Rosa, 
2001). Although demand in financial services has grown significantly during the last two decades, it has 
not always followed the evolution of supply. Thus, overcapacity appeared in an increasing number of 
activity segments. By reducing the prices and the margins, overcapacity obliges banks to seek increased 
volumes and therefore higher market shares.  
15 Hannan (1991) and Berger & Hannan (1989, 1997). 
16 Vander Vennet (1996).  
17 Pre-emption implies that the price fixed by the bank is lower than the average cost while predation 
involves fixing the price at a level lower than the marginal cost.  
18 Hannan (1997) and Radecki (1998). BANKING CONSOLIDATION IN THE EU | 17 
the opening up of markets which has encouraged the entry of new competitors and thus 
increased the degree of contestability of the market.
19 Moreover, the emergence of new 
distribution channels such as e-banking, while contributing to the disappearance of the 
geographical boundaries, has made the concept of ‘local market’ less relevant.  
2.1.2.2  Greater efficiency  
An M&A allows the resulting company to obtain efficiency gains through cost reductions (or 
cost synergies), revenue increases (or revenue synergies), the exchange of best practices and/or 
risk diversification.  
Cost synergies result from an improved organisation of banking production, a better scale and/or 
a better combination of production factors. The core objective is to extract benefits from cost 
complementarities and economies of scale and scope. In practice, cost synergies might be 
derived from: a) the integration of different skilled teams or information technology 
infrastructures, b) the combination of different back-office and general services or c) the 
rationalisation of the domestic and/or international banking networks. The more flexible the 
labour market, the more likely it is that the company will achieve cost synergies.  
Revenue synergies also derive from a better combination of production factors. Improvements 
in the organisation of activities, however, offer benefits from product complementarities which 
help to enhance revenues. In practice, revenue synergies might result from the harmonisation of 
product ranges, the existing complementarities between activities, cross-selling and the 
generalisation of a ‘multi-distribution channel’ approach to the various segments of customers.  
It should be noted, however, that revenue synergies are much more difficult to obtain compared 
to cost synergies, because they depend not only on managers’ decisions but also on customer 
behaviour. In this respect, several studies have estimated that some 5% to 10% of a bank’s 
customers leave the bank after a merger.
20 Accordingly, M&As between banking institutions in 
Europe have very often targeted higher cost synergies than revenue synergies (see Table 6).  
Table 6. Synergies announced in recent M&A deals in the EU 
Banks  Year  Expected synergies  
(€ million) 
Revenue synergies  
(%) 
Cost synergies 
(%) 
Crédit Agricole-Crédit Lyonnais  2002  760  0  100 
CDC-Caisses d’Epargne  2001  500  85  15 
Allianz-Dresdner 2001  1080  88  12 
Halifax-Bank of Scotland  2001  1113  51  49 
Dexia-Artesia 2001  200  15  85 
HVB-Bank Austria  2000  500  0  100 
RBoS-Natwest 2000  2335  17  83 
BNP-Paribas 1999  850  18  82 
BBV-Argentaria 1999  511 0  100 
Intesa-COMIT 1999  1000  50  50 
Banco Santander-BCH  1999  630  0  100 
Sources: Annual reports and financial press. 
                                                 
19 A contestable market is one with low barriers to entry and exit (Baumol et al., 1982). In such a 
situation, potential competitors may engage in hit-and-run behaviour to take advantage of the super 
normal profit situation of the market. Contestability hinges on the absence of exit costs (called ‘sunk 
costs’), which are the costs that cannot be recovered by transferring assets to other uses or by selling 
them. Entry to the financial services sector requires substantial investment that tends to be sunk to a high 
degree.  
20 See Burger (2001). 18 | AYADI & PUJALS 
To achieve the goal of efficiency, two types of strategies can be pointed out. Firstly, in theory, a 
merger or an acquisition involving two companies with homogeneous activity profiles should 
lead to economies of scale by reducing the unitary production costs, as a result of an increase in 
activity volume and a decrease in the fixed costs obtained by combining the support functions 
(marketing, information technology, physical infrastructures, personnel management...). The 
final objective is to obtain a competitive advantage in the activities involved.  
In Europe, expectations ride high in the reinforcement of retail banking. The strategy consists 
firstly in merging domestic banking institutions, while maintaining the existing branch network 
and secondly in implementing upstream cost synergies, i.e. at the level of physical network 
management. The desire to achieve greater economies of scale can be seen in the recent 
operations of several retail banks: BHV in Germany, SCH and BBVA in Spain, CIC-Crédit 
Mutuel in France, Unicredit in Italy and Lloyds TSB or RBoS-Natwest in the United Kingdom. 
The second strategy to achieve greater efficiency is adopted in circumstances where banking 
institutions are operating in heterogeneous but complementary markets. A merger or an 
acquisition not only allows the resulting company to widen its customers’ portfolio but it also 
leads to a more diversified range of services and offers scope economies by optimising the 
synergies between the merged activities. Here, the main objective is to increase revenues, rather 
than to obtain economies of scale.  
For this, two possibilities could be highlighted according to the complementarities attained 
through diversifying activities or geographical areas. In the first case, scope economies are 
generally obtained through a merger or an acquisition between either commercial banks and 
investment banks, or banking and insurance, as illustrated by a few recent transactions in 
Europe: Allianz-Dresdner in Germany, BNP-Paribas and CDC-Caisses d'Epargne in France or 
San Paolo-IMI in Italy. Similarly, the acquisition of Bankers Trust by Deutsche Bank was 
completed mainly to penetrate the American market for investment banking.
21 In the second 
case, the principle of geographical complementarities has increased the interest on the part of 
Crédit Agricole to acquire Crédit Lyonnais in France. The first is firmly anchored in the 
provinces and in rural areas, whereas the second has a strong presence in the Ile-de-France 
(urban area of Paris) and other large French cities.  
In sum, efficiency gains are obtained by input and output adjustments in order to reduce costs, 
increase revenues and/or reduce risks so as to increase the value added. Restructuring operations 
can also allow efficiency gains through the reorganisation of teams (managers and employees) 
and/or the generalisation of ‘best practices’, known as ‘X-efficiency’.
22 Lately, beyond greater 
economies of scale and scope, efficiency can also be improved by a greater diversification of 
risks (functional and/or geographical).
 23 
In practice, efficiency gains do not appear to be the only explanation for the recent M&A wave 
in banking.
24 Moreover, gains obtained through increased market power seem to be a strong 
incentive to merge, but the relationship between market concentration and performance has only 
been verified partially.
25 There is thus a need to seek other explanations for the current 
                                                 
21 One might also mention in this context UBS and PaineWebber or Crédit Suisse Group and DLJ in 
2000, and Dresdner Bank and Wasserstein Perella in 2001.  
22 Leibenstein (1966). 
23 According to Méon & Weill (2001), a comparison of the annual growth rate of real GDP suggests that 
the economic cycles of many European countries are not perfectly correlated. Consequently, geographical 
diversification could enable European banks to significantly reduce their risks. 
24 For more details, see Chapter 4. 
25 Rhoades (1998). BANKING CONSOLIDATION IN THE EU | 19 
phenomenon.
26 Studies carried out in the United States and in Europe tend to confirm that three 
other factors are likely to play an important role: ‘managerial hubris’, mimicry effect and/or 
defensive reaction.  
2.1.3  The role of managers, mimicry effect and defensive reaction  
When control and ownership are separated within the firm,
27 managers can pursue other 
objectives than maximising shareholder value or increasing profit. Instead of enhancing 
shareholders’ wealth, a manager might prefer to serve his own interests. Therefore, it is possible 
that a merger or an acquisition is mainly dictated by the power, prestige and/or higher 
remuneration that are related to the management of a larger firm. In that case, it is the desire for 
power
28 that is expressed, and not the direct interest of the shareholders. This situation is more 
likely to arise where shareholding is dispersed and passive.  
M&A operations can also be triggered by mimicry effect following the consolidation process 
initiated by competitors in the marketplace.
29 Indeed, within a relatively concentrated sector, the 
actions of the major ‘player(s)’ might have an immediate impact on the behaviour of others, 
inducing in turn a homogeneous behaviour. As Keynes said: “Universal wisdom teaches that it 
is better for one’s reputation to fail with the conventions than to succeed against them”.  
During the last two decades, indeed, the development strategies in the banking industry were 
very often induced by common strategic standards, which have led to a rather homogeneous 
behaviour. As shown in the 1980s, the commercial strategies of banking institutions were 
marked by a race to achieve a larger size. Similarly, in the 1990s, enhancing the profitability of 
shareholders’ equity became the new development standard. Today, value creation represents 
the major strategic issue in modern banking management circles.  
Moreover, the acceleration of M&A operations could also result from a defensive reaction on 
the part of a few actors against competitors’ initiatives. Indeed, as the wave of mergers spreads, 
banking institutions that have remained outside the process are likely to become themselves a 
potential target in a hostile takeover transaction. To protect themselves from possible predators, 
managers can pursue an active acquisition policy in order to maintain or preserve their position.  
Numerous M&As carried out recently in fact seem to have been dictated by the desire to modify 
the existing equilibrium and to be proactive to others’ actions. Sometimes disguised as a 
hypothetical value creation move, a number of these operations are simply the reflection of the 
single market impetus, where mergers have simply become the objective rather than the result 
of careful strategic thinking. Most European banking institutions, reacting to the increased 
contestability of their national banking market, have sought to strengthen their national position, 
in order to improve their profitability and to protect their position from new competitive 
entrants.  
Therefore, it seems more likely that the explanation of the recent banking consolidation process 
must be sought in the new rules of corporate governance. Committed to ensuring the growth of 
their companies while maintaining their competitiveness and forced to provide equity capital to 
which pressing remuneration requirements are attached, bank managers have pursued external 
growth through M&As as a strategic means to expand their activities.  
                                                 
26 Deutsche Bank (2001a). 
27 ‘Agency relation’ of Jensen & Meckling (1976). 
28 ‘Managerial’ theory (Berle & Means, 1932; Williamson, 1964). 
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2.2 Classification
30 of the industrial strategies pursued by the European 
banking sector through M&A operations 
In order to identify the type of merger or acquisition according to its ex ante motives, we use 
both geographical (regional, domestic and cross-border – both EU and international) and 
activity (to distinguish between within-sectors or businesses and cross-sectors or businesses) 
criteria.  
We are able to define the main characteristics of a typology of the underlying ex ante industrial 
strategies through M&A operations observed in recent years in the European banking sector. 
These strategies will have different economic effects, depending on the motives behind the 
transaction. We suppose that the majority of M&As in the European banking sector were at least 
dictated by one of these strategies. Some examples are given at the end of the table (see Table 
7). 
                                                 
30 The analysis and results are extracted from a chapter in the draft thesis of Ayadi (2004). This typology 
was validated by the use of the ACP method (factorial analysis of principal components) on a sample of 
250 European banks involved in a completed merger or acquisition over the period 1994-2000. This 
statistical analysis permits the creation of homogeneous subgroups of mergers and acquisitions according 
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Table 7. Main characteristics of a typology of industrial strategies through M&As in EU banking  
  
  National M&As  Cross-border M&As 
National consolidation   Pan-European diversification   International diversification  Geographical 
dimension  National M&As  Pan-European M&As  International M&As 
  National consolidation   National 
diversification  
Cross-border diversification 
Activity segment 
or business 
 
Same activity, 
same business 
 
Same activity, 
different 
businesses 
 
Different activities 
 
Same activity, same 
business 
 
Same activity, 
different 
businesses 
Same activity Different 
activities 
  Types of  industrial strategy  
Industrial 
strategies  
 
National 
consolidation 
(business) 
 
National 
diversification 
(business) 
 
National and 
conglomerate 
diversification  
 
Business consolidation 
and cross-border 
diversification  
 
Business 
diversification and 
cross-border 
diversification  
Activity 
consolidation 
and 
international 
diversification 
Conglomerate 
and 
international  
diversification 
  Motivations related to the strategies adopted 
Motivations 
resulting from 
M&A 
operations  
 
Increase of the 
market power in a 
given market  
Reduced risk due 
to the 
diversification of 
activities (of the 
income), and the 
extension of the 
activity into 
another 
geographical area  
 
Scope economies 
through diversification 
of the held portfolio 
 
Attaining an important 
size in a cross-border 
market  
 
Diversification of 
risks and incomes  
 
Attaining a 
larger size in 
a cross-border 
market 
Scope 
economies 
and 
diversification 
of risks  
  Possible economic effects 
Economic 
effects resulting 
from the new 
strategy  
 
Cost savings due 
to the increase of 
the volume of the 
production, 
rationalisation of 
the infrastructure 
and of the 
administrative 
office  
 
Increased 
revenues due to 
larger size and the 
diversification of 
activities  
 
Increase in revenues 
due to diversification 
of the portfolio. 
Possibilities of 
rationalisation in the 
administrative office 
that would involve 
economies of scale 
(costs savings)  
 
Developing in new 
markets in other 
segments of customers 
 
Increased 
revenues due to 
complementarity 
in businesses  
Increased 
revenues due 
to 
international 
development 
Increased 
revenues to 
complete 
diversification
Other Effects 
 
Reduction of 
banking over 
capacity (M&A of 
small banking 
institutions)  
 
Cost savings due 
to product 
diversification  
 
Optimal use of the 
infrastructures due to 
complementary 
activities  
    
Examples  
Crédit Agricole-
Crédit Lyonnais 
(France) 
 
Bank of Scotland-
Halifax 
(UK) 
 
Allianz-Dresdner 
(Germany) 
 
HVB-Bank Austria 
(Germany/Austria) 
SCH-AKB 
(Spain / Germany) 
ABN Amro-
Sudameris 
(NL / Brazil)
Deutsche 
Bank- 
Banker Trust 
(Germany / 
USA) 
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Chapter 3 
An Attempt to Assess Banking Consolidation in the EU 
Several studies have tried to assess the effects of the banking consolidation wave that occurred 
in the 1990s. The majority have concentrated on the impact on shareholder value and efficiency 
on the one hand, and on the consequences for customers – households and SMEs – on the other. 
Empirical studies have been more useful to policy-makers in terms of their findings related to 
financial stability and competition, but none to date has established a clear and direct 
relationship. To assess banking consolidation effects in the EU, it is also crucial to carry out a 
structural analysis given the strong particularities of European banking markets. 
3.1  What economic effectiveness? 
Concerning the impact of M&As on shareholder value and efficiency, the results were mixed. 
Several academic studies have been carried out mainly in the United States, using a wide range 
of methodologies, from the most basic (event studies or balance-sheet-based indicators) to the 
most sophisticated (efficiency frontier
31), but their findings have not been conclusive. 
The studies on the impact of mergers on consumer welfare focused primarily on the possible 
market power effect without verifying that under certain conditions, mergers might improve the 
customers’ surplus.  
3.1.1  Value creation: Still not very conclusive results…  
It is very difficult to make a final and exhaustive assessment of the effects of European banking 
M&As on performance for several reasons. Firstly, this phenomenon is still far too new in 
Europe to have produced sufficient empirical results worthy of serious academic study. As a 
result, the majority of the studies have mainly focused on the US, but the lessons cannot 
automatically be applied to the European environment since the regulation and structure of 
European banking markets are quite different.
32  
Moreover, it is quite difficult to come up with general rules to assess M&As because each one 
depends on the particular context in which it was carried out (such as the flexibility of the 
labour market, the applicable takeover regulations including the broader spectrum of anti-take-
over mechanisms,
33 the liquidity of the capital market, …), the different sizes of the institutions 
involved, the corporate structure (private, hybrid or public) and especially the intrinsic 
characteristics of the operation (friendly or hostile, cash or equity financed …). 
3.1.1.1  Banking M&As and value creation 
A large number of event studies have been carried out to assess the effects of M&As on stock 
market values. They all tend to evaluate the change in total market value of the acquiring 
company plus target institutions – adjusted for changes in overall stock market values – 
associated with an M&A announcement. This embodies the present value of expected future 
changes in terms of efficiency and market power. Although these effects cannot be 
disentangled, the change in market value may be viewed as an understatement of the expected 
                                                 
31 For more details about efficiency frontier methodologies, see the first chapter of Pujals’ thesis (2004). 
32 Dietsch & Oung (2001).  
33 The compromise reached by the Council to accelerate the adoption of the takeover directive in 
November 2003 has given a maximum flexibility to member states to implement its provisions. This will 
certainly create different applications from one country to another one.  BANKING CONSOLIDATION IN THE EU | 23 
efficiency improvement, since it is unlikely that an M&A would reduce the market power of the 
participants. 
In the US, the empirical results were mixed.
34 On average, the combined shareholder value (i.e. 
the bidder and the target) is not affected by the announcement of the deal since the bidder 
suffers a loss that offsets the gains of the target.
35 Therefore, an M&A only implies a transfer of 
wealth from the shareholders of the bidder to those of the target. Compared to the 1980s, 
however, the evidence from the 1990s was more favourable where average abnormal returns 
have been higher for both bidders and targets.
36  
One problem with event studies is that the announcement of a deal mixes information 
concerning the proposed merger with information on its financing. Because investors consider 
the announcement of a stock issuance as ‘bad news’, the negative returns to the bidding bank 
could reflect the fact that mergers tend to be financed with stocks. Consistent with this notion, 
one study finds that returns to bidders are significantly higher when mergers are financed with 
cash relative to mergers financed with new equity.
37  
Other studies have examined the stock market reaction to different types of deals. Houston & 
Ryngaert (1994) found that the combined gains tend to be greater when the bidding firm is 
unusually profitable or when there is significant overlap between institutions. The first result is 
consistent with a market for corporate control favouring competent over incompetent managers. 
The second result is consistent with the market power hypothesis, according to which a higher 
market share leads to higher profits. DeLong (2001) found that mergers that concentrate banks 
geographically or in product create value while those that diversify them don’t create value.  
On the other hand, Zhang (1995) found results consistent with the diversification hypothesis, 
according to which geographical diversification leads to a lower variability of income; and that 
out-of-market transactions create value for shareholders. Higher market concentration is likely 
to lead to an increase in prices for retail financial services, leading in turn to an increase in 
profits. It is also true, however, that firms operating in more concentrated markets are generally 
found to be less efficient.
38 This effect might offset the gains from an increase in market power 
and thus leave unchanged the market value of the bank.  
In Europe, the few studies carried out to assess the value creation through M&As in banking 
found positive abnormal combined returns. In the study conducted by Van Beek & Rad (1997), 
                                                 
34 Rhoades (1994) and Pilloff & Santomero (1997) provide a survey of event studies. Some studies of US 
banking M&As found increases in the combined value around the time of the M&As’ announcement 
(Cornett & Tehranian, 1992 and Zhang, 1995); others found no improvement in combined value (Hannan 
& Wolken, 1989; Houston & Ryngaert, 1994; Pilloff, 1996 and Kwan & Eisenbeis, 1999); while still 
others found that the measured effects depended upon the characteristics of the M&A (Houston & 
Ryngaert, 1997). A study of domestic and cross-border M&A involving US banks found more value 
created by the cross-border M&A (DeLong, 1999).  
35 Stock market event studies of bank mergers have shown that merger announcements typically result in 
a fall in the equity value of the acquiring firm and no significant gain in the combined value of the two 
firms together. This result suggests that the market believes that, on average, there are unlikely to be 
substantial gains realised from bank mergers. And since the value of the acquiring firm typically falls, the 
market also believes that acquiring firms tend to overpay for acquisitions in anticipation of merger 
benefits that are not likely to be realised. This is a common finding and is not limited to bank mergers, 
which points in the direction of a more general problem associated with the corporate governance of 
M&As. 
36 Houston et al. (2001). 
37 Houston & Ryngaert (1997). 
38 Berger & Hannan (1998). 24 | AYADI & PUJALS 
these returns were not statistically significant. In a more recent study undertaken by Cybo-
Ottone & Murgia (2000), shareholder value gains were positive and significant, mostly driven 
by domestic bank-to-bank deals and diversification of banks into insurance. However, these 
positive abnormal returns do not necessarily mean that mergers improve efficiency; in fact, one 
possible explanation for the difference between the European and American markets is that 
weaker antitrust enforcement in some European countries allows gains in monopoly power from 
in-market mergers.  
Globally, it seems that the large majority of M&As carried out recently, in Europe or in the 
United States, are far from having proved their effectiveness in terms of value creation in the 
short run.
39 
3.1.1.2  Banking M&As and Efficiency 
Efficiency may be improved following a merger or an acquisition, if the acquiring institution is 
more efficient ex ante and brings the efficiency of the target up to its own level by spreading its 
superior managerial expertise, policies and procedures.
40 Simulation evidence suggests that 
large efficiency gains are possible if the best practices of the acquirers reform the practices of 
inefficient targets.
41  
The M&A event itself may also improve efficiency by awakening management to the need for 
improvement or to implement substantial restructuring. Alternatively, efficiency may worsen 
because of the costs of consummating the M&A (legal expenses, consultancy fees, severance 
pay…) or disruptions from downsizing, difficulties in integrating corporate cultures... Efficiency 
may also decline because of organisational diseconomies in operating or monitoring a more 
complex institution. 
The studies carried out on a sample of US banks showed, on average, very little or no cost 
efficiency improvement from M&As in the 1980s.
42 However, more recent studies using data 
from the 1990s were mixed. On the one hand, some found that mergers produce no 
improvement in banks’ cost efficiency,
43 especially when the deals involve very large banks.
44 
This may be due to the organisational diseconomies of operating larger firms in relation to 
                                                 
39 According to AT Kearney (1999): “58% of the M&As announced and completed are unfortunately a 
failure. Indeed, the stock market value of the merged entity two years after the operation is lower than the 
sum of both separated partners three months before”. Similarly, Arthur D. Little's study (1999) has shown 
that: “Two years following the announcement of the operation, the stock market performance of 60% of 
the companies having merged has been lower than the average of their sector”. Finally, according to a 
KPMG survey (2001): “30% of the M&As have increased the shareholders’ value, 39% haven’t brought 
any considerable change and almost 31% have destroyed value”. In other words, 70% of mergers were 
unsuccessful in producing any business benefit as regards shareholder value.  
40 Generally, the acquiring bank in a merger is more cost efficient and more profitable than the institution 
being acquired. As noted in a recent survey (Berger et al., 1999), this holds for the US (Berger & 
Humphrey, 1992; Pilloff & Santomero, 1997; Peristiani, 1997; Cummins et al., 1999 and Fried et al., 
1999) as well as for Europe (Vander Vennet, 1996 and Focarelli et al., 2002). The expectation is that the 
more efficient and profitable acquiring bank will restructure the target institution and implement policies 
and procedures to improve its performance.  
41 Shaffer (1993). 
42 Berger & Humphrey (1992), Srinivasan (1992) and Pilloff (1996). 
43 Peristiani (1997), Berger (1998) and Rhoades (1998). 
44 Akhavein et al. (1997) and Berger (2000). BANKING CONSOLIDATION IN THE EU | 25 
disruptions from the M&A process, which may offset most potential efficiency gains. And on 
the other hand, other studies found cost reductions also for very large US banks.
45 
The evidence for European banks is broadly consistent with these results. Domestic mergers 
among banks of equal size seem to improve cost efficiency, but these results do not hold for all 
countries and all banks.
46 More recent studies on Italian banks
47 or UK building societies
48 
found significant cost efficiency gains following an M&A. Moreover, simulation evidence 
suggests that a cross-border acquisition may be associated with a reduction in the costs of the 
target, while little effect is found for domestic M&As.
49 The difficulties in improving cost 
efficiency may be related to the obstacles often encountered, especially in continental Europe, in 
reducing a bank’s labour force. In fact, personnel reduction, one of the main sources of savings, 
is hardly an option in countries with rigid labour markets.
50 
Studies on profit efficiency of US banks more often found gains from M&As. The fact that cost 
efficiency is, on average, little improved as a result of a bank merger, does not necessarily mean 
that there is no improvement in profits. Profit efficiency incorporates both cost as well as 
revenue efficiency. Revenue efficiency can be improved by simply raising prices as market 
power
51 is expanded through the merger process itself. Or revenues may rise because the 
merged institution restructures its assets mix.  
Two studies in particular have attempted to determine the profit effects of mergers. Akhavein et 
al. (1997) found little change in cost efficiency but an improvement in profit efficiency of large 
US banks from 1980-90 following M&As, especially when both merger participants were 
relatively inefficient prior to the merger.
52 Also, after merging, banks tended to shift their 
portfolios to take on more loans and fewer securities. They attribute gains in profit efficiency to 
the benefits of risk diversification: larger banks have more diversified loan portfolios and lower 
equity-asset ratios. But their measure of profit efficiency does not account for changes in risk 
likely to result from such a portfolio switch. Berger (1998) found similar results in a study that 
includes all US bank mergers, both large and small, from 1990 to 1995.  
In Europe, Vander Vennet (1996) found that domestic mergers of equals in European countries 
have a positive impact on profitability, mainly driven by improvements in operational 
efficiency. Focarelli et al. (2002) found that Italian deals that consist of the purchase of a 
majority (but not all) of the voting shares of the target appear to result in significant 
improvements, mainly due to a decrease in bad loans. For full mergers, they observe that Italian 
                                                 
45 Houston et al. (2001). 
46 Vander Vennet (1996). 
47 Resti (1998). 
48 Haynes & Thompson (1999). 
49 Altunbas et al. (1997). 
50 Focarelli et al. (2002). 
51 Many studies of market structure, price conduct and profit performance have found that higher bank 
concentration is significantly associated with lower prices for deposits, but the relationship between 
higher concentration and higher profits is often mixed, being sometimes significant and sometimes not. A 
recent study has found that cost efficiency tends to be lower in markets where concentration is higher 
(Berger & Hannan, 1998). Indeed, higher concentration (market power) may lead to higher prices and 
revenues but, with less competition, the incentive to reduce costs to their minimum levels is blunted. So, 
the higher revenues are largely absorbed in higher costs rather than contributing fully to expanded profits. 
From this perspective, market concentration seems to have a greater negative effect on cost efficiency 
than it does on prices.  
52 Other relevant studies include Berger (1993 and 1996), Berger & Mester (1997), Clark & Siems (1997), 
Cummins et al. (1999) and Berger (2000). 26 | AYADI & PUJALS 
banks aim to change their business focus towards providing financial services and thus increase 
their non-interest income, rather than to obtain efficiency gains. After the merger, they observe 
an increase in profitability in the long run that is also related to a more efficient use of capital.  
3.1.1.3  What are the reasons of failure and the drivers of success of M&As?  
According to a KPMG survey (2001), several factors could explain the incapacity of banking 
institutions to fully benefit from the pre-assumed synergies to enhance shareholder value 
through M&A operations:  
•  poor strategic rationale or a poor understanding of the strategic levers of the whole 
transaction process 
•  overpayment of target firm 
•  overestimation of the potential synergies 
•  inadequate strategy or planning 
•  too slow an integration process 
•  a void in executive leadership and strategic communication 
•  high integration costs of the information systems and/or risk management 
•  cultural mismatch 
•  bureaucratic complexities 
•  loss of customers 
•  team defection, particularly in investment banking, where the main know-how resides in 
human capital.  
In this context, the same survey identified the main drivers of success of M&A transactions, 
along the whole process from strategic planning to the measurement of the outcome:  
1)  The entire process should be robust, thoughtful and well-managed. Indeed, mergers should 
not only mean growing in scale. Rather, success requires gaining scale in specific activities 
or sources of revenues and then using them to become more competitive overall. 
2)  As a merger or an acquisition is considered as a strategic deployment, it is crucial to 
redefine the business model by re-organising and prioritising what should be carried out, 
and take decisions about how and by whom the activities should be handled. 
3)  A strategic rationale for a merger or an acquisition allows a rigorous assessment of the 
target company and the deal, understanding the drivers of value and the price range that will 
enable the purchaser to create value. 
Moreover, it appears that banks that have had prior experience with mergers are more successful 
at lowering costs and creating shareholder value.
53 That is, it is likely that a ‘learning curve’ is 
involved in making the merger a success. This finding is supported by consultancy analysis that 
concluded that firms with prior merger experience were the ones that added the most equity 
value (relative to peers) after a merger.  
According to these findings, it is essential to complement the economic and financial 
assessment of a merger or an acquisition by a strategic dimension. This not only gives a new 
horizon to any growth operation, but also enables a more thoughtful and robust process.  
3.1.1.4 Conclusions   
The empirical evidence suggests that banking M&As do not significantly improve cost and 
profit efficiency and, on average, do not generate significant shareholder value. These results 
seem to contradict the motivations cited by practitioners for consolidation strategies, which are 
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largely related to economies of scale and scope and to improvements in management quality. 
However, there are a few possible explanations for the divergence between the econometric 
evidence and bankers’ beliefs:
54 
1)  The lack of clear-cut results on the effects of M&A could reflect difficulties in measuring 
efficiency improvements. 
2)  Studies restricted to short post-merger periods might fail to detect value gains that can only 
emerge slowly, after some years. For example, studies restricted to a short post-merger 
period might fail to account for the efficiency gains of consolidation.
55 Long lags in the 
improvement of performance may reflect difficulties in refocusing lending policies, 
rationalising branches, integrating data processing systems and operations, and training the 
personnel of the target to market the new owner’s products.
56 Moreover, culture clashes 
may be especially harmful in banking,
57 as the relationship with customers depends heavily 
on soft information, which is more difficult to transfer than such objective information as 
balance sheet data. The resignation of key executives or the emergence of morale problems 
due to reassignments or employee turnover may cause a loss of information, especially 
when the new management has little time to develop customer information. 
3)  Deals done in the past might have suffered from stricter regulation that prevented firms 
involved in an M&A from reaping all the benefits of the deal. For example, the limitations 
imposed by the Glass-Steagall Act on the range of US banks’ financial activities could have 
impeded the realisation of gains from cross-selling. Similarly, restrictions on bank 
branching or on geographical expansion could have hampered the exploitation of scale 
economies. This view suggests that the deregulation of banking underway in all major 
countries (e.g. the Riegle-Neal Act or the Gramm-Leach-Billey Act in the US) might 
increase the potential for scale and scope economies. The evidence available for the 1990s 
in the US is consistent with this view. 
4)  The fact that mergers often occur in waves makes it hard to separate the effect of a single 
deal from transformations experienced by the industry as a whole.  
Another possibility is that – in the presence of agency problems between managers and 
shareholders – M&As could be mainly driven by non-value maximising motives (such as 
‘managerial hubris’). Non-value maximising motivations for M&As have been analysed in 
recent papers that examine the relationship between executive compensation and M&A activity. 
According to these studies, the motivations of M&As could be traced back to managers’ desire 
to increase their compensation (CEOs of larger institutions earn higher compensation).  
                                                 
54 Amel et al. (2002). 
55 In an analysis of the effects of M&A in the market for bank deposits, Focarelli & Panetta (2002) find 
that in the short run the costs of restructuring the consolidated bank cancel out the gains, which cannot 
fully emerge for years. In the long run, however, the efficiency gains dominate over the market power 
effect, leading to more favourable prices for consumers.   
56 Berger et al. (1998) and Calomiris & Karceski (1998) mention three years as the gestation period 
needed to restructure the merged bank. This was consistent with the results of the interviews conducted 
by the Federal Reserve Board staff with officials of banks involved in mergers (Rhoades, 1998). In a 
study of US bank mergers, Houston et al. (2001) find that cost savings and revenue gains take two to four 
years. 
57 Practitioners indicate that “differences in corporate cultures” is one of the main obstacles to the 
completion of bank mergers in all the major industrial countries (see BIS, 2001). 28 | AYADI & PUJALS 
There is some evidence that CEOs with higher levels of stock-based compensation relative to 
cash-based compensation are less inclined to lead their institutions to make acquisitions.
58 
Moreover, managers without a large stake in their banks are more likely to get involved in non-
value maximising mergers.
59 Thus, managerial hubris may be an important reason for the lack 
of conclusive evidence on the benefits of M&As among banks during the past decades.
60 
3.1.2  Towards an improvement of the collective welfare?  
Based on the hypothesis of the increase of market power, it appears that the creation of mega-
banks, by altering the effective competition, does not allow for any immediate profit for 
consumers because of dominant position abuses
61 and consumers’ surplus capture. The effects 
of an M&A on the collective welfare, however – mainly via prices – will depend on numerous 
factors. 
Firstly, it is necessary to distinguish between national and cross-border M&A operations. Prior 
studies of the pricing effects of M&As
62 found that national consolidation, by strengthening the 
degree of concentration, could generate substantial market power, which is likely to be harmful 
for households and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).  
However, the few existing studies on European bank mergers seem to conclude that there are 
often significant efficiency gains which result in better conditions for consumers. Huizinga et al. 
(2001) analysed 52 major mergers between European banks between 1994 and 1998, which 
were found to be largely socially beneficial. Some other studies found strong evidence of 
positive effects of M&As at a country level, leading to more favourable prices for consumers.
63  
Conversely, cross-border M&A operations would intensify competition in the domestic market 
but do not change the banks’ local market shares. Consequently, the national authorities, after 
having encouraged the constitution of ‘national champions’, should promote cross-border and 
particularly pan-European operations.  
Secondly, it is also essential to distinguish M&A operations according to the ‘means’ used – 
market power or efficiency gains – to create shareholder value. If the value creation occurs 
primarily through increased market power, the transaction would only constitute a simple profit 
redistribution in favour of shareholders, but to the detriment of the customers, employees and 
public authorities, without a net gain in terms of collective welfare. In this case, the transaction 
involves a simple redistribution between the various stakeholders of the banking institution, 
                                                 
58 See Bliss & Rosen (2001). Similar results on the existence of agency problems in the banking industry 
can be found in Gorton & Rosen (1995) and Ryan (1999).   
59 Palia (1993). 
60 Pilloff & Santomero (1997). 
61  The possibility of a cartel in banking is not purely theoretical and can be prejudicial for effective 
competition, as shown by the “Cruickshank” report (2000) in the UK and in the Canoy & Onderstal 
(2003) in the Netherlands. 
62 Berger et al. (1999). 
63 A number of further studies exist at the country level. For example, Focarelli & Panetta (2002), by 
distinguishing between short-run and long-run effects of M&As, have found strong evidence that these 
effects are different. Precisely, they showed that national mergers leading to deposit rate changes are 
unfavourable to consumers in the short-run, but in the long run, if banks succeed in reducing costs, 
efficiency gains from mergers prevail over the market power effects, so that consumers benefit. Hence, 
the adverse price changes generated through consolidation are by all means temporary. Thus, studies 
restricted to a short post-merger period might fail to register the efficiency gains and as a consequence 
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which does not create wealth for the economy because the increase of banking profits is much 
lower than the welfare loss suffered by the other economic agents.  
On the other hand, value creation obtained through the improvement of efficiency (through scale 
and/or scope economies, risk diversification...), will benefit not only the shareholders, but also 
the customers (price drop and/or improvement in the quality of the services) and the public 
authorities (higher solvency of credit institutions). For the employees, the results remain 
unclear. The overall impact of the consolidation process remains ambiguous, according to 
whether market power or efficiency effects would prevail. 
Many authors have also focused their analysis on banking exclusion and unequal treatment. In 
this context, Immergluck (2000) explained that the concentration of financial power between a 
small number of banks – the consequence of the consolidation process – may contradict the 
principle of universal banking service, whose objective is to ensure equal access to financial 
products for all people and all communities.  
Over the past few years, these developments have encouraged the emergence of specialised 
financial institutions, taking the form of ‘interdependent finance associations’ aiming to reduce 
the harmful effects of banking exclusion on the poorest households, even if the cost of access to 
these financial services is higher than in traditional banking. Consequently, the establishment of 
a universal banking service – offering minimum banking services
64 for all the European citizens 
regardless of their social situation – could be addressed. This could notably permit competitive 
banking activities that achieve a general interest mission including the social cohesion pillar.  
3.1.3  Impact on the quality of banking services: The major role of the new 
technologies  
From a functional standpoint, banking consolidation might improve the quality of banking 
service under certain conditions, which might improve the customers’ surplus. According to the 
existing literature, the quality of banking service is measured by geographical availability,
65 
financial access and the technology integrated in the service.  
Banking consolidation is likely to affect access to banking services through branch 
rationalisation and/or price increases, and also their quality through the reduction of services 
and/or the loss of customer relationships. In this respect, retail activities appear to be 
particularly exposed. Indeed, recent empirical studies
66 show that the quality of banking services 
would be inversely correlated to the size of the institutions restructured. In other words, a 
merger between large credit institutions would tend to reduce the quality of banking services 
offered to retail customers, while operations between small- or medium-sized banks might 
increase it.  
If these results are verified in some observed restructuring operations in the US or in Europe, 
they should be carefully manipulated. Indeed, the study carried out by Morgan Stanley Dean 
Witter (2000) shows that on the contrary, the incorporation of new information technology, such 
as the internet, would reduce the price of banking service and strengthen its geographical 
availability through new distribution channels (e.g. e-banking, call centres, internet services...), 
leading to the improvement of consumers’ surplus.  
The customer would benefit from an improvement in the quality of the banking service for two 
reasons. Firstly, the creation of new distribution channels supplementing the service offered by 
                                                 
64 Called ‘service bancaire de base’ in France. 
65 Such as the availability of banking services from the branches. 
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the branches would improve the financial services access and the overall geographical 
availability. Secondly, by integrating new technologies, banking institutions would provide 
services at higher value-added.  
However, this situation could encounter some resistance from the customers, related to the 
acceptance of new distribution channels. Moreover, access to these new distribution channels 
requires a substantial financial cost, such as internet access or computer tools, that could be the 
source of socio-economic discrimination towards some less-favoured population categories.  
3.2  Banking consolidation and growth: An ambiguous relationship 
For the time being, there are very few analytical models or empirical studies illustrating the 
impact of banking consolidation on the long-term growth path. Nevertheless, it appears that the 
possible transmission channels are numerous.
67 It is particularly important to focus on the 
stability of the banking sector, due to the major role it plays in financing the economy. Indeed, 
the existence of a sound and safe banking sector depends on the effectiveness of the monetary 
policy. Currently, the case of Japan illustrates the extent to which this structural element can 
have a negative influence on the growth path of the economy.  
One could think that M&As are likely to strengthen the soundness and the financial stability of 
the sector for three reasons. Firstly, the persistent threat of a possible repurchase by a competitor 
urges banking institutions to constantly attempt to be more competitive. Moreover, M&As 
constitute a kind of natural selection mechanism to permit the increase of the long-term 
efficiency in the sector, through  the rationalisation of the banking supply structure. 
Consequently, only the ‘best’ banking institutions will remain in the long term, with the least 
efficient being repurchased by the most efficient ones. Finally, banking consolidation can also 
contribute effectively to the elimination of over-capacity and thus strengthen the profitability, 
competitiveness and therefore the soundness of banking sectors.  
The relationship between banking consolidation and stability, however, is not as simple and 
uniform as it might appear at first sight. In a highly competitive environment, where there is a 
constant battle to keep the margins and profitability levels high, consolidation could constitute a 
response to counter the fragility of the system resulting from competitive pressures. 
Nevertheless, it might also be perceived as a new source of fragility.  
More precisely, the current wave of banking consolidation, while leading to the creation of 
mega-banks, could involve an extension of the application of the ‘too big to fail’ rule
68 (TBTF), 
which is likely to exacerbate the consequences of the ‘moral hazard’ phenomenon.
69 Beyond a 
certain size, which varies from one country to another, a banking institution cannot declare 
bankruptcy without generating, by a contagion effect, an enlarged systemic risk,
70 creating 
instability for the whole banking sector. Consequently, the supervisory authorities are forced to 
                                                 
67 De Boissieu (2001). 
68 This rule, which is de facto applied everywhere in the world, has forced the supervisory authorities to 
act as a ‘lender of last resort’, in order to contain any possible systemic-risk crisis as a result of the failure 
of one or more banking institutions (in particular the large ones).  
69 Deutsche Bank (2001b). 
70 Within the banking system, a systemic risk appears when the failure of an important banking 
institution, or even of several institutions, can contagiously cause the bankruptcy of other institutions and 
induce situations of serious ruptures within the banking and financial system. The mechanisms of 
contagion can be in particular psychological (panic behaviour of the participants and/or of the depositors) 
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prevent such a scenario by rescuing large and insolvent banks under the rule of ‘lender of last 
resort’.  
This supervisory behaviour not only causes competitive distortions between large and small-
sized banking institutions, but it might also produce a moral hazard effect. Indeed, benefiting 
from a public guarantee de facto, these mega-banks would feel less compunction to monitor the 
quality of their assets, and therefore could be exposed to riskier and more volatile activities, 
thought to be supported over time by competent authorities in the event of serious difficulties. In 
order to counter this moral hazard problem, and therefore to protect their role as ‘lender of last 
resort’, the central banks have a) cultivated the principle of ‘constructive ambiguity’, which 
maintains the uncertainty in their policy and b) implemented two lines of defence: the guarantee 
mechanisms (of a curative nature) and supervision (of a preventive nature). The latter consists 
of two complementary aspects: prudential rules and monitoring. Intervention as ‘lender of last 
resort’ is reserved only for the most extreme cases.  
In sum, the banking consolidation process in Europe could generate more efficient banks and a 
healthier banking system that is less exposed to banking failures. Conversely, it could be a 
source of greater instability/vulnerability,
71 leading to a chain of bankruptcies and 
unprecedented financial crises.
72 
Finally, the observation of the recent M&A wave leads to strong contradictions. On one hand, 
the marketplace has been hit hard by this phenomenon which, since the beginning of the 1990s, 
has been progressively more pronounced. On the other hand, the rare attempts to assess the real 
effects of the consolidation process in terms of economic (micro and macro) effectiveness have 
revealed frequent failures and ambiguous results based on the various performance indicators. 
Consequently, banking institutions should base their acquisition strategies on a genuine 
framework mainly oriented to the interests of shareholders, stakeholders and consumers. 
3.3  What impact on market structure? 
Amongst others, the latest M&A wave contributed substantially to changing the market 
structure in European banking. These changes might have important effects on the market 
concentration and capacity utilisation (branches and employment).  
3.3.1  Impact on concentration and contestability  
The consolidation wave of the 1990s resulted in an overall increase in concentration levels in 
almost all EU banking markets. Nevertheless, significant differences continue to exist across 
countries. In some countries, this increase has reached such proportions that concern has been 
voiced whether it would not lead to an abuse of market position. In others, particularly in 
countries where small- and medium-sized banks still prevail in the savings or co-operative 
sector, M&A activity is expected to continue for years to come.  
It is important to interpret these concentration indicators with caution. Indeed, principal 
drawbacks of simple concentration ratios are that they tend to be very general and static. They 
do not take into account the non-financial institutions, for example. Also, because the data set 
consists of consolidated figures, they do not distinguish between domestic and foreign 
operations. For these reasons, concentration index values for small countries with large 
international banks are overstated.  
                                                 
71 Mishkin (1998) and Lambert et al. (1997).  
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In addition, the question arises: what reference market (or relevant market) should be used to 
assess the degree of concentration and competition? The reference market differs depending on 
the type of services considered (retail or wholesale activities) and also on the geographical 
dimension. For retail banking, the local dimension of a market is relevant while the international 
dimension is relevant for investment banking. Ideally, an evaluation of the competitive 
conditions and the degree of concentration in the banking industry should begin with a rigorous 
definition of the market under consideration.  
In this respect, it is important to address the issue of the degree of contestability of the market to 
complement the competitive analysis. Indeed, De Bandt (2000) considered that the 
contestability of retail banking markets is linked to the concentration of the sector because of 
the sunk costs associated with the bank-client relationship (based on reputation and the role of 
brand names) and asymmetric information. In addition, the contestability of retail banking has 
certainly increased as a result of technological change and the major role played by the 
introduction of the euro.  
More applied research undertaken in the area
73 has not been conclusive as regards finding a 
significant relationship between concentration and profits in banking or identifying the true 
geographical market associated with a given measure of concentration. To verify this statement, 
Figure 14 below shows no sign of any systematic or significant correlation (R
2 = 0.1668) 
between levels of concentration measured by CR5 and profitability measured by the ROE in the 
main European countries.  
Figure 14. Concentration and profitability in banking in the main European countries in 2001 
                                                 
73 The literature on the measurement of competition could be divided into two main streams: the 
structural and the non-structural approach. The first approach includes the Structure-Conduct-
Performance (SCP) paradigm and the efficiency hypothesis. The SCP paradigm investigates whether a 
highly concentrated market causes collusive behaviour among larger banks resulting in higher market 
performance, whereas the efficiency hypothesis tests whether it is the efficiency of larger banks that 
entails better performance. In response to the theoretical and empirical deficiencies of the structural 
models, the non-structural models derived from the New Economic Industrial Organisation (NEIO) have 
been developed, namely the Iwata (1974), Bresnahan (1989) and Panzar & Rosse (1987) models. These 
models have been used to measure the form of competitiveness or the closely related concept of 
contestability. The Panzar and Rosse model, based on reduced form revenue functions, was very much 
used to assess the contestability of the EU banking market (Molyneux et al. (1994), Vesala (1995), Bikker 
& Groeneveld (1998) and Davis & De Bandt (1999).  
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Following Baumol’s 1982 critique that competition depends on the contestability of the market 
(that is, on the absence of sunk costs), the new empirical industrial organisation (NEIO) 
literature has argued in favour of a set of tests based on rigorous microeconomic foundations.  
In particular, the Rosse-Panzar test
74 relies on the fact that an individual bank will respond 
differently to the change in costs, depending on whether the bank enjoys some monopoly power 
or operates instead in a competitive market.
75 Many studies have used the Rosse-Panzar test on 
European banking markets to assess the competition levels. Vesala (1995) found consistently 
positive value of H, which implies monopolistic competition.  
The results of De Bandt & Davis (1999) showed that over the period 1992-96, Germany and 
France tend to show monopolistic competition for large banks and monopoly for small ones, 
whereas in Italy there is evidence of monopolistic competition for small and large banks. A 
more recent study by Bikker & Haaf (2001) confirmed globally a monopolistic competition in 
all the EU countries. However, depending on H value, competition is stronger among large 
banks operating predominantly in international markets, and weaker among smaller banks, 
operating mainly in local markets, while medium-sized banks operate in an intermediate 
position. These results were consistent with the previous findings of Bikker & Groeneveld 
(1998, 2000). However, a possible drawback of this methodology is that these tests are based on 
reduced form equations so that they cannot cope with both the diversity of banking products and 
the integration of financial markets in the EU.  
Finally, to assess concentration at the EU level and its impact on competition, the definition of 
the relevant market segments will certainly be a crucial issue in the years to come.
76 For the 
time being, however, the European supervisory authorities rely on simple concentration 
indicators such as the CR5 and the Herfindahl index (see Box 1). Hence, according to Table 8, 
three observations on concentration levels can be highlighted:  
1.  Concentration has reached relatively high levels in the Scandinavian and Benelux countries 
(around 70%); this might give rise to competition concerns for the national authorities in 
some relevant markets. Consequently, it seems that there is no further scope for domestic 
consolidation. 
2.  Despite the relatively advanced integration process of EU financial markets and the 
introduction of the euro, concentration indicators seems to remain highly dispersed between 
the EU countries, which illustrates the divergence of national banking structures. 
3.  With the exception of Ireland and Luxembourg, concentration levels appear to be higher in 
small countries. Thus, there is a direct relationship between the size of the economy and the 
concentration level derived from the high dependency on the size of the country or the 
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. The market power is measured by the 
extent to which changes in factor prices are reflected in revenues. Under monopoly, an increase in input 
prices will increase marginal costs, reduce equilibrium output and subsequently reduce revenues; hence H 
will be 0 or negative. With perfect competition and when banks are operating at their long-run 
equilibrium, a proportional increase in factor prices induces an equi-proportional change in gross 
revenues, in this case H=1. Under monopolistic competition or where potential entry leads to a 
contestable markets equilibrium, revenues will increase less proportionally than the factor prices because 
the demand for banking products from individual banks is inelastic, here 0<H<1.   
75 See Schaffer (1993, 1994) for the survey.  
76 See De Bandt (2000). 34 | AYADI & PUJALS 
banking market.
77 The speed (or the degree) of consolidation in a given market is then 
inversely proportional to the size of the country. 
Table 8. Concentration indicators
a in European banking (in %) 
  Total assets
b  Total credits  Total deposits 
  1990 1999 1990 1999 1990 1999 
  CR5 HHI CR5 HHI CR5 HHI CR5 HHI CR5 HHI CR5 HHI 
Austria 34.67  0.036  50.39  0.102  33.9  0.032 43.3 0.073  33.12  0.028 39.6 0.054 
Belgium 48  na  77.39  0.155  58.0  na 80.38  0.167  67.00 na  74.7  0.135 
Denmark 76  na  77.00  0.136  82.0  na 79  0.154  82.00  na 79  0.150 
Finland 41  na  74.33  0.191  49.7  na 68.02  0.174  46.08 na  63.4  0.190 
France  42.5 na  42.70  0.051  44.7 na 46.4  0.067  58.70  na 69.2  0.133 
Germany 14  na  18.95  0.014  13.5  na 15.75  0.012  11.57 na  15 0.009 
Greece 83.7  0.25  76.62  0.151  87.2  0.248 74.53 0.129 86.78 0.276  81.7  0.183 
Ireland 44.2  na  40.79  0.048  42.9  na 48.22  0.061  43.70 na  51 0.070 
Italy 19  0.014  26.00  0.060  28.9  0.015 47.57 0.059 30.64 0.013  46.1  0.058 
Luxembourg na  na  26.09  0.024  na  na 34.32  0.042 na  na  28.1  0.028 
Netherlands 73.39 0.117 82.25 0.170 76.7 0.129 81.5 0.160  79.50  0.166 83.4 0.188 
Portugal 58  0.096  72.60  0.123  57.0  0.101 72.9 0.130  62.00  0.119 79.6 0.164 
Spain 35  0.035  51.90  0.072  31.5  0.033 47.9 0.059  36.28  0.037 45.3 0.054 
Sweden 82.68  0.225  88.21  0.195  81.3  0.191 85.3 0.177  90.55  0.234 83.5 0.160 
UK  na 0.019  29.07  0.026 na 0.034  30.28 0.036  na  0.024  32.4  0.028 
a See Box 1. 
b Calculated on a unconsolidated basis, which implies that only domestic banking assets are included. 
Source: ECB (2002). 
 
 
 
Table 9 provides a classification of the concentration levels (total assets, credits and deposits, 
respectively) by group of countries in 1999. 
                                                 
77 Scherer & Ross (1990) and Sander & Kleimeier (2001). 
Box 1. Simple concentration measurements 
 
Concentration has been measured by two different methodologies. The simplest is called CR5, which 
measures the market share of the five largest banking institutions, in terms of deposits, credits and/or 
total assets. A more advanced methodology is based on the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) = 
∑
=
n
i
i PM
1
2 . Where  i PM  represents the market share of the bank i and n the total number of banks in 
the market. Unlike the CR5 ratio, the HHI reflects both the distribution of the market share of the top 
five firms and the composition of the whole market. It also gives proportionately greater weight to the 
market share of the larger firms, in accordance with their relative importance in competitive 
interactions. If HHI reaches its maximum value (1), one bank could retain 100% of the market share, 
in which case the market is in a monopoly situation. In case of perfect competition, the large number 
of banks present in the market retains a small market share and the HHI tends to 0. BANKING CONSOLIDATION IN THE EU | 35 
Table 9. Classification of the countries by concentrations levels in 1999 
Type of assets   CR5>60%  40%<CR5<60%  CR5<40% 
Assets  Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, Greece, 
the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Sweden 
Austria, France, 
Ireland, Spain 
Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg,  United 
Kingdom 
Credits  Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, Greece, 
the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Sweden 
Austria, France, 
Ireland, Italy, Spain 
Germany, 
Luxembourg, United 
Kingdom 
Deposits  Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, 
Greece, 
the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Sweden 
Ireland, Italy, Spain  Austria, Germany, 
Luxembourg, United 
Kingdom 
Concentration levels  High Intermediate   Low 
 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden show high 
concentration ratios in assets, credits and deposits. In these countries, opportunities for domestic 
consolidation are rare. In this respect, competition authorities would probably object to any 
domestic merger between large players
78 to preserve fair competition.  
Let us give the example of retail banking in the Netherlands
79 which deserves a close 
examination by the competition authorities given its very tight oligopolistic structure. This 
market is dominated by five main players (ABN Amro, Rabobank, ING, SNS and Fortis), with 
an estimated combined market share of 93% for payment services and also high percentages for 
other market segments. Besides that, reputation constitutes the most important entry barrier to 
new entrants. Indeed, building up a brand name requires substantial advertisement and public 
relations costs, which cannot be recovered in the event the company must exit the market for 
payment services. These sunk costs constitute an additional entry and also an exit barrier to the 
market, which decreases the contestability of the market and harms fair competition.  
In Austria, France, Ireland, Italy and Spain, concentration ratios are intermediate. In these 
countries where savings and cooperative banks dominate the banking sector, there might be 
scope for further domestic consolidation. In France, the deposit market (unlike the credit 
market) has the distinction of being highly concentrated. This situation is partly due to 
l’épargne réglementée which forms a large part of the deposits distributed through networks 
such as Crédit Mutuel (Livret bleu) and Groupe Caisses d’Epargne (Livret A). 
Finally, in Germany, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom, concentration ratios are low. In 
Germany, this low ratio is due to the highly fragmented character of the banking market and the 
dual presence of the savings banks (Sparkassen) and Landesbanken which together maintain a 
market share of almost 35.5%, compared to 27.3% for commercial banks.
80 At the end of 1999, 
the market share of the big four (Deutsche Bank, HypoVereinsbank, Dresdner Bank and 
Commerzbank) was only 15.3%.  
                                                 
78 The planned merger in Sweden between Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken (SEB) and 
Foreningssparbanken (Swedbank) was not pursued because of competition concerns. 
79 Canoy & Onderstal (2003). 
80 Deutsche Bundesbank, Activity Report for 2000.  36 | AYADI & PUJALS 
In Luxembourg and the UK, the high foreign penetration could explain their low degree of 
market concentration. According to the Bank of England, 306 foreign banks were established in 
the UK in 2000, owning 55% of the total assets. Hence, to correctly portray the British banking 
market, it is more appropriate to look at the total assets in sterling owned by more than 70% of 
British institutions, and then to differentiate between wholesale and retail markets. Foreign 
banks are more active in the wholesale market accounting for 40% of credits to corporate 
clients, and are almost absent in the retail market where the main British banking institutions 
share almost 60% of deposits and credits to individual customers.  
Despite the ‘low’ concentration of the banking market in the UK, a Treasury-sponsored study 
(Cruickshank, 2000) concluded that competition problems existed in the markets for money 
transmission, services to personnel customers and services to SMEs. For services to personnel 
customers, it found that the supply of current accounts was dominated by a few large firms. For 
banking services to SMEs, the levels of concentration were even higher. This market structure 
resulted in high prices, in particular for money transmission services, and high bank profits.
81 
The conclusions of the report were sufficiently alarming to cause the bid to be blocked in 2001 
by Lloyds TSB for Abbey National.  
To conclude, there is a general expectation that consolidation in banking will continue in the 
coming years, especially where the domestic concentration level is intermediate to low. In 
countries where competition concerns have already been raised, there will be scope for cross-
border consolidation. 
3.3.2  Impact on capacity 
According to the economic literature and the evidence on capacity reductions, M&As can 
perform a disciplining function against cost inefficiency and excess capacity (see Box 2) and 
promote market contestability. 
 
 
In addition to a decrease in the number of credit institutions, banking consolidation in the EU 
appears to have been closely associated with capacity reductions through job cuts
82 and branch 
closures, even though other factors have contributed to this trend, such as technological 
developments or the decline in the volume of business. This statement is confirmed in Table 10. 
                                                 
81  An over-profit was estimated between £3 to £5 billion per year by the Cruickshank report. 
82 According to careful estimations, at least 130,000 jobs were likely to have been suppressed in the 
European financial services sector following the M&A wave over the last decade; the same estimations 
predict another 300,000 jobs lost in the years following for the same reasons (ILO, 2001).  
Box 2. Differences between over-capacity and over-branching 
Over-capacity (or excess capacity) is by no means straightforward, since it is linked both to market and 
technological conditions. Excess capacity must not be confused with over-branching even if, under 
certain circumstances, over-branching could be taken as a good empirical proxy for over-capacity. Davis 
& Salo (2000) used two different meanings of excess capacity: 1) From the ‘engineering’ viewpoint, 
excess capacity means a positive gap between the maximum potential output (given labour and capital 
resources) and the prevailing output. 2) According to the ‘economic’ concept, excess capacity exists 
when at least one firm in an industry operates in the short term at an output below the optimum level 
(defined in terms of average cost minimisation) (Shapiro, 1989). Whatever the definition, the empirical 
measures of over-capacity raise difficult issues. Over-branching is considered as a simple indicator of 
the density of the branch network and can be used to a certain extent as a simplified measure to qualify 
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Indeed, the number of credit institutions, branches and employment in the EU has registered an 
overall decline of 36%,
83 2% and 8%, respectively.  
Table 10. Branches and employment variation in European banking during the 1990s 
  % of change in the number  
of credit institutions 
% of change in branches  % of change in employment 
  90-95 95-99 99-01 90-01 90-95 95-99 99-01 90-01 90-95 95-99 99-01 90-01 
Belgium  -8 -19 -4 -29  -16 -11 -12 -33  -5 -1 -1 -7 
Germany -20  -21  -16  -46  -6 20 -7  5  -16 6  -1 -12 
Greece 36  8  7  56  21 13  8  47  10 9  2 23 
Spain -27  -24  -5  -47  12 6 -2 17  2 2 0 5 
France -28  -21  -9  -48  -2 -2 2 -2  -8 0 na  -7 
Ireland 17  45  9  83  7 0  -10  -4  28 -4 na 23 
Italy -16  -8  -5  -27  32 15  9  65  5 -5 1 1 
Luxembourg*
  24 -4 -8 10  9 -16 -4 -13  7 8  11  30 
NL  -8 na -9 -12  -19 na -15 -39  -9 na 2  1 
Austria -14  -16  -4  -31  0 -2 -2 -3  -1 -7 1 -7 
Portugal -10  -4  -5  -18  75 51 30  245  -2 -1 -9  -12 
Finland -28  -9  7  -30  -34 -37  -4  -60  -38 -26  4  -52 
Euro Area  -19  -11  -9  -35  0 9  na  9  -8 0 na  -8 
Denmark  -2 72 -3 64  -28 2  2 -24  -16 1  1 -14 
Sweden -65  -41  1  -79  -21 -20  na -37  -8 -1 na -8 
UK**
  -10 -12  -9  -28  -6 -21 -8 -31  -11 1  -8 -17 
EU -21  -11  -9  -36  0 6 -8  -2  -8 0 na  -8 
US -20  -15  -6  -36  3 1  na  4  -4 7 na 3 
*   Includes local and foreign branches (EU and non-EU). 
** Includes major UK banking groups and building societies. 
Sources: ECB, US Federal Reserve Board, OECD and authors’ own calculations. 
 
Undoubtedly, banking M&As could fully explain the reduction in the number of credit 
institutions as few banking closures were reported in the 1990s, but this phenomenon must be 
complemented with other relevant factors to explain the trend observed in employment and 
branches. Indeed, the development of new technologies would have strongly contributed to the 
closure of branches in Europe and entailed numerous job lay-offs. For example, the emergence 
of call centres and e-banking services have created new opportunities for banking institutions to 
offer their services at a lower cost than that incurred by traditional branching network. Also, in a 
period of economic downturn, it is inevitable to cut costs through cutting jobs or through a 
substantial pruning of branch networks.  
Besides these factors and banking M&As, one could expect a significant rationalisation of 
banking branch networks as well as a substantial reduction in employees. Therefore, according 
to these figures, this trend has not been fully verified by the facts. Why? It seems that the overall 
effect of M&As on employment and branching is not straightforward. While they might 
                                                 
83 The overall decrease has been divided into -21% between 1990 and 1995, -11% between 1995 and 
1999 and -9% between 1999 and 2001. Likewise, over the same period, the number of credit institutions 
in the United States has fallen by 36%. Nevertheless, an increase has been registered exceptionally in 
Ireland due to the entry of foreign banks, in Greece owing to a catch-up effect in its banking infrastructure 
and in Luxembourg owing to the benefits of taxation. At the end of 2002, the EU banking industry, 
consisting of some 7,968 institutions including cooperatives and saving banks, could be considered as 
unusually fragmented, although it has been consolidating at the domestic level for some time.  38 | AYADI & PUJALS 
contribute to massive job losses due to downsizing programmes,
84 they could also generate job 
creation through the growing banking segments such as investment/corporate banking in the 
decade of the 1990s, or asset management/private banking and other specialised financial 
services today.  
Moreover, two other particularities in Europe may explain this trend. Firstly, labour market 
rigidities and the power of labour unions serve to protect employees of banking institutions 
facing restructuring. Secondly, the branch network remains the most important distribution 
channel for many banks
85 and customers. So, European banks seem to prefer a multi-channel 
strategy combining large traditional branching with new distribution channels (mainly e-
banking and call centres).  
At national level, cross-country differences still persist. It appears that the largest reductions in 
bank branches have taken place in those countries where e-banking was the most developed and 
the concentration ratios the highest (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden). 
The number of bank employees has also declined significantly in these countries (except in the 
Netherlands). In Spain and Italy, the dual structure of their banking systems (savings banks in 
Spain and regional cooperative banks in Italy) could partly explain the increase in the number of 
branches and employees.  
While the evolution in the number of branches and employees differs from one country to 
another, one can identify several qualitative changes. In general, European banking institutions 
are trying to redesign and upgrade their branch networks either by closing branches or by 
incorporating new technologies, which allows the reallocation of staff to more advanced tasks 
(back to front office for example).  
It is clear that the bank-client relationship is the core strategy of Europeans banks. For that, the 
development of a rationalised branching network, combined with the new distribution 
alternatives and well-trained staff is the most effective strategy to apply in the future. With this 
strategy in mind, European banks will attempt to optimise geographically their branch networks, 
but this strategic redeployment might penalise less-favoured regions
86 and people.
87 
                                                 
84 A report (see Rhodes, 1998) summarising nine case studies of banking mergers in the United States 
reported that all nine mergers resulted in significant cost-cutting in line with pre-merger projections. The 
largest volume of cost reduction was associated with staff reductions and data processing systems and 
operations.  
85 See ECB (2002). 
86 In the past, it is especially the less-favoured regions that have suffered the most from the closure of the 
branches (Gosling, 2000). 
87 In their study, Leyshon & Thrift (1996) have shown that financial innovations and the increasing 
competition in banking during the 1990s in the UK and the US have been very beneficial to higher social 
classes who had access to a broad range of financial products. Conversely, the poorest communities 
would have suffered the most from downsizing of branch networks in their areas. Geographical exclusion 
results from the decision by banking institutions to reduce their risks and costs, to improve their 
profitability and to create value for their shareholders. | 39 
Chapter 4 
What prospects for the banking industry in the EU? 
The diagnosis of the 1990s shows the importance of the global consolidation wave in the 
European banking sector, leading to an overall increase in concentration levels. In the long term, 
the increase in cross-sector and cross-border operations will lead to the creation of international 
financial conglomerates regardless of the traditional boundaries. It is likely that cross-border 
transactions will accelerate in countries where domestic consolidation is advanced and/or where 
competition concerns have been voiced in specific market segments. In countries where cross-
border and cross-sector consolidation has already been triggered, the formation of 
conglomerates is inevitable. Therefore, one might wonder which banking model will emerge to 
become the dominant one in Europe.  
4.1  What are the prospects for consolidation in the medium term?  
The EU banking market is considered to be relatively fragmented:
88 regional leaders and 
national oligopolies still co-exist and very few European banking institutions operate as a global 
player.
89 There is no doubt that the domestic consolidation wave experienced in most EU 
countries has resulted in more or less concentrated domestic banking markets. In the most 
concentrated markets where domestic growth opportunities have become scarce, bank managers 
will seek new growth opportunities in different geographical areas to benefit from the effects of 
geographical diversification.  
Accordingly, two potential future developments can be expected in the medium term: firstly, the 
completion of the domestic consolidation
90 taking place in EU countries where concentration 
levels are intermediate to low, and secondly, an acceleration of cross-border M&A operations,
91 
particularly in countries where competition concerns have already been voiced from within the 
domestic market.  
If bank mergers in the past have been hampered by significant regulatory obstacles, the 1992 
Treaty on European Union, the 1998 Council directive on the liberation of capital movements, 
the creation of the euro in 1999 and the European Commission’s progress towards the 
integration of EU financial markets through the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP
92) 
constitute the Union’s major achievements in removing the regulatory obstacles to an integrated 
financial services market. In addition to the unrestrained imperative to acquire an ever-greater 
market share and to maximise shareholder value, these regulatory changes will sooner or later 
                                                 
88 ECB (2002). 
89 In contrast to retail banking, some banking institutions operate at EU level in investment or private 
banking and in a few specialised financial services, such as Deutsche Bank in investment banking and 
Cetelem (BNP Paribas) or Sofinco (Crédit Agricole) in consumer credit.  
90 According to Fitch Ratings (2001), “The national consolidation process will continue in the main 
countries of the European Union (Germany, Spain, France, Italy and the United Kingdom) as long as 
there will remain not more than three or four major banking groups in each country”. 
91 According to McKinsey (2003), “An important cross-border transaction is expected between two of the 
top 15 European banks in the two or three coming years. This might trigger further cross-border 
consolidation”. 
92 See Annex 1 for an overview of the FSAP. 40 | AYADI & PUJALS 
lead numerous banking institutions to adopt this strategic option. In the meantime, cross-
shareholdings and strategic alliances might proliferate between the major banks within the EU.
93 
4.1.1  Country analyses: Different patterns of consolidation in the future  
In a majority of European countries, domestic operations have been characterised by an 
increasing average transaction rate since 1998. This has led to the creation of banking ‘giants’ at 
the domestic scale. This observation – which seems to reinforce the idea of the maturity of the 
national consolidation process in numerous countries – foresees the strengthening of the cross-
border consolidation phase and the emergence of a few cross-border European ‘leaders’ in the 
medium term.  
As previously noted, the underlying hypotheses suggest that the swing towards cross-border 
operations could take place when the concentration threshold admitted by the competition 
authorities is reached in the national relevant market. Although none of the principal European 
countries has reached the threshold considered critical, in general the majority of the countries 
have tended to reach it, but at different degrees (see Table 11).  
Indeed, in 2001, two major M&A operations were aborted due to a risk of dominant position at 
the national level: the failures of the bid for Abbey National by Lloyds TSB due to the veto of 
national competition authorities in the UK and of the proposed merger between SEB and 
Swedbank in Sweden due to the opposition by competition services in the European 
Commission.  
These regulatory interventions clearly indicate that as long as domestic consolidation advances, 
external domestic growth opportunities will become limited due to competitive concerns. 
Therefore, cross-border consolidation might be the right alternative for fulfilling a targeted 
strategic external development via geographical diversification and enhancing competition in a 
domestic market.   
This does not exclude the possibility that specific scaled M&A operations could take place in a 
majority of the European countries (notably France, Spain and the United Kingdom). In France, 
domestic consolidation is likely to continue but to a limited extent. The last example to date
94 is 
the acquisition of Crédit Lyonnais by Crédit Agricole. It is nevertheless worth mentioning the 
case of Société Générale, which might be a perfect target for a larger international bank.  
In Spain, an important consolidation wave is expected within savings banks in order to fulfil the 
objective of reducing local retail excess capacity and in the private sector, where its healthy 
commercial banks (e.g. Banco Popular and Banco Sabadell) seem to offer an ideal target to 
international institutions ready to benefit from the geographical redeployment.
95  
Finally, there might be opportunities for the major British players in some specific product 
areas. For instance, the HSBC and the Royal Bank of Scotland Group will probably make 
acquisitions in the area of mortgages, since their market shares related to this segment are 
relatively low.
96 Amongst the principal targets in mortgage, Abbey National, Alliance & 
                                                 
93 As examples: the alliance announced in December 2001 by the French Banques Populaires Group and 
the German DZ Bank for the creation of a federative and powerful mutual network at a European scale 
and the recent one between Crédit Mutuel-CIC and Banca Popolare di Milano.  
94 In December 2002, Crédit Agricole launched a friendly takeover bid of Crédit Lyonnais. This 
transaction was approved by the shareholders in June 2003. 
95 The last example to date is the merger between Barclays and Banco Zaragozano (May 2003), creating 
the sixth largest bank in Spain. 
96 Fitch Ratings (2002). BANKING CONSOLIDATION IN THE EU | 41 
Leicester, Bradford & Bingley or Northern Rock could be on the list. Germany and Italy, 
however, still seem to have a fragmented banking market leading many to predict the 
occurrence of national and scaled M&A operations in those countries in the near term.  
Table 11. The status of national consolidation in the European banking sector (as of 2001) 
Country Status 
Germany  Consolidation starting as obstructive tax legislation and public sector banking 
system are being tackled 
Italy  Consolidation gaining speed thanks to reforms in the banking sector 
France  Consolidation to be finalised 
Spain  Consolidation of savings banks 
UK  Consolidation to be completed – looking at smaller deals 
Portugal Substantially  completed 
Ireland/Greece Substantially  completed 
Austria/Switzerland Substantially  completed 
Nordic countries  Substantially completed 
Benelux Substantially  completed 
Source: Van Dijcke (2002). 
 
In Germany, the banking sector is considered as one of the least concentrated, given its complex 
structure divided between savings, cooperative and commercial banks. Owing to this 
fragmented structure, a high wave of concentration is expected in the coming years. As regards 
the private sector, a continuing consolidation process would make Commerzbank an ideal target 
among major German commercial banks. The situation is more alarming for the public sector – 
savings and cooperative
97 banks – for two reasons.  
First, the institutions that fall into this category will effectively lose the state support 
mechanisms by 2005,
98 following the agreement reached by the European Commission and the 
German authorities. Consequently, the cost of funding will increase and this will force these 
institutions to pay more attention to the quality of their loan books. Hence, many institutions 
will become more fragile than others. This situation may increase the potential targets among 
the German savings banks, in particular within the regional public banks (Landesbanken) and 
the local savings banks (Sparkassen).  
Secondly, the current situation of the German banking sector seems to be worrying. Indeed, the 
weak profitability experienced due to excess capacity and high costs, the pressures to adapt to 
the new competitive environment without government guaranties and the relatively weak 
                                                 
97 The cooperative banking association has accordingly undertaken to speed up the reduction of banking 
institutions over the next few years from 1,800 at the end of 2001 to 800 institutions. 
98 As from 19 July 2005, the Landesbank and the Sparkassen  will no longer benefit from the state 
guarantees accorded them by the German regions and municipalities. According to the European 
Commission, the German system of state guarantees for public law credit institutions is incompatible with 
the state aid rules of the EC treaty. Indeed, the German state guarantee suggests two separate support 
mechanisms. The first one, called ‘Anstaltslast’ or maintenance obligation, requires the founding entity (a 
public law entity) to make a capital injection or to provide liquidity support. In this case, the public law 
bank cannot be subject to insolvency. The second mechanism, called ‘Gewahrtragerhaftung’ or guarantee 
obligation, is a formal unlimited guarantee for the banks’ obligations provided by the founding entity. It is 
an external guarantee and therefore gives creditors a direct claim on the public sector owners of the bank. 
Hence, thanks to these guarantees, these banks would receive a higher credit rating which would then 
allow them to have access to funding on preferential conditions.  42 | AYADI & PUJALS 
interest margins (see Figure 15a) will pressure public German banking institutions to undertake 
significant and necessary structural changes
99 in the coming years. Nevertheless, the particular 
status of the public banks – being under federal state and municipal ownership – might slow 
down the process of restructuring.  
In Italy, the banking sector has experienced a strong consolidation wave. Some second-ranked 
private banking institutions seem to have been particularly exposed to the ongoing domestic 
consolidation movement (Capitalia, Banca Nationale del Lavoro and Banca Monte dei Paschi di 
Siena). Similarly, the popular banks (banca popolare) and the regional savings banks (cassa di 
risparmio), which hold considerable local market shares, have experienced strong consolidation 
activity in recent years (see Annex 3).  
To confirm this diagnosis, the Italian Minister of Finance announced in December 2001 the 
adoption of a broad reform of the ‘banking foundations’
100 which hold significant participation 
in the Italian banking sector. Its principal objective is to accelerate the disengagement of the 
Italian foundations from the capital of the banking institutions, which will lead to a dispersion of 
the ownership of a significant proportion of Italian banks. This will certainly accelerate the 
restructuring process.  
The national consolidation process, having reached its mature phase in most of the European 
banking sectors, has gradually encouraged interest in cross-border operations. Therefore, until 
today, the majority of the cross-border M&As at the EU level have been confined to 
geographical areas with strong historical and cultural links.
101  
However, the merger of HSBC and CCF in 2000 and that of Barclays and Banco Zaragozano in 
2003, and the permanent rumours of probable transactions between the major European banking 
institutions (such as HSBC and Dexia, ABN Amro and Nordea or BNP Paribas and Fortis…) 
seem to sustain the idea of a growing interest in pan-European operations in the banking 
community. This is true despite the existing disparities between countries, which not only 
increase the risk of failure but also limit the expected operational synergies of such operations, 
particularly in retail banking.
102 Besides, only a few large-scale transactions at EU level may 
play an important role in triggering a cross-border consolidation process
103 through a chain 
reaction involving the major banking institutions in Europe.  
                                                 
99 The trend has slowly begun to emerge since 1999, with the merger between SudwestLB, 
Landesgirokasse and Landeskreditbank Baden-Wurttemberg to create Landesbank Baden-Wurttemberg in 
1999, between SGZ Bank and GZB Bank to form GZ Bank in 2000 and finally between DG Bank and 
GZ Bank to create DZ Bank in 2001. 
100 New stricter measures have been introduced for application to the foundations. These rules require the 
transformation into non-profit-making organisations within a 3-month time frame, in order to separate 
their mission from that of the banking sector and to compel them to sell their stakes to independent 
savings management companies. According to the Italian authorities, the purpose of excluding the 
foundations from the banking sector is “to enable banks to compete at European and international levels 
in the realms of privatisation and development”. 
101 Scandinavian countries (Nordea = MeritaNordbanken-Unidanmark-Christiania Bank), 
Germany/Austria (HVB-Bank Austria), England/Scotland (Natwest-RBoS), Belgium/France (Dexia), 
Belgium/Netherlands (Générale de Banque-Fortis) and Spain/Portugal (SCH-Banco Totta & Acores). 
102 As observed by Michel Pebereau, CEO of BNP Paribas, in April 2003: “There will be certainly a large 
cross-border consolidation in the near future. Nevertheless, owing to the lack of harmonisation of 
European regulations particularly in the fields of savings taxation and consumer protection, it is difficult 
today to fulfil the objective of synergies creation, especially in retail banking in Europe”. 
103 A study carried out by McKinsey (2002) concluded that the opportunities of mergers between equals 
seem to be rare in the European banking sector. Indeed, only 22 opportunities of cross-border mergers BANKING CONSOLIDATION IN THE EU | 43 
Against this prospect, it is important to highlight that the major banking institutions in the UK, 
which are considered very efficient (see Figure 15b) and strongly valued by the markets, will 
occupy a prime place in the future reconfiguration of the European banking sector. This will be 
an impetus to the creation of cross-border group leaders at EU level.  
Although there has been a certain convergence in the financial performance of the main 
European banks (see Figure 15c), the British banking institutions have held the lead in the 
global market valuation at nearly the equivalent of the combined market value of the Dutch, 
French, German, Spanish and Italian banks in November 2003 (see Annex 4). As a result, the 
high valuation of British banks constitutes an advantage for the future pan-European M&A 
movement. 
 
Figure 15a. Changes in interest margins in the main EU banking sectors 
Figure 15b. Changes in the cost-to-income ratio in the main EU banking sectors 
 
                                                                                                                                               
between equals are likely to happen out of a total of 60 cross-border operations. According to this report, 
two large operations might drop the number of opportunities from 22 to 10. 
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Figure 15c. Changes in financial profitability for the main EU banking sectors 
Source: Bankscope (2002). 
4.1.2  Regulatory changes and remaining obstacles to full European banking 
integration 
Many actions have been undertaken since the establishment of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 to 
create a single European market. Almost 20 years of deregulatory measures (1957-77) have 
facilitated the right of establishment and the coordination of legislation for banking institutions. 
In 1973, the Council adopted a directive on the abolition of restrictions on freedom of 
establishment and freedom to provide services for self-employed activities of banks and other 
financial institutions.
104  
In 1977, the adoption of the first banking directive on the coordination of laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of credit institutions
105 was the 
first step to harmonise the regulations by the establishment of the principle of home country 
control. In 1989, further principles including a single banking licence, home country control and 
mutual recognition were legally incorporated in the second banking Directive,
106 under which 
all credit institutions authorised in an EU country would be able to establish branches or supply 
cross-border financial services in the other countries of the EU without further authorisation, 
provided that the bank was authorised to provide such services in the home state.  
These regulatory developments were complemented by the creation of the single currency in 
1999 and the Financial Services Action Plan (see Annex 1), which consists of a long series of 
initiatives taken to ensure the full integration of banking and capital markets by the year 2005. 
Besides that, the adoption of the Lamfalussy (2001) process in the area of capital markets is 
considered as the first step to increase the speed and the flexibility of the European legislative 
processes. This procedure has been put forward under a committee set up to design and 
implement common regulations in the area, possibly to be extended to other financial sectors, to 
enhance the reactivity of regulations to constant market developments.  
The adoption of the financial conglomerate directive in November 2002, which aims to enhance 
the prudential soundness and effective supervision of large financial groups in Europe, and the 
approval of the investment services directive (ISD) were the major European regulatory 
achievements in the field of financial services. In addition, it is important to mention the 
                                                 
104 Directive 73/183/EEC. 
105 Directive 77/780/EEC. 
106 Directive 89/646/EEC. 
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progress made by the European Commission services as regards the new capital adequacy 
directive (CAD3) which will apply to credit institutions and investment firms and is expected to 
enter into force in 2006. This new directive will certainly create a new competitive environment 
for European banks and investments firms.  
As regards the European Community merger regulation, many actions have been taken and are 
expected to enter into force in early 2004 to better harmonise the merger control procedure,
107 to 
reduce the burden of the European merger review and to achieve better coordination between 
the EU and the US. 
Besides adding flexibility to the current regulatory system, these developments will create a new 
regulatory and competitive environment for banks and other financial services providers. On the 
one hand, they will facilitate any cross-border growth opportunities without the attendant high 
transaction costs and less regulatory burden and on the other hand will enhance competitive 
pressures by encouraging new entrants and thus increasing the contestability of the market. To 
respond to the competitive pressures due to the relaxation of regulatory barriers, banking 
institutions would have to operate strategically in order to maintain or increase their 
profitability. Cross-border consolidation could be an adequate response to diversify revenues by 
acquiring new foreign market shares without incurring any regulatory burden.  
Nevertheless, many of the regulatory obstacles identified in the FSAP are not yet removed and 
important challenges have to be addressed to fulfil the objective of a fully integrated European 
financial services market by the scheduled deadlines. Following a 14-year period of negotiations 
aiming to harmonise takeover regulations across the EU, a compromise
108 was reached by the 
European Council and the European Parliament on the Commission’s new proposal on 
takeovers bids in November 2003. Nevertheless, there are still many obstacles and controversies 
to resolve before a system of fair common rules for takeovers bids will have been achieved in 
the EU for all interested parties. Hence, the lack of minimum harmonised rules on takeovers 
continues to act as an obstacle to the cross-border consolidation process.  
Also, according to the current national regulations on mergers, member states can act 
individually to protect certain domestic interests from foreign competition. National competition 
authorities may indeed favour domestic consolidation and discourage acquisitions by foreign 
banks.
109 Last but not least, divergent taxation rules for savings remain an important issue that 
needs to be tackled in order to achieve full integration. In addition, the process of establishing 
harmonisation in consumer information and procedures for solving disputes with financial 
services providers is still on track. The result is that it is difficult to acquire services abroad, and 
banks need to develop products separately for different local markets. Consequently, these 
remaining barriers, which are scheduled to be removed, act as a temporary brake to the current 
cross-border consolidation process.  
                                                 
107 The proposal for review of merger regulation was adopted by the Competitiveness Council in 
November 2003, and is due to enter into force on May 2004.  
108 The compromise reached by the Council in November 2003 under the Italian Presidency tabled on the 
introduction of optional arrangements for the application of provisions concerning defensive measures 
used by the target company and obligations of its board as well as the so-called breakthrough provisions: 
Article 9 (which aims at ensuring shareholders can vote on which defensive measures to take after a bid 
has been publicised) and Article 11 (which neutralises measures that could be interpreted as pre-bid 
defences, including voting right restrictions). The Commission was dismayed by the compromise reached, 
saying that it had emptied the original proposal of its substance. 
109 This situation still prevails in Italy where the Governor of Banca d’Italia, Antonio Fazio, has always 
discouraged foreign acquisitions in the Italian banking market aiming to support the creation of national 
banking leaders in Italy before opening the sector up to international competition. 46 | AYADI & PUJALS 
Finally, the ongoing process of consolidation raises two important questions for the future of the 
European banking sector: Which banking model is going to prevail in Europe and what reforms 
to banking supervision in the EU will be necessary? 
4.2  Towards which banking model in Europe? 
Together with the consolidation wave of the 1990s and the regulatory developments undertaken 
since the mid-1970s, the boundaries between financial activities – which were clear cut in the 
past – began to blur. This contributed to the enlargement of the range of activities proposed by 
the major European banks (see diagram in Annex 5). Hence, operating under the universal 
banking model became more popular than operating in one specific financial activity. In 
Europe, the integration of the financial markets and the ongoing regulatory changes, including 
the new Basel Capital Accord, have intensified this trend.  
4.2.1  Which banking business model will prevail in Europe? 
Whereas a common integrated universal banking model in Europe has prevailed in the past few 
years, two big trends
110 seem to have emerged following the recent consolidation wave (see 
Figure 16).  
 
Figure 16. Current business strategies in the European banking sector (end 2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Crédit Agricole SA (2002). 
                                                 
110 Contamin & Melone (2002). 
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On the one hand, there is global investment banking, which is highly concentrated on a 
worldwide scale and specialised in a few activities – M&A advisory, capital market activities 
(equities, fixed income, forex, interest rate, derivatives…), corporate or specialised financing 
(export, real estate…) – for international corporate clients. Deutsche Bank, Credit Suisse Group 
and UBS are the only European banking institutions to have reached a critical size in investment 
banking comparable to the American ‘bulge bracket’ (see Table 12).  
Table 12. European ranking of investment banks (M&A advisory, deals completed in 2003) 
Rank   Advisors  $ billions 
 
Deals Market  share 
(%) 
1 Goldman  Sachs  126.5  58  29.8 
2 Lazard  100.1  46  23.6 
3 Citigroup  97.8  47  23.1 
4 JP  Morgan  96.8  60  22.8 
5 Morgan  Stanley  83.1  56  19.6 
6 Merrill  Lynch  81.6  44  19.3 
7 UBS  75.5  56  17.8 
8 Rothschild  &  Cie  74.4  69  17.5 
9 Deutsche  Bank  57.1  60  13.5 
10 CSFB  44.8  43  10.6 
  Industry total  424.0  561   
Notes: Market shares and deal totals include double counting of deals; therefore markets share totals will not add up 
to 100%. All transactions over $100 millions are included. Year-to-date is as of 31 December 2003.   
Source: Thomson Financial (2004). 
 
Reaching a certain size is necessary in the investment banking segment owing to the high fixed 
costs inherent in these activities and the importance of having distribution channels around the 
world. Nevertheless, the economic downturn experienced since 2001 confirmed the high 
cyclicality of investment banking activities. Consequently, during the past few years, many 
European banking institutions (such as the British Barclays and Natwest, the Dutch ING and 
ABN Amro and the French BNP Paribas and Société Générale) have progressively reallocated 
their capital into other less cyclical banking activities, i.e. essentially retail and asset 
management (see Table 13).  
Table 13. The main characteristics of banking activities   
  Customer 
proximity 
Risk Equity 
utilisation 
Economies 
of scale 
Entry 
barriers 
Income 
volatility  
International 
exposures 
 
Retail banking 
 
5 
 
2 
 
2 
 
2 
 
4 
 
2 
 
1 
Corporate 
banking 
 
3 
 
4 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
Market 
activities 
 
3 
 
5 
 
3 
 
4 
 
4 
 
4 
 
4 
Asset 
management 
 
3 
 
3 
 
2 
 
5 
 
2 
 
2 
 
4 
Corporate 
finance 
 
2 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
2 
 
4 
 
4 
Bancassurance 3  2  3  3  4  3  3 
Note: Ranked from 1 to 5, with very low indicated by a 1 and very high by a 5. 
Source: Bellon & Pastré (2003). 48 | AYADI & PUJALS 
On the other hand, the multi-specialised banking institutions or ‘universal retail banking’,
111  
which are heavily involved in retail activities, are considered as the dominant model in Europe. 
Today, these banks are highly diversified. Their logic is not to merge networks but to associate 
specialised subsidiaries with a branch network oriented to retail businesses, e.g. private 
customers, SMEs and corporates, and to offer complementary financial services, such as 
insurance, asset management, private banking and corporate and investment activities.  
For the past few years, the asset management business has been one of the most important 
activities for banking institutions in Europe owing to the favourable retirement schemes for 
savings and the likely synergies between the production subsidiaries and their distribution 
networks. Also, international retail banking, specialised financial services and private banking 
offered banks new growth opportunities. It is important to note that this strategic redeployment 
has been accompanied by asset and capital reallocation  towards these new activities and 
probably at the expense of traditional ones.  
4.2.1.1  Are specialised banks condemned to disappear?  
Recent developments in national, European and American banking legislation seem to 
encourage a greater diversification of banking activities, with reference to the ‘universal 
banking’ model. In the US since the late 1990s, wide-ranging deregulatory measures have been 
introduced partly through liberalising the legislation contained in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
and partly through a more liberal interpretation of the Bank Holding Company Act. Similar 
regulatory developments in Europe have aimed at the creation of integrated financial markets. 
The financial conglomerates, including banking, insurance and securities, have represented the 
most completed form of the diversification strategies.  
Beyond the purely regulatory factors, the development of universal banking is justified by 
economic reasons related to the advantages of diversification with respect to economies of 
scope, the satisfaction of specific customer demand and risk reduction. Banks might find it 
profitable to diversify in order to benefit from these range savings and thus to lower their 
production costs. If economies of scale do not always exist, scope economies resulting from 
diversification are more frequent.  
Also a diversified supply that corresponds to the characteristics of the demand could be the right 
means to develop customers’ trust in the context of intensified competition. Finally, 
diversification (functional and/or geographical) could reduce risks.
112 Theoretically, a 
diversified portfolio involves lower risks than its respective individual components, since bad 
results recorded for one activity could be compensated for by the good results obtained in 
another. 
Nowadays, universal banking can follow a specialisation strategy through an efficiency aim. 
This dual requirement – diversification versus specialisation – could be satisfied through an 
internal reorganisation, which leads to a creation of banking groups structured in two levels. At 
the lower level, banks are organised into specialised productive units benefiting from 
                                                 
111 See Blanqué (2002). 
112 Banks face three distinct types of risk. The first is related to interest rates and derives from the fact that 
asset investments have a different period of maturity than savings and consequently, different interest 
rates. The second type is the risk of solvency, derived from credits granted by banks. The third is liquidity 
risks which exist because of the possibility of immediate withdrawals which in turn would require the 
cancellation of asset investments. For the two fundamental theories involving the advantages of 
diversification, see Markowitz (1952, 1959), which was made more sophisticated by Sharpe (1963, 1964), 
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management autonomy. At the higher level, the activities benefiting from range savings are 
gathered into broader entities.
113 
Nevertheless, universal banking is not the only possible business model in Europe. Indeed, the 
specialised banking model is also viable, although it is subject to certain conditions (size, 
activity segments...). Specialisation takes on multiple dimensions. Firstly, it can be functional 
while covering an individual activity and/or customer segment, for example, in private banking 
or custody. In this respect, it appears that the strategic segments concerned will have to offer a 
high-growth potential in a reasonably competitive environment. Moreover, specialisation could 
be geographical: the knowledge of a specific geographical area would be a decisive comparative 
advantage in the future.  
It is difficult to choose between the alternatives of diversification and specialisation. Banking 
institutions will have to approach this strategic choice with flexibility and pragmatism. 
Universal and specialised banking institutions will continue to co-exist in Europe, each one 
having its specific characteristics and responding to individual needs. One of the major 
objectives of banking consolidation is precisely to reconcile the advantages of diversification, 
specific to the universal and/or multi-specialised banks, with the search for better specialisation 
(taking the form of a centring strategy towards the core business).  
In this context, it is worth mentioning that European banking institutions are expected to seek 
recourse in outsourcing
114 and/or offshore
115 strategies for non-core activities to optimise the 
utilisation of their inputs (productive efficiency objective) and to reduce their costs (cost 
efficiency objective). 
4.2.1.2  Optimum size: A controversial question… 
The recent banking consolidation wave, characterised by relatively large-scale M&As, might 
give the impression that the so-called ‘optimum size’ of banking institutions is getting larger (as 
in the ‘big is beautiful’ principle) and thus the small and/or medium-sized banking institutions 
might gradually disappear as the consolidation process advances. 
Theoretically, a larger size could lead to economies of scale and economies of scope. With 
respect to the former, a larger scale would permit better absorption of fixed costs. In fact, the 
importance of technology investment in the banking cost function reinforces this concept. This 
is particularly true when the need for software is growing. More precisely, given a certain size, a 
bank operates with economies of scale when the average cost per unit decreases as output 
grows.  
Conversely, up to a certain size, diseconomies of scale occur when operating costs increase 
more proportionately than the production volume. Size could also be a source of scope 
economies when it is possible to generate cost savings from delivering multiple goods and 
services jointly through the same organisation rather than through different specialised 
providers. 
                                                 
113 Plihon (2000). 
114 According to a study by McKinsey (2002), the outsourcing market of banking activities should register 
an annual increase of 11% up to 2005. 
115 According to a survey by Deloitte Consulting (2003), the world’s 100 largest financial services 
companies indicate they expect to transfer an estimated value of $356 billion of their operations and 2 
million jobs offshore over the next five years in order to reduce their costs. This survey found that 
financial institutions expect to reduce costs by nearly $1.4 billion each by 2008 by sending work to low-
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Empirical research undertaken in the US and in Europe in the 1990s on the relationship between 
size and profitability in the banking sector was more conclusive than studies done in the 1980s. 
Whereas the evidence in the earlier studies on the existence of economies of scale was very 
weak and exclusively observed up to a rather modest size – only about $10 billion
116 – research 
in the 1990s found unexploited scale economies even for fairly large banks in both the US
117 
and in Europe.
118  
With regard to scope economies, the evidence was more oriented towards diseconomies of 
scope.
119 Nevertheless, the variety of banking activities suggests that each business follows its 
own model. Thus, the concept of critical size is different depending upon the type of banking 
involved. Whereas retail banking could remain domestic, investment banking requires 
expansion to a continental and even a global level. Consequently, the analysis of size benefits 
should not be done crudely, but rather at the level of each type of banking activity.  
Besides scale and scope economies, banks might want to get larger in order to gain market 
power. This situation is more prevalent in very concentrated industries with high entry barriers, 
such as reputation. Also a larger scale could be justified by the benefits of diversification. The 
significant regulatory progress made towards the integration of the financial markets in Europe 
has made it easier for banks to operate in other activities, such as asset management and/or 
insurance.  
Finally, thanks to financial globalisation and technological innovation, the recent 
reconfiguration of the banking environment strengthened the competitive advantage of scale. 
Size could also be an essential factor in enhancing a bank’s image and reputation. Given the 
necessity to take risks in any banking activity, the customers need to be reassured of the 
soundness of their bank. Hence, credibility can help to attract or maintain customers.  
Despite the advantages of ‘big is beautiful’, it is far from certain that attaining a larger size is a 
synonym of higher profitability. Indeed, the race to a larger scale might increase the risks of 
bureaucratisation, customer remoteness and therefore, inefficiency. Also, it is not certain that 
small and medium-sized banking institutions are condemned to disappear.
120 Under some 
conditions, small-sized banking institutions can constitute a genuine comparative advantage. 
Today, the existence of niche activities, including the majority of services involving a high 
consulting dimension, such as private banking, could offer an important source of growth well 
adapted to provide product differentiation and service personalisation demanded by customers.  
In the future, although many banking activities will be increasingly dependent on a larger size, it 
seems that institutions with variable dimensions will co-exist. It is more the product mix and 
finally, the targeted customer that will determine the optimum bank size. 
                                                 
116 Mester (1987a & b) and Vander Vennet (1994). 
117 Berger & Mester (1997) and Berger & Humphrey (1997). 
118 Allen & Rai (1996), Molyneux et al. (1996) and Vander Vennet (2001). 
119 Mitchell & Onvural (1996). 
120 According to Olivier Pastré (2001), “The principles to the survival and the development of small-sized 
banking institutions are the following: 1) not to work in strong economies of scale businesses, 2) to be 
specialised, 3) to be flexible, 4) not to take too many risks, 5) to develop cooperation and 6) never 
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4.2.2  Is there any ‘best’ banking development strategy? 
4.2.2.1  Mergers or partnerships? 
Integration through mergers or acquisitions is not the only external growth strategy available in 
the European banking sector. Indeed, trade agreements, joint ventures, strategic alliances, cross-
shareholdings... could a priori be considered as alternative vehicles for consolidation in Europe. 
Therefore none of these alternatives is considered to be as an ultimate reference. Many concerns 
have been raised particularly on the possible definition of an optimum threshold of cooperation. 
But the only consensus reached is that the smaller the bank, the greater is the need for 
cooperation.  
According to the Group of Ten (BIS, 2001), alliances and cross-shareholdings have had 
relatively comparable experiences to those of M&As over the past few years. Unlike mergers, 
however, the alliances in the financial services sector have been mostly established at a 
European scale rather than at a national scale (see Annex 6). As a result, the emergence of pan-
European networks involving the major banking institutions might be a first step towards pan-
European mergers or acquisitions.  
In practice, cross-shareholdings are very popular in continental Europe (see Figure 17). German 
and Italian banks have been the most active in recent years in building a finely spun network of 
cross participation. German financial groups represented 30% of the cross-shareholdings, 
followed by Italy with 21% and France with 14%. Conversely, such arrangements seem to be 
unpopular with financial groups in the UK, Benelux and Nordic countries, where very few 
agreements have been reached. It is important to note that the more fragmented the banking 
sector; the more the cross-shareholdings strategy is developed. 
Figure 17. Distribution of cross-shareholdings in the European financial sector 
(% of the number of total agreements) 
Source: UBS (2003). 
The rationale for such a strategy is mainly to establish oneself in new markets without acquiring 
a banking license and/or board representation, which can be a useful way to influence a 
partner’s behaviour and to prepare for a future strategic acquisition or consolidation scenario. 
Italy
21%
Spain
7%
France
14%
Switzerland
7%
Netherlands
8%
Portugal
7%
UK
6%
Germany 
30%
Germany 
Italy
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Switzerland
UK
France52 | AYADI & PUJALS 
According to UBS Warburg (2003), cross-shareholdings can be divided into four broad 
categories on the basis of the rationale on which they were first set up: 
•  Offensive market entry. The typical pattern is for large European financial institutions to 
seek entry in European markets that remained fragmented, both large and small. The most 
typical example is Italy where the two largest Spanish banks as well as some of large Dutch 
and French banks have built minority stakes in local banks, as a future expansion option. 
•  Defensiveness. These transactions have been driven to protect a company from a hostile 
takeover or to establish an alliance with another institution aiming to position itself ahead of 
a future consolidation. These considerations emerged during the 1990s, partly as a proactive 
strategy following the introduction of the euro. 
•  Operational focus. Most cross-shareholdings have been established in the early 1990s at 
domestic or cross-border levels, partly as a response to the bank-insurance model. Usually, 
the large European insurance companies buy stakes in banks either in their own home 
markets or in other European markets aiming to expand their distribution networks. These 
agreements prevail in countries where bank distribution networks are very strong or where 
banks have adopted a less aggressive ‘bancassurance’ model (such as Italy and France) and, 
thus, they are willing to distribute a third party’s products. 
•  Tax and accounting-financial considerations. Tax or financial considerations have been key 
drivers in both the Benelux countries and in Germany.  
In the short term, being more flexible, partnerships are supposed to guarantee the advantages of 
a merger,
121 i.e. access to new markets or diversifying services offered to customers, without 
having to support the normal costs (such as financial or human costs...) and risks associated with 
cultural integration.  
However, in the long term, the constitution of a broad network of partners in Europe may not 
guarantee the synergistic advantages (rationalisation of the productive chain and the unity of the 
decisions) of a merger or an acquisition.
122 Moreover, partnerships are complex to manage and 
constitute an unstable equilibrium which can be modified constantly. Thus, pan-European 
partnership strategies that have succeeded
123 are rare. Indeed, according to a study by Bearing 
Point (2003), it seems that only few partnership projects are successful, such as that between 
SCH and RBoS in retail banking and between ABN Amro and Rothschild in investment 
banking.  
To conclude, partnerships or alliances between European banking institutions should be seen 
more as a temporary solution with the aim of achieving external growth, but they should not be 
considered as a permanent situation.  
4.2.2.2  Do pure e-banks live?  
In contrast to earlier studies performed by consulting companies following the internet wave, 
which forecast an e-banking ‘boom’ and an erosion of traditional banking institutions, the latest 
studies have found that the traditional banking actors are more than ever strongly positioned in 
the e-banking market.  
                                                 
121 See Bailly & David (1999). 
122 In October 2002, BNP Paribas signed a ‘friendly’ accord with Dresdner Bank to put an end to their 
cooperation agreement, which had existed since 1996, as a result of profound differences in their 
respective development strategies. 
123 In October 2001, the Spanish banking group SCH decided to reorganise its participation portfolio, 
keeping only the partnership concluded with the British Royal Bank of Scotland (RBoS), which had 
positive economic repercussions.   BANKING CONSOLIDATION IN THE EU | 53 
A study done by Accenture (2001), for example, reported that:  
•  The seven principal French banking groups hold 99% of the on-line accounts. 
•  Three internet users out of four are likely to open an on-line account with a traditional 
banking institution. 
•  Only 6% of them are thinking of closing their accounts in banking branches. 
The observations made recently in the United States have strengthened this diagnosis. Thus, 
according to a study of Gomez Advisors (2001), only 4% of account holders are customers of a 
pure on-line bank. These results would suggest an uncertain future of the e-banking business 
model (‘click’ only). To illustrate this statement, two of the major European e-banking players 
found themselves unable to efficiently pursue their activities and were acquired by banks in 
2002.
124 
Traditional banks can see in these results the confirmation that traditional brands are preserved 
on the internet, and that only a multi-channel distribution strategy combined with a large branch 
network and e-banking services (‘click and mortar’) is successful today. 
Moreover, traditional European banks have perfectly integrated this strategic opportunity by 
considering that e-banking is not only a fashionable phenomenon with favourable prospects
125 
but that it also has strong economic justification. Indeed, e-banking could be an efficient means 
to reduce banking costs (the transaction costs are ten times lower than those of traditional 
networks
126), to enhance productivity and to improve the quality of banking services (see Box 3 
and Annex 7).  
Under certain conditions,
127 the e-players could probably overcome their initial disabilities, 
including the lack of recognition, the absence of a customer base, the high costs of acquiring 
new customers and the absence of a physical network. In addition to the implementation of a 
minimum agency network, the survival of on-line banking institutions passes through their 
backing to an already established financial group, which would enable them not only to have 
access to the broad existing customer base, but also to diversify the range of products and 
services offered. The experiences of the British Egg, which belongs to the insurer Prudential, 
and the Dutch ING direct are worth mentioning in this context. 
 
                                                 
124 Boursorama (Société Générale) acquired Self Trade in France and Cortal (BNP Paribas), the German 
Consors. 
125 In January 2003, Jupiter forecasted that the number of online banking users in Europe would increase 
from 54 million in 2002 to 103 million in 2007. It is expected that the number of online banking users 
will grow at a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 14%. In the near future, the personal computer 
will remain the most popular online channel for banking services, followed by wireless devices and 
interactive digital television. Despite the saturation of many European markets and the negative outlook 
for internet investment, banks are having success in persuading their customers to migrate onto the 
internet, giving them plenty of reasons to continue investing strongly in e-banking services in order to 
support this growth. In April 2003, Forrester projected that the number of Europeans using online 
banking would double to almost 130 million users in five years, representing a CAGR of 21%. 
126 The figures quoted by the British Ministry of Trade and Industry revealed that a financial transaction 
carried out by a banking agency costs in general $1.07. This cost can be reduced to 52¢ thanks to the use 
of telephone call centres and to 10¢ by using the internet. 
127 See Taufflieb (2002). 54 | AYADI & PUJALS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.3  Prospects for banks after the new Basel Capital Accord (Basel II)  
4.2.3.1  An overview of the new capital adequacy regime 
The new capital adequacy regime (Basel II) was initiated in response to the perceived 
drawbacks of the current regulatory regime. Hence, in 1999, the Committee considered that the 
1988 Accord was no longer containing the true risks faced by the banking industry and 
proposed a new framework built on three mutually reinforcing pillars: 
•  Pillar 1, minimum capital requirements 
•  Pillar 2, supervisory review 
•  Pillar 3, increased disclosure and market discipline (see Table 14). 
 
Table 14. Framework of the Basel II Accord  
Minimum capital 
requirements 
Supervisory review  Market discipline 
•  Sets minimum acceptable 
capital level 
•  Enhanced approach for 
credit risk (external ratings, 
internal ratings, mitigation)  
•  Explicit treatment of 
operational risk 
•  Market risk framework 
 
•  Banks must assess solvency 
versus risk profile 
•  Supervisory review of 
banks’ calculations and 
capital strategies 
•  Banks should hold in 
excess of a minimum level 
of capital 
•  Regulators will intervene at 
an early stage if capital 
levels deteriorate 
•  Improved disclosure of 
capital structure 
•  Improved disclosure of risk 
measurement practices  
•  Improved disclosure of risk 
profile 
•  Improved disclosure of 
capital adequacy 
Source: Mercer Oliver Wyman (2003). 
 
Box 3. Economic advantages of e-banking as a new distribution channel for European 
banks 
Several features of internet banking make it an attractive distribution channel.  
•  Firstly, there is a decisive cost advantage. The costs of internet banking are estimated to be as 
low one-tenth of those associated with traditional distribution channels. These savings arise 
from: 1) the lower overall cost of electronic transactions, 2) greater cost economies arising from 
centralised information collection and transaction processing, 3) rationalisation of financial 
services production and standardisation of banking processes and 4) the cross-selling of non-
banking products.  
•  Secondly, e-banking offers enhanced revenue opportunities. New lines of business are possible 
from capitalising on existing customer bases, which can be used to match individuals with 
business customers for e-commerce opportunities or selling advertisement space.  
•  Finally, there are several customer benefits, including: 1) improved price transparency as a large 
amount of financial services suppliers become accessible on the internet, 2) round-the-clock 
access to banking services, 3) faster transactions where time is valuable, such as stock market 
operations or transfers between accounts and 4) easily customised banking services.  
Internet banking thus represents a potential strategy for large banking groups to compete in areas 
where the high initial cost of traditional ‘brick and mortar’ branches and the dominant position of 
local players have traditionally acted as barriers to entry. BANKING CONSOLIDATION IN THE EU | 55 
The three main goals of the new Accord are to introduce a framework that is more risk-sensitive 
and compatible with current market practices; to provide incentives for banks to improve their 
risk measurements and management procedures; and to better align regulatory capital with 
economic capital. 
With regards to the first pillar, the new Accord offers alternative approaches to credit risk 
measurements, ranging from the standardised approach to a more sophisticated one called the 
internal rating-based approach (IRB). While the standardised approach is the simplest, it 
represents a significant change and improvement with respect to the 1988 capital adequacy 
guidelines. It incorporates a finer gradation of risks based on the external ratings assessment of 
the different weighting categories of claims.  
The IRB approach ranging from the foundation to the advanced approach allows banks to adopt 
their internal rating systems after a proper validation by the relevant national supervisory 
authorities. These approaches are considered to be quite challenging for banks, taking into 
account the entire body of credit portfolio assessment criteria. As such, the IRB approach 
represents a considerable amount of complexity but permits a fine and efficient internal risk 
assessment.  
As far as the second pillar is concerned, it requires banks to demonstrate their ability to justify 
to their supervisors the use of their internal systems to assess their risk profile and the allocation 
of economic capital, as well as to improve their risk management. Finally, the third pillar 
focuses on efficient market disclosure.  
4.2.3.2  What strategic impacts for European banks?  
At the European level, the new capital Accord will be implemented as a European capital 
adequacy directive 3 (CAD3), taking into account the main characteristics of the European 
banking industry. This directive along with its annexes will be applied to credit institutions and 
investment firms by the end of 2006. Undoubtedly, these new regulatory rules will strongly 
impact the structure of the European banking industry. This is true for at least three reasons.  
Firstly, the new rules-setting will entail capital reallocation in banking portfolios (or ‘strategic 
reorientation’) by introducing significantly different capital requirements across most 
activities/segments depending upon the approach adopted (standardised, IRB foundation or IRB 
advanced). More precisely, banks would have to hold higher capital charges for higher-risk 
segments, such as low-rated SMEs, low-rated sovereigns, and also investment, asset 
management or custody activities, which had had no capital charges assigned to them under the 
current Accord. On the other hand, capital charges for retail, consumer credit, mortgage or 
leasing activities might decrease depending on the approach used. Hence, to enhance their 
solvency, many banks would be confronted with the choice either of re-capitalisation or 
withdrawal from riskier activities. Not being able to match the requirement of the universal 
banking model, these banks might trigger a trend towards a specialisation or re-specialisation 
strategy.
128 
Secondly, the new Accord may be a driver of M&A activity (see Table 15). Indeed, banking 
M&As have traditionally been motivated by ‘synergies’, typically opportunities to reduce costs 
or increase cross-sales of products. The new Accord raises the prospect of capital synergies as a 
                                                 
128 According to Christian de Boissieu (2001), “We should assist in the coming years to ‘re-specialisation’ 
of certain European banking institutions which will not be able to match, in the long run, the requirements 
of the ‘universal banking’ model. This phenomenon could be designated under the ‘overshooting’ 
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driving factor. Banks that use the most sophisticated and costly
129 IRB approaches can 
potentially liberate capital to acquire less sophisticated banks.  
Table 15. Summary of Basel II impacts on M&As 
M&A factors  Basel II impacts 
Capital release  Acquirers release capital through IRB compliance to help fund purchase 
Unsophisticated banks facing increase in capital requirements under 
standardised approach could be acquired 
Portfolio mixes  Business line profitability shifts prompt shake-outs. Retail banks benefit 
from increased balance sheet flexibility 
Targets identification  Enhanced disclosure via Pillar 3 on risk and capital position aids 
screening of targets and due diligence 
Regional focus for expansion  Regulatory capital changes will differ by country/region, yielding a 
concentration of possible targets 
National barriers  Basel II and IAS reduce international regulatory and accounting 
differences 
Source: Mercer Oliver Wyman (2003). 
 
Indeed, according to the Quantitative Impact Study 3 (QIS 3) results,
130 European banks are 
expected to release capital if they use the IRB approaches (see Table 16).  
Table 16. The global impact of the Basel II proposals on minimum capital requirements 
  Standardised approach  IRB foundation approach  IRB advanced approach 
  Average Max Min  Average  Max  Min  Average  Max  Min 
G10 Group 1  11%  84%  -15%  3%  55%  -32%  -2%  46%  -36% 
G10 Group 2  3%  81%  -23%  -19%  41%  -58%       
EU Group 1  6%  31%  -7%  -4%  55%  -32%  -6%  26%  -31% 
EU Group 2  1%  81%  -67%  -20%  41%  -58%       
Others Group 1 & 2  12%  103%  -17%  4%  75%  -33%       
Notes: Group 1: Banks are large, diversified and internationally active with tier-one capital in excess of €3 billion. 
Group 2: Banks are smaller and, in many cases, more specialised. 
Source: BIS (2003). 
 
This capital could be reallocated more efficiently either internally by streamlining the portfolio 
to less risky activities or to acquire unsophisticated banks having a strong potential to unlock 
capital. Conversely, smaller banks that cannot adopt sophisticated and efficient risk models will 
probably face an increase in capital requirements and a decrease in the quality of their balance 
sheet, thereby becoming easy targets for high performers’ institutions. As larger institutions will 
benefit from adopting credit risk models to efficiently assess their portfolios and release capital, 
the motivation to reach a larger size will be a comparative advantage in the future, thus in all 
likelihood accelerating the consolidation wave.  
Finally, the new capital Accord will also foster the emergence of new competitors. Indeed, the 
developments of new regulatory models will encourage non-banking specialists to enter 
                                                 
129 According to a report carried out by Mercer Oliver Wyman (2003), banking institutions are spending 
an average of 5 basis points of assets on compliance, with the largest players typically investing between 
$100 and $200 million over the next five years. 
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financial services or to expand their portfolios. These firms will avoid the cost of compliance 
and be able to anticipate and adapt more quickly to the post-compliance world and in many 
cases hold less capital against the same business portfolio.  
Hence, Basel II will give the banking industry one of the biggest structural shocks it has 
experienced in decades. In the future, advances in risk and balance sheet management will be a 
clear signal of potential success. Since both strategic and tactical decisions to address the post-
Basel II era need to be made, the winners and losers in Europe will become increasingly 
identifiable as the date for Basel II implementation approaches. 
Based on previous developments, it does not seem that there is an ultimate reference model for 
banking institutions that will prevail in Europe in the coming years. Until today, there is no 
standard and/or single strategic rule to guarantee the success of one or another banking model at 
the beginning of the 21
st century. The only certainty is that customer satisfaction, shareholder 
value and compliance with the new capital requirements will be the core objectives of any 
opportunity or strategic action to come (see Figure 18).  
The prospect of growing cross-sectoral and cross-border consolidation as well as the likely 
convergence of a substantial number of financial institutions to the new universal retail banking 
model, operating in different activities or/and countries, will certainly create new challenges to 
supervisory authorities in Europe. Indeed, the proper monitoring of large and complex financial 
institutions requires effective coordination and cooperation between supervisors within one 
country, as well as between the national supervisors in different countries.  
In that context and given the considerably fragmented and heterogeneous structure of European 
financial supervision, there is a growing need for cross-sectoral and cross-border financial 
supervision.
131 
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Figure 18. The main characteristics of the new banking model in the EU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3  Which prospects for European supervisory authorities? 
The diagnosis of the industry in the 1990s has shown that the consolidation wave has 
contributed to an increase of concentration levels in the domestic markets and to a constitution 
of banking and/or financial cross-border conglomerates operating in different activities and 
countries in the EU. Future trends towards more cross-border and cross-sector transactions will 
generate a new type of systemic fragility by widening the area of the ‘too-big-to-fail’ rule.
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This situation is likely to increase the difficulties in supervising financial institutions at national 
and cross-border levels. Consequently, the task of supervisors has become more demanding.  
Besides that, the transition period between the current regulatory capital accord and the new one 
(Basel II) and the extension of the Lamfalussy process to banking and insurance will create new 
challenges for supervisors, which have to find a balance between adaptability and flexibility. To 
respond to these changes and to contain moral hazard, the supervisory authorities must not only 
improve the monitoring of large banks and financial conglomerates but also make sure of the 
reliability of the control procedures applicable to small and medium-sized banks. Undoubtedly, 
this would influence the organisation of prudential policy and banking supervision.  
Many initiatives have already been taken to develop the practical functioning of supervision and 
to enhance cooperation between the competent authorities as a first step. Indeed, closer 
cooperation might prevent systemic crises and financial instability, and provide an answer to the 
deficiencies due to the geographical decentralisation of the current European supervisory 
mechanisms and their traditional institutional anchoring. However, in this context of strong 
financial market integration and increased cross-border and cross-sector consolidation activity, 
the European supervisory authorities are facing new challenges to effectively preserve financial 
stability and to contain systemic crises.  
4.3.1  The institutional framework and the current state of cooperation in 
banking supervision  
The institutional framework for banking supervision in the EU countries has been established by 
Community directives – notably the first banking directive in 1977 and the second in 1989 – 
and relies on two building blocks: national competence (based on the principles of home 
country control and mutual recognition) and cooperation.  
Firstly, by being close to financial institutions at a national level, supervisors could exercise 
better control if any cause for concern over financial stability appears. This option favours 
timely access to information and allows detailed monitoring of banks’ activities.  National 
competencies are based on two fundamental principles for the practical functioning of the 
supervision:  
1.  Home country control requires that an institution remains subject to the exclusive control of 
the supervisory authorities of its home country. Thus, a financial institution can expand 
throughout the EU countries (offering cross-border services or establishing branches) 
without extra supervision. The host country has to recognise the home country authorities’ 
supervision. However, the home country authorities are not responsible for the financial 
stability of the host countries (it is the responsibility of the host country to monitor the 
stability of its financial system).  
The arguments in favour of home country control are two-fold. Firstly, it promotes the 
effectiveness of the supervision, as the national supervisor can make a group-wide 
assessment of the risk profile and the required capital adequacy of financial institutions. 
Secondly, it promotes the efficiency of supervision, since financial institutions are not 
confronted with different supervisors likely to result in a duplication of efforts and a higher 
regulatory burden.
133 
                                                 
133 In practice, financial institutions also operate through subsidiaries (separate legal entities) in other 
countries. These subsidiaries are separately licensed and supervised by the host country authorities. Large 
financial institutions such as ABN AMRO or Deutsche Bank report to over 20 supervisors in the EU 
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2.  Mutual recognition of the authorisations granted to EU banking institutions by their national 
banking regulatory authorities. Hence, an institution based in one member state can use its 
national authorisation as a ‘passport’ to export its activities to other member states, either 
through the establishment of branches or through the cross-border provision of services.  
Secondly, to avoid the possible drawbacks of a fully decentralised approach vis-à-vis an 
increasingly integrated financial services market, the principle of  cooperation between the 
competent authorities is forcefully stated within the institutional framework of the EU. More 
precisely, the European supervisory and regulatory cooperation option consists of the adoption 
of transverse and cross-border information networks throughout the EU countries at the bilateral 
and multilateral level.  
Bilateral cooperation is based on a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which is a form of 
agreement between supervisors having no legal force, but defining the tasks and obligations of 
both parties. It covers information exchanges between national supervisors and also aims to 
insure the good functioning and efficient supervision of the financial institutions.
134 On the other 
hand, the multilateral cooperation between regulators and supervisors (see Table 17), assured by 
several other committees, aims to improve the rules and the practices of the supervision and to 
assure an equal treatment.  
Although the current institutional framework of banking supervision – based on a decentralised 
approach combined with ever-more cooperation – has functioned fairly well up to now, it does 
not seem to be appropriate in an increasingly open and competitive EU context. Indeed, in a 
period of strong market integration, financial market volatility and increased cross-border or 
cross-sector activity stimulated by EMU and EU enlargements, the highly fragmented
135 
European supervisory structures could reveal their limits in three cases: the supervision of the 
financial conglomerates, the supervision of cross-border groups and the management of 
systemic crises
136 within the eurozone.  
Being aware of the inadequate regulatory and supervisory structures, national and European 
authorities undertook a number of institutional and structural reforms in order to improve the 
efficiency of the current system. As a consequence, many actions have recently been initiated to 
address the deficiencies of the current system.  
In October 2002, the European Commission launched an open consultation on improving the 
way the EU institutions draw up, adopt and put into effect legislation on financial services 
(banking, insurance and financial conglomerates). The objective is to strengthen supervisory 
practices and boost regulatory convergence between the member states, as well to shorten the 
time necessary for adapting financial regulation to new market developments and practices.  
                                                 
134 In banking, some 90 bilateral MoUs had been signed by the end of 1999. 
135 Presently, supervision in the EU is dispersed over an extremely complex network of some 39 different 
institutions and authorities at national or European level. 
136 In the EFC report (2001), the Economic and Financial Committee deplored the fact that the level of 
coordination between prudential supervisors was still inadequate, especially with regard to devising 
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The consultation is based on a report
137 from the EU’s Economic and Financial Committee 
(EFC), endorsed on 8 October 2002 by the Ecofin Council meeting in Luxembourg and 
approved by the Council in December 2002. In particular, under the new approach based on 
extending the Lamfalussy framework to the banking and the insurance sectors, the EFC report 
recommends that arrangements should adhere to those already implemented in the securities 
sector based on existing inter-institutional agreements, whilst also recognising sectoral 
characteristics.
138 
Then, in November 2002, the European Parliament adopted the financial conglomerates 
directive
139 as provided in the strategic objective 3 (namely “prudential rules and supervision”) 
of the Commission's Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP). This directive will enhance the 
prudential soundness and effective supervision of financial conglomerates, defined as large 
financial groups active in different financial sectors and often across borders, which are 
important for the overall stability of the financial system. It will also promote convergence in 
national supervisory approaches and will make a much-needed contribution to the stability of 
the financial sector. 
More recently, in March 2003, the banking supervisory authorities and the central banks in the 
EU have agreed on a Memorandum of Understanding on high-level principles of cooperation in 
crisis management situations.
140 The cooperation envisaged in the MoU aims to pursue the 
                                                 
137 In April 2002, the informal Ecofin Council in Oviedo, having agreed on the need to ensure that the EU 
has appropriate structures in place for financial supervision to deal with a rapidly changing financial 
environment, invited the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) to assess and report on possible 
arrangements for improving financial regulation and supervision in the EU. A preliminary report on 
financial regulation, supervision and stability assessing possible options was presented to the Ecofin 
Council meeting in July 2002, and a final report was completed in October 2002.  
138 EFC (2002). 
139 The directive on financial conglomerates stipulates that a single supervisory authority should be 
appointed to coordinate the overall supervision of a conglomerate – which may involve many different 
authorities dealing with different parts of the conglomerate’s activities – and sets out the scope of the 
responsibilities of that coordinating supervisor. Then, while granting that current MoUs between banking 
and insurance supervisors are an adequate way to treat financial conglomerates whose activity spreads 
across a limited number of countries, this directive implicitly acknowledges that this form of cooperation 
may be insufficient when facing future conglomerates operating all over Europe. Furthermore, the 
directive amends some existing rules for homogeneous financial groups (banking groups, insurance 
groups and investment firm groups) in order to achieve more coherence and ensure a minimum of 
equivalence between the supervisory regimes for such groups and financial conglomerates. This directive 
must be implemented by member states within 18 months of its publication in the Official Journal.  
140 This MoU, which is not a public document, consists of a set of principles and procedures for cross-
border cooperation between banking supervisors and central banks in crisis situations. These principles 
and procedures deal specifically with the identification of the authorities responsible for crisis 
management, the required flows of information between all the involved authorities and the practical 
conditions for sharing information at the cross-border level. The MoU also provides for the setting-up of a 
logistical infrastructure to support enhanced cross-border cooperation between authorities. The 
framework defined in the MoU will apply in crisis situations with a possible cross-border impact 
involving individual credit institutions or banking groups, or relating to disturbances in money and 
financial markets and/or market infrastructures (including payments infrastructures) with  potential 
common implications for member states. Cooperation will take the form required by the specific features 
of the crisis and with regard to all the relevant supervisory and central banking tasks and functions, and 
will be consistent with the necessary flexibility of action of each of the authorities involved. Crisis 
management procedures will in practice involve a wider range of authorities and respective functions than 
those within the scope of this MoU. They include ministries of finance and deposit insurance funds, 
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common objective of banking supervisors and central banks to ensure the stability of the 
financial system. The progress made in the integration of financial markets and market 
infrastructures in the EU, the growing number of large and complex financial institutions and 
the diversification of financial activities have increased the liquidity and efficiency of the 
relevant markets. At the same time, such developments may also increase the likelihood of 
systemic disturbances affecting more than one member state, and possibly increase the scope for 
cross-border contagion.  
In this context, the MoU aims to enhance the practical arrangements for handling crises at the 
EU level, since smooth interaction between supervisory and central banking functions will 
facilitate an early assessment of the systemic scope of a crisis and contribute to effective crisis 
management. The MoU also represents a contribution by banking supervisors and central banks 
towards meeting the recommendations made by the Economic and Financial Committee in its 
report on financial crisis management (EFC, 2001), as endorsed by the Ecofin Council. In order 
to follow up on the recommendations of this report, the Banking Supervision Committee of the 
European System of Central Banks worked on the definition of cooperation principles and 
procedures, and these have now been formalised in the MoU. 
Finally, in November 2003, the European Commission launched a package of seven measures 
consisting of one directive and six Commission decisions aiming to create a modern and 
streamlined decision-making structure for financial services designed to improve regulatory and 
supervisory cooperation. The package aims to extend the committee structure and approach that 
has been used in the securities sector since 2002 to banking, insurance and investment funds 
(UCITS). Once agreed and implemented, the measures will produce real benefits by allowing 
greater and more detailed cooperation between supervisors and much greater convergence in 
day-to-day regulation and supervision.
141 
In banking, two committees are set up (see Table 17). The European Banking Committee 
(EBC), which is a regulatory committee, serves to advise and assist the European Commission 
in adopting implementing measures in banking legislation, as well as adapting the EU 
directives. The Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), which is a supervisory 
committee, aims to improve the practical implementation of EU law in their respective fields in 
the member states. 
                                                                                                                                               
EU authorities in the case of crises originating or having an impact outside the EU. The MoU can 
therefore be regarded as a contribution to other cooperation arrangements that might be implemented or 
may be developed in the future involving other relevant authorities. The banking supervisory authorities 
and central banks of acceding countries will be invited to become parties to the MoU once these countries 
have joined the EU. The MoU entered into effect on 1 March 2003.   
141 To avoid duplication of committees and to avoid pre-empting the views of both the European 
Parliament and the EU Council of Ministers, the Commission’s decisions to establish the EBC and 
EIOPC and to transfer responsibility for UCITS to the ESC and CESR would be suspended until the 
proposed directive replacing references to existing committees in current financial services legislation 
was adopted by the European Parliament and the Council. In addition, the package establishes two 
committees bringing together national supervisors, the CEBS and the CEIOPS, with effect from 1 January 
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Table 17. The new structure of European supervisory and regulatory cooperation  
 
  Banking  Insurance and 
occupational pensions 
Securities 
(including UCITS) 
Cross-sector and 
horizontal matters 
Regulatory 
European 
Banking 
Committee 
(EBC) 
European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions 
Committee (EIOPC) 
European Securities 
Committee (ESC) 
European Financial 
Conglomerates 
Committee (EFCC) 
Supervisory 
Committee of 
European 
Banking 
Supervisors 
(CEBS) 
Committee of European 
Insurance and 
Occupational Pension 
Supervisors (CEIOPS) 
Committee of 
European Securities 
Regulators (CESR) 
Financial Services  
Committee (FSC) 
Financial  
stability 
ECB’s Banking 
Supervision 
Committee 
(ESCB and EU 
non-central bank 
supervisors) 
  
Economic and 
Financial Committee 
(EFC) 
Source: European Commission. 
4.3.2  The main scenarios to a more effective supervision in the EU 
The choice of an appropriate model for Europe’s supervision – regarding in particular the 
organisational structure – has not yet received much attention. On a conceptual level, the range 
of possible models for the institutional structure of financial supervision at a national and a 
European level is identified by Kremers et al. (2001). The main scenarios are summarised in 
Table 18.  
Horizontally, the table shows a classification of the national models. In the sectoral model, there 
are separate supervisors for banking, insurance and securities. In the functional model, there are 
separate supervisors for each of the supervisory objectives: prudential supervision and conduct-
of-business (protection of consumers and investors).
142 Finally, in the integrated model, there is 
a single supervisor for banking, insurance and securities combined (or, put alternatively, one 
supervisor for prudential supervision and conduct of business combined). At the time being, all 
three national models can be observed at a domestic scale in Europe, but the organisational 
structure of national supervision is changing in most European countries (see Annex 8). 
Vertically, the table shows various forms of European models. The first level depicts 
decentralised supervision with some form of cooperation between national supervisors. 
Cooperation means decision-making by consensus. The second level is coordination between 
national supervisors. Coordination means international decision-making by autonomous 
national decision-makers according to some sort of rule (e.g. majority voting). The third level is 
the two-tier model; the largest banking or insurance institutions that operate increasingly at 
cross-border and cross-sector levels would be supervised at the European level whereas the 
local institutions could still be supervised at the national level. The two-tier system may 
constitute the right balance between efficiency and proximity.  
 
                                                 
142 The functional model is also known as the ‘twin peaks’ model (Taylor, 1995).  64 | AYADI & PUJALS 
Finally, the fourth level is a centralised structure of supervision. A centralised solution means 
that supervision is organised on a European basis instead of a national basis. Decision-making 
on supervisory policy in that case is shifted from the national to the European level. The 
European structure is currently moving from cooperation to coordination with the extension of 
the Lamfalussy approach to the whole financial market.   
Table 18. The main scenarios leading to an appropriate model for European banking 
supervision 
National models 
 
European 
models 
Sectoral 
(Separation between 
banking, insurance and 
securities) 
Cross-sector: Functional 
(Separation between 
prudential supervision and 
conduct-of-business) 
Cross-sector: 
integrated 
(all sectors, all 
practices) 
Decentralised 
with cooperation 
Cooperation in sectoral 
committees 
Cooperation in functional 
committees 
Cooperation between 
national single agencies 
(FSAs) 
Coordination 
(or enhanced 
cooperation) 
Coordination between national 
sectoral supervisors: 
Harmonisation in sectoral 
regulation 
Convergence in supervisory 
practices in banking, 
insurance and securities 
respectively 
Coordination between 
functional supervisors: 
Functional EU-wide 
legislation 
Convergence in supervisory 
practices in prudential 
supervision and conduct-of-
business supervision 
Coordination between 
national single agencies: 
Tendency toward single 
financial services market 
act within the EU 
Convergence in 
supervisory practices 
between national single 
agencies 
Two-tier 
Separate European banking 
and insurance supervisors for 
large cross-border institutions 
and national supervisors for 
local entities 
Coordination between the two 
level of supervision  + 
European financial market 
agency 
European prudential or 
conduct-of- business 
supervisors for large 
internationally operating 
institutions (financial 
conglomerates) and national 
prudential or conduct-of- 
business supervisors for local 
entities 
Coordination between the 
two level of supervision + 
European financial market 
agency 
European single agency 
for large cross-border  
institutions and financial 
markets + national single 
agencies for local entities
Coordination between 
the two level of 
supervision 
Centralised 
Separate European banking, 
insurance and securities 
supervisors 
European prudential 
supervisor and European 
conduct-of-business 
supervisors (broad SEC) 
+ European financial 
market agency 
European Single Agency 
(European FSA) 
Sources: Kremers et al. (2001) and authors.  
 
There are two important questions in this crucial debate on the future design of the structure for 
financial supervision in the EU: a) Would it be desirable to move from the current national 
structure to a European structure? b) If so, which model should be chosen for financial 
supervision at the European level? Both questions are controversial.  
The basic argument in favour of moving to a European structure is that it might be difficult to 
achieve simultaneously a single financial market and stability in the financial system, while 
preserving a high degree of nationally-based supervision with only decentralised efforts at BANKING CONSOLIDATION IN THE EU | 65 
harmonisation.
143 Arguments against moving to a European solution for the time being could be 
that the degree of integration in financial markets
144 does not yet justify such a move and that 
other preconditions have not yet been fulfilled, e.g. harmonisation of financial regulation. The 
pros and cons of moving supervision to the European level have been extensively debated in the 
literature.
145  
Nevertheless, we believe that the present stage of enhanced and strengthened 
cooperation/coordination
146 constitutes only a transitional period in a general trend, which will 
ultimately lead to the creation of one or several European integrated supervisors. Hence, it 
appears inevitable that the control of financial institutions and the decision-making process in 
Europe will have to be done through federal mechanisms even if the information remains 
decentralised. Although such developments are not currently feasible, given the still relatively 
fragmented financial services industry and the lack of psychological readiness on the part of 
national supervisors, the need for ever-closer union will become so urgent in the medium term 
that the choice of unified supervisor at European level will gradually come to appear preferable. 
Besides, a major crisis could force national authorities to hasten this inevitable conclusion.  
Further financial integration within the enlarged Europe may hence require a move to a more 
centralised system, as argued previously, but it is too early to provide a definitive answer 
regarding the optimal institutional structure of the supervision in the EU.
147 It might be entirely 
speculative to attempt to predict what would be the dominant model for European financial 
supervision, given the unpredictable structural changes within the financial services industry, 
and also due to the fact that no prospective scheme (integrated or single-sector specialised 
supervisors) is currently dominant. Indeed, the evidence is still mixed.   
Although an integrated financial supervisor approach may look attractive
148 from an 
organisational point of view and with respect to the future challenges of financial supervision, it 
also makes sense to have specialised supervisors for banking, insurance and securities (see Box 
4). Indeed, in term of objectives, the independence between a securities market supervisor and a 
banking supervisor, for instance, is relevant, as the former’s priority is to protect retail investors, 
whereas the latter may have overriding priorities in relation to preserving profitability and the 
soundness of financial institutions.  
Secondly, no empirical research has yet found which organisational model would perform better 
in terms of achieving the objectives of supervision (financial stability, prudently managed 
financial institutions and proper treatment of consumers). Furthermore, some authors argue that 
                                                 
143 Thygesen (2002). 
144 The process of integrating 15 national financial systems is not yet completed. While wholesale markets 
are generally largely integrated (with the exception of the fragmented clearing and settlement 
infrastructure), retail markets are still highly fragmented within the EU. However, the introduction of euro 
notes and coins in 2002 as well as the removal of remaining legal and regulatory obstacles as envisaged in 
the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) of the European Commission (to be completed by 2005) may 
give new impetus to the integration of retail markets.  
145 Prati & Schinasi (1999), Lannoo (2000) and Vives (2001). 
146 The European structure is currently moving from cooperation to coordination with the implementation 
of the Lamfalussy approach to speed-up the regulatory process and to foster supervisory convergence in 
the EU. 
147 Kremers et al. (2001). 
148 Recently, the increasing conglomeration trend leading to more complex financial services groups has 
been an important argument in favour of an integrated financial supervisor, but its advantages, compared 
to specialist supervisors, are not clear-cut. See Lannoo (2002) for more details.   66 | AYADI & PUJALS 
a certain competition may be beneficial to highlight the strengths and the weaknesses of the 
different models.
149 
 
 
However, all possible models should provide a close link between the prudential supervisor and 
the central bank, which is always responsible for safeguarding financial stability
150 (see Box 5 
and Annex 8). This link with the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) is especially 
important in EMU, since the integration of payment systems and the interbank market could 
lead to an increase in systemic risk across borders. Central banks are the first to detect this kind 
of problem and the access by central banks to supervisory information is crucial in these 
circumstances.
151 
                                                 
149 Fender & Von Hagen (1998). 
150 According to Padoa-Schioppa (2002): “Central banks do play and should play an important role in 
maintaining financial stability, regardless of the institutional structure of supervision”. He defined central 
banks’ financial stability functions as occupying a land in between monetary policy and supervision, 
somewhat independent of both functions. Smooth interplay on both borders is, however, crucial. He 
didn’t see a fundamental conflict of interest between preserving price stability and being concerned with 
financial stability. A successful monetary policy (in keeping prices stable) will not always be sufficient to 
prevent financial instability. Hence, central banks cannot be indifferent to financial stability. While 
central bank involvement in financial stability is distinct from, and complementary to, supervisory 
functions, the role of the central bank needs to be embedded in an appropriate overall supervisory regime, 
whether or not it is due to the Central bank. Successful conduct of supervisory and central bank functions 
requires close cooperation and information exchange, and central banks should continue to provide advice 
on supervisory rules and policies. Moreover, according to Duisenberg (2002): “Central banks have a 
genuine interest to prevent any financial instability from arising, which clearly has its origins in the 
Treaty on European Union. Indeed, the Treaty states that the ESCB shall contribute to the smooth conduct 
of policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions 
and the stability of the financial system”. 
151 Goodhart & Schoenmaker (1995).  
Box 4. Specialist vs. integrated financial supervisor: Comparative advantages 
 
Advantages of a specialist supervisor 
•  Lower profile 
•  Clearly defined mandate 
•  Easier to manage 
•  Better adapted to the differences in risk profiles and nature of the respective financial businesses (e.g. retail 
vs. wholesale), clear focus on objectives and rationale of regulation 
•  Closer to the business (but not necessarily) 
•  Better knowledge of the business, more specialisation 
•  Stimulates inter-agency competition    
 
Advantages of an integrated financial supervisor 
•  One-stop shopping for authorisations, and (possibly) a single rule book 
•  Adapted to evolution in financial sector towards more complex financial products (as credit-derivatives) and 
financial conglomerates 
•  Eases cooperation between sectoral supervisor; one lead supervisor or a single supervisory team for 
conglomerates 
•  Can reduce regulatory arbitrage and deliver regulatory neutrality 
•  Pooling of expertise and economies of scale (certain units could be merged; e.g. authorisations, support 
services) 
•  Lower supervisory fees 
•  More transparent to consumers 
 
Source: Lannoo (2002).BANKING CONSOLIDATION IN THE EU | 67 
 
Also, the introduction of more risk-sensitive capital requirements (as envisaged by Basel II in 
banking and Solvency II in insurance) may require stronger interaction of the macro-approach 
of the central bank and the micro-approach of the prudential supervisor. While risk-sensitive 
capital requirements foster good risk management (micro), they may also increase pro-
cyclicality (macro) as these requirements are sensitive to business cycle effects (increasing 
capital charges and limiting credit supply, right when the economy is slowing). To dampen 
these pro-cyclical effects, supervisors may need to require higher capital buffers in ‘good’ 
periods, which can in turn be drawn down in ‘bad’ periods.
152 Consequently, it seems evident 
that the central bank should be properly involved in the various forms of future EU-wide 
prudential supervision. 
                                                 
152 Schoenmaker & Wierts (2002). 
Box 5. The central bank and supervision: Pros and cons 
 
Arguments in favour of assigning supervisory capacity to the central bank. A central bank is best placed: 
•  To distinguish between problems of liquidity and solvency in order to minimise the losses associated with 
loans granted and making possible a role as crisis manager;  
•  To determine the best kind of intervention (open-market or discount operations); 
•  To profit from economies of scope in the acquisition of information between the function of providing 
liquidity and that of supervising; and 
•  To exploit synergies between the conduct of monetary policy and information collected with supervisory 
purposes. Indeed, banking supervisory information (early warning of problems with non-performing loans 
or changes in the lending pattern of banks) may improve the accuracy of macro-economic forecasts.  
 
Arguments against the central bank having supervisory capacity: 
•  The combination of control of monetary policy and the role of lender of last resort (LLR) at the dentral 
bank raises an inflationary concern. However, a central bank committed to price stability will sterilise the 
injections of liquidity necessary for the stability of the system in the event of crisis (as the Federal Reserve 
did in 1987) so that there is no undesired increase in the money supply. In practice, matters may not be so 
simple, however, and intervention as LLR may give rise to confusion in the expectations of the private 
sector regarding the central bank’s monetary policy stance. 
•  There may be a conflict of interest between the reputation of the central banks as guarantor of currency and 
financial stability. For example, concern for the reputation of the central bank as supervisor may encourage 
an excessive use of the LLR facility so that bank crises will not put its supervisory capacity in question. 
Underlying the conflict of interest concern are incentive problems among regulators related to their career 
concerns, accountability and monitoring of their multiple tasks, allocation of control, incentives to produce 
information and potential capture (see Vives, 2000). 
•  Some preliminary evidence indicates that central bank involvement in supervision may increase inflation 
(see Bini Smaghi, 2000 and Di Noia & Di Giorgio, 1999). 
 
The case for an independent FSA. Arguments for the separation of supervision from the central bank: 
•  Separation facilitates the optimal provision of incentives to self-interested bureaucrats so as to minimise 
conflicts of interest. 
•  The convergence between the activities of financial institutions and markets points to the need for the 
combined regulation of banking, insurance and securities. It is becoming increasingly difficult to separate 
market-derived risk from credit risk. Banking crises that involve operations with financial derivatives (such 
as Barings or LTCM) seem to require specialised knowledge of the market regulator. At the same time, 
banking and insurance tend to converge. 
•  There are also EU-related political economy considerations. In a system in which the ECB is already 
perceived as having too much power and faces accountability questions, the creation of an independent 
regulatory agency may help lessen both concerns. It is easier to hold an agency accountable that has a well-
defined mission. 
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4.3.3 Concluding  remarks 
Historically, different models of regulation and supervision for the financial sector have been 
developed in the member states. The different solutions currently seen are the result of local 
developments and market situations, inevitably leading to diverging perceptions and priorities. 
Therefore, unfortunately, total harmonisation of modes of regulation, in the short run, even if it 
would be warmly welcomed, is probably not within reach.  
However, the lack of harmonisation of supervision and regulation is an important obstacle to the 
development of cross-border financial services, which is one of the major ways of creating an 
integrated and more efficient European financial sector. Moreover, a harmonised framework for 
supervision will contribute to improving the stability of the European financial system. 
Given this situation, it is of vital importance in the short run that the goals and functioning of 
supervisors should be totally compatible between all member states and that a process of 
continuous convergence is encouraged by the political authorities. The initiative taken in 
November 2003 by the European Commission to extend the Lamfalussy approach for securities 
to the banking and insurance sectors is a first step not only to improve the organisation, 
cooperation and coordination between regulators and supervisors in Europe, but also to ensure 
more convergence in supervisory practices. But clearly this is not sufficient as was recently 
stated by the EFR, a group of leading European bank and insurers formed in 2001, to provide a 
strong industry voice on European policy issues relating to financial services.
 153 
In the meantime, an open debate in Europe about the future institutional structure of financial 
services supervision is also necessary. Several solutions can be envisaged. One possibility is a 
structure similar to the ESCB, with a centralised organisation, e.g. a European FSA. Another 
possibility is a specific organisation, operating in all member states, exclusively for cross-border 
financial institutions (two-tier model). For each of these possible solutions, a choice has to be 
made between a single supervisor or specialised supervisors for each sector (banking, insurance 
and securities).  
Consequently, it is clear that reform of the future organisation of supervision is a complex 
process which raises many questions requiring thoughtful and carefully researched answers. 
Moreover, a complete overhaul of the regulatory and institutional framework, in the short run, 
might provoke institutional battles and bring more confusion instead of improving the quality of 
supervision. Hence, we recommend a pragmatic step-by-step approach, both at the national and 
at the European level, which joins all forces to ensure efficient and effective supervision of 
financial services in Europe.  
                                                 
153 In October 2003, the European Financial Services Round Table (EFR) presented an appeal for 
harmonised supervision and regulation in the European financial sector. In its main recommendations, the 
EFR strongly appealed for an increased harmonisation on a European level, promoted convergence of 
supervisory practices (e.g. changing supervisory organisation only after consultation) and asked for an 
urgent debate on the future institutional structure of supervision in Europe. According to EFR: “The 
extension of the Lamfalussy approach to the banking and insurance financial sectors offers an opportunity 
to improve the organisation and functioning of regulation and supervision in Europe. Nevertheless, there 
is a risk that the process will not produce the expected results because timing and goals are not precisely 
defined. In addition it is not clear who will be in the driving seat to point the process in the direction in 
which it should be heading. The idea that discussion between local supervisors will lead to convergence 
and best practices is an optimistic view of a complicated and time-consuming process. Furthermore, there 
is no clear incentive to organise efficient coordination between the different sectors. Finally, the 
responsibility and mission of each of the committees within the framework of the global European 
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Nevertheless, in the medium to long-term, it seems generally accepted that an integrated 
European financial sector – initiatives such as the FSAP aim precisely to remove the remaining 
obstacles – implies de facto an integrated European structure for regulation and supervision. 
Major discussions about the future institutional model of financial supervision for Europe 
should start as soon as possible in order to move towards a gradual convergence of local 
systems or at least to avoid further divergence. 
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Chapter 5 
General Conclusions 
The diagnosis of the banking industry of Europe in the 1990s showed an intensification of 
M&A activity. This has led not only to the emergence of large banking groups at the domestic 
level, ready to deploy out of their national market if competition concerns were to be raised by 
the national authorities, but has also contributed to the consolidation process in countries where 
a fragmented banking market still prevails. This trend has been accelerating owing to the 
continuously changing regulatory and competitive environment which creates pressures for 
change in order to remain competitive and to benefit fully from the dynamic character of the 
financial market.  
The diversity of European banking markets was illustrated by the difference in consolidation 
patterns across countries, showing that consolidation is more advanced in the north, with the 
exception of Germany, as compared to the countries in the south of Europe. This diversity will 
certainly lead to different evolutions in the medium term. In markets where the concentration 
threshold is reached, managers will look to cross-border opportunities, especially those offering 
the greatest growth given the strategic priorities. In markets where the priority is to reduce over-
capacity at domestic scale, further consolidation is required.  
Nevertheless, one can observe a strong contradiction in the recent M&A wave in banking. On 
the one hand, banking markets have been hit hard by this phenomenon, which has been steadily 
growing for over a decade. On the other, economic, strategic and financial studies aimed at 
assessing the real effects of banking consolidation on efficiency, shareholder value, customer 
welfare and financial stability were usually inconclusive. Is this a product of a strong divergence 
between the econometric evidence and the bankers’ beliefs or it is simply the shortage of pre-
merger analysis and the brevity of the post-merger period on which most economists and 
strategists have based their post-merger analysis? The reality is that M&As provide an 
appropriate means to grow externally and to expand into one or more different markets to 
increase revenues and sometimes to reduce operating costs if the activities imply redundant 
fixed costs. 
In the European context, the previous regulatory developments and the ongoing ones have 
facilitated the emergence of the universal banking model, which combine retail and investment 
activities, and in some cases insurance activities. Wisdom suggests that this model is more 
likely to achieve the theoretical underlying diversification benefits of M&As. This might raise 
questions in the future, however, as regards the co-existence of multi-specialised banking and 
specialised banking institutions and their optimal size.  
As was stated earlier in this paper, it is difficult to set a general rule between diversification and 
specialisation alternatives. It is essential for all institutions to approach this strategic 
interrogation with flexibility and pragmatism. Universal and specialised banking institutions 
will continue to co-exist in Europe, each one having its specific characteristics and responding 
to individual needs. And although many banking activities will be increasingly dependent on a 
larger size, it is fundamental to note that ‘big is beautiful’ is not an absolute criterion of 
efficiency and profitability, for it may entail the extension of the application of the ‘too-big-to-
fail principle’. It is more the product mix and finally, the selected consumer target that will 
determine the optimum size of a bank. 
Accordingly, it is necessary to preserve market competition forces to ensure an efficient and 
secure financial market that delivers full benefits to consumers and investors. Competition is 
either preserved by structural changes provided by the market itself, e.g. technological advances 
that permit the enhancement of the quality of the service – the emergence of financial services BANKING CONSOLIDATION IN THE EU | 71 
providers in competition with the traditional providers, or regulatory intervention. Regulatory 
and supervisory authorities intervene to ensure financial stability and to contain financial crises.  
In Europe the objective of integrating 15 financial markets, which is reaching 25 with the 
enlargement, poses a strong challenge to competent authorities. Many achievements have 
already been recorded, at the same time that the financial industry has been reshaped thanks to 
the consolidation process, including cross-border and cross-sectoral consolidation. The 
emergence of complex cross-border and cross-sectoral groups in the financial services sector 
will increase the difficulty for supervisors to ensure day-to-day supervision.  
Moreover, the transition from the current capital accord to the new one and the implementation 
of the growing number of directives in the context of the FSAP will create new challenges for 
supervisors, which have to find a balance between flexibility and adaptability to respond to 
these prominent changes. The main issue to be addressed is the future institutional organisation 
of prudential policy and banking supervision.  
It is true that the recent initiative taken by the European Commission aiming to extend the 
Lamfalussy approach to banking and insurance is an important step to enhance cooperation and 
coordination between national supervisors to ensure more harmonisation and more convergence 
in the procedures in the supervisory procedures. But is this a permanent situation or simply a 
transitional structure aiming to achieve a complete integrated financial supervisor in the long 
term?  
Although several institutional structures can be envisaged for the financial supervision in 
Europe, it is clear that, in the medium- to long-term, the prospects for an integrated European 
financial sector implies de facto an integrated European structure for regulation and supervision. 
But in the short run, a complete overhaul of the regulatory and institutional framework might 
provoke institutional battles and bring more confusion instead of improving the quality of 
supervision. Hence, we recommend a pragmatic step-by-step approach, at both the national and 
the European level, which joins all forces to ensure efficient and effective supervision of 
financial services in Europe.  
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http://www.gomez.com 
http://www.jup.com/ 
http://www.kpmg.com/ 
http://www.mckinsey.com/ 
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Annexes 
Annex 1. The Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) 
Adopted by the European Commission on 11 May 1999, the Financial Services Action Plan 
(FSAP) outlines a series of policy objectives and specific measures to improve the Single 
Market for financial services over the next five years. This initiative stems notably from the 
introduction of the euro, the gathering pace of restructuring in the financial services sector and 
greater understanding of the need to take account of consumers’ concerns. The FSAP suggests 
indicative priorities and time-scales for legislative and other measures to tackle three main 
strategic objectives, namely completing a single wholesale financial services market, developing 
open and secure markets for retail financial services and ensuring the continued stability 
(prudential rules and supervision) of EU financial markets. 
1)  Completing a single wholesale market 
Market-driven modernisation of EU securities and derivatives markets (such as closer 
relationships between different exchanges and improved payment and securities settlement 
systems), spurred by the introduction of the euro, are already making it easier to issue and trade 
securities across the EU. This brings the potential to generate significant benefits in terms of 
liquidity, risk-spreading and the emergence of viable risk-capital markets (as an attractive 
alternative to debt-financing for SMEs). Carefully targeted EU regulatory measures can 
encourage and facilitate these market-driven improvements. The envisaged EU action would 
focus on: 
•  the removal of outstanding barriers to raising capital on an EU-wide basis (updating the 
directives on reporting requirements and prospectuses); 
•  a common legal framework for integrated securities and derivatives markets (inter alia 
clarification and possible amendment of the investment services directive, the proposal for a 
directive on market manipulation and the communication on the clarification of protection 
rules for sophisticated and retail investors); 
•  moving towards a single set of financial statements for listed companies (inter alia 
amendments to 4th and 7th company law directives); 
•  providing legal security to underpin cross-border securities trading (inter alia a proposal for 
a directive on cross-border use of collateral); 
•  creating a secure and transparent environment for cross-border restructuring (agreement on 
proposals for a European Company Statute and the takeover bids directive; proposals for 
Directives on cross-border mergers and transfers of company headquarters; requirement for 
disclosure of objective and stable criteria for authorisation of restructuring in the banking 
sector); and 
•  creating a sound framework in which asset managers can optimise the performance of their 
portfolios in the interest of the fund-holders (proposals for directives on prudential 
supervision of and tax arrangements for supplementary pensions and on closed-end 
collective investment funds).  
2)  Developing open and secure markets for retail financial services 
Consumers wishing to shop around for basic financial services, particularly with the spread of 
electronic commerce and other methods of distance selling, are likely to be frustrated by an 
array of legal, administrative and private law obstacles which hamper the cross-border purchase 
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identifies a number of pragmatic steps that could be undertaken to realise this objective. These 
steps would focus on: 
•  promoting enhanced information, transparency and security for cross-border provision of 
retail financial services (inter alia the proposed directive on distance selling of financial 
services), recommendation on mortgage credit information, proposed directive on insurance 
intermediaries and action plan to prevent counterfeiting and fraud in payment systems); 
•  expediting speedy resolution of consumer disputes through effective extra-judicial 
procedures (communication on out-of-court settlements); and 
•  balanced application of local consumer protection rules (inter alia communication on waiver 
from application of local consumer protection rules to business-to-business/sophisticated 
investor transactions, interpretative communication on ‘general good’ in the insurance 
sector).  
3) Ensuring the continued stability (prudential rules and supervision) of EU 
financial markets 
EU regulatory safeguards need to keep pace with new sources of financial risk and state-of the-
art supervisory practice in order to contain systemic or institutional risk (e.g. capital adequacy, 
solvency margins for insurance) and take account of changing market realities (where 
institutions are organised on a pan-European, cross-sectoral basis). Suggested measures include: 
•  moves to bring banking, insurance and securities prudential legislation up to the highest 
standards, taking account of the work of existing bodies such as the Basel Committee and 
the Forum of European Securities Commissions (adoption of proposed directives on 
winding-up and liquidation of banks and insurance companies and on electronic money, 
amendment to the money laundering directive, proposals to amend the capital framework 
for banks and investment firms and amend solvency margins for insurance companies); 
•  work on prudential supervision of financial conglomerates (proposal for a directive); and 
•  arrangements to increase cross-sectoral discussion and cooperation between authorities on 
issues of common concern (creation of a Securities Advisory Committee).  
4)  Eliminating tax obstacles to financial market integration 
The FSAP also addresses broader issues concerning an optimal single financial market, 
including the elimination of tax obstacles and distortions. The Commission considers that it 
would be technically unbalanced and politically difficult to boost the full realisation of a Single 
Market for financial services unless the parallel process of tax coordination currently underway 
delivers the expected results. The Action Plan therefore underlines the need for adoption of the 
proposed directive on minimum effective taxation of cross-border income from savings and 
implementation of the December 1997 Code of Conduct on business taxation. The Commission 
will also present a proposal for a directive to coordinate tax arrangements governing 
supplementary pensions and will further examine with the member states (within the Taxation 
Policy Group) ways to eliminate tax distortions on cross-border financial products (insurance 
and pension funds). 
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Annex 2. A Note on the Study’s Methodology 
The sample contained 151 completed mergers and acquisitions (120 domestic and 31 cross-
border deals) executed by banks headquartered in the EU. The announcement dates ranged 
between 01/01/1994 and 01/01/2001. The deals were obtained essentially from the Thompson 
Financial Securities, M&A SDC database and from press coverage. The period under scrutiny is 
of a particular interest because it immediately follows the regulatory changes associated with 
the completion of the single market programme in the EU, and it also covers the period before 
and after the introduction of the euro. As a breakdown is made between the domestic and the 
cross-border deals, both the single market programme and EMU are expected to be catalysts for 
cross-border M&A activity in banking.   
The analysis on the number, value and average value was carried out for the year of the 
announcement. Only the principal operations (based on the amount of the transaction) 
announced and carried out are taken into account.  
All the deals included in our study are horizontal takeovers that can either be classified as 
complete mergers (involving the combination of the consolidating partners) or majority 
acquisitions exceeding the threshold of 49% of voting rights (in which the acquiring bank buys 
a controlling equity stake in the target bank, and both banks remain legally separate entities), in 
order to take into account all the operations having generated a transfer of capital control.  
The targets and the acquirers are banking institutions as defined in the second banking directive. 
Insurance and ‘securities’ are excluded.  
Since the legal differences between the various types of institutional banks have been abolished, 
the sample contains commercial banks, savings institutions, cooperatives banks and public 
credit institutions.  84 | AYADI & PUJALS 
Annex 3. The Major M&A Deals in the EU Banking Sector, 1995-2002 
Year 
announced 
Acquirer  Origin Target Origin  Transaction 
amount  
(€ million) 
Type  
1995  Abbey National  UK  National And Provincial 
Building Society 
UK  1,628.5  Merger 
1995  Dresdner Bank  GER  Kleinwort Benson Group UK  1,168.3  Merger 
1995  Lloyds Bank  UK  Tsb Group  UK  11,667.1 Merger 
1995  Ing  NL  Barings  UK  770  Merger 
1996  Svenska Handelsbanken  SW  Stadshypotek  SW  2,723.5  Merger 
1996  Caisse Nationale Du 
Credit Agricole 
FRA  Banque Indosuez  FRA  970.3 Acquisition
1996  Mediocredito Centrale  ITA  Banco Di Napoli  ITA  1,401.1 Acquisition
1996  Credit Local De France   FRA  Credit Communal De 
Belgique 
BEL  1,488  Acquisition
1997  Societe Generale   FRA  Credit Du Nord  FRA  332.8  Merger 
1997  Sparbanken Severige  SW  Foreningsbanken  SW  1,153.8 Merger 
1997  Bayerische Vereinsbank  GER  Bayerische Hypotheken-
Und Wechselbank 
GER  6,491.3 Merger 
1997  Nordbanken  SWE  Merita   FIN  3,831.2  Merger 
1997  Banco Ambrosiano 
Veneto 
ITA  Cariplo  ITA  4,071.5 Merger 
1997  Bank Austria   AUS  Creditanstalt  AUS  1,241.6 Acquisition 
1997  Cie Financiere De 
Paribas 
FRA  Cetelem  FRA  1,919.8 Acquisition
1997  Cie Financiere De 
Paribas 
FRA  Compagnie Bancaire  FRA  2,406 Acquisition
1998  Almanij Kredietbank  BEL  Centrale 
Raiffeisenkasbank 
BEL  4,664.8  Merger 
1998  Almanij Kredietbank  BEL  Abb Verkekeringen Bank BEL  2,047.7 Merger 
1998  Credito Italiano  ITA  Unicredito  ITA  10,032.3 Merger 
1998  Istituto Bancario San 
Paolo Di Torino 
ITA  Istituto Mobiliare Italiano 
(Imi) 
ITA  8,628.3 Merger 
1998  Banco Santander  SP  Banesto  SP  3,544.7 Acquisition
1998  Caisse Centrale Des 
Banques Populaires  
FRA  Natexis Banque   FRA  548 Acquisition
 
1998  Credit Mutuel   FRA  Cie Financiere Du Credit 
Industriel (Cic) 
FRA  2,026.8 Acquisition
1998  Banca Intesa  ITA  Cassa Di Risparmio Di 
Parma (Cariparma) 
ITA  2,121 Acquisition
1998  Credit Agricole  FRA  Sofinco  FRA  1,470 Acquisition
1998  Dexia  BEL / 
FRA 
Banco De Credito Local  SP  2,600  Acquisition
1999  Banco Santander  SP  Banco Central 
Hispanoamericano (Bch)
SP  9,713 Merger 
1999  Hsbc   UK  Safra Republic Holdings  LUX  2,413.2  Merger 
1999  Skandinaviska Enskilda 
Banken (Seb)  
SW  Bfg Bank  GER  1,589.8  Merger 
1999  Bnp   FRA  Paribas  FRA  12,122.9 Acquisition
1999  Banca Intesa  ITA  Banca Comerciale Italiana 
(Comit) 
ITA  7,760.8 AcquisitionBANKING CONSOLIDATION IN THE EU | 85 
1999  Efg Eurobank   GRE  Ergo Bank  GRE  2,051.2 Acquisition
1999  Caisse Centrale Des 
Caisses D'epargne 
FRA  Credit Foncier De France FRA  709.2 Acquisition
1999  Dexia   BEL / 
FRA 
Banque Internationale De 
Luxembourg  
LUX  1,003.2  Acquisition
1999  Banco Bilbao Vizcaya 
(Bbv) 
SP  Argentaria  SP  10,460 Merger 
2000  San Paolo Imi  ITA  Banco Di Napoli  ITA  2,224  Acquisition
2000  Royal Bank  
Of Scotland (Rbos)  
UK  National Westminster  
( Natwest) 
UK  42,150 Merger 
2000  Dexia  BEL / 
FRA 
Labouchere  NL  896  Acquisition
2000  Banco Comercial 
Portugues  
POR  Banco Pinto E Sotto 
Mayor 
POR  3,000 Acquisition
2000  Merita Nordbanken  FIN / 
SW 
Unidanmark  DAN  4,780  Merger 
2000  Hypovereinsbank  GER  Bank Austria  AUS  7,800  Acquisition 
2000  Banco Santander 
Central Hispano (Bsch) 
SP  Banco Totta & Acores  POR  1,610  Merger 
2000  Hsbc  UK  Credit Commercial De 
France (Ccf) 
FRA  11,000  Acquisition
2000  Barclays  UK  Woolwich  UK  9,100 Merger 
2000  Den Danske Bank   DAN  Real Danmark   DAN  3,500 Merger 
2000  Merita Nordbanken  FIN / 
SW 
Christiania Bank  NOR  na Merger 
 
2001   Bank Of Scotland  UK  Halifax Group  UK  14,500 Merger 
2001  Ccf  FRA  Banque Hervet   FRA  529 Acquisition
2001  Dg Bank  GER  Gz Bank  GER  12,270 Merger 
2001  Dexia  BEL / 
FRA 
Artesia Banking Corp.  BEL  3,300 Acquisition
2001  Caisse Des Depots Et 
Consignations 
(Cdc) 
FRA  Groupe Caisses 
D’epargne 
FRA  na Merger 
2001  Sanpaolo Imi  ITA  Cardine  ITA  6,200 Merger 
2001  Banco Sabadell  SP  Banco Herrero  SP  na Acquisition
2001  Banca Popolare Di 
Verona 
ITA  Banca Popolare Di 
Novara  
ITA  na Merger 
2002  Banca Di Roma  ITA  Bipop-Carire  ITA   Merger 
2002  Banca Popolare Di Lodi  ITA  Banco Di Chiavari E 
Della Riviera Ligure 
ITA  405 Acquisition
2002  Banca Popolare Di 
Bergamo 
ITA  Banca Popolare 
Commercio E Industria 
(Bpci)  
ITA  na Merger 
2002  Credit Agricole  FRA  Credit Lyonnais  FRA  16,900 Acquisition   
2002  Banca Popolare Di 
Vicenza   
ITA  Cassa Di Risparmio Di 
Prato  
ITA  411 Acquisition
2002  Den Norske Bank  NOR  Nordlandsbanken  NOR  130 Acquisition
2002  Credit Agricole  FRA  Finaref  FRA  2,500 Acquisition
2002  Natexis Banques 
Populaires 
FRA  Coface  FRA  290 Acquisition
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Annex 4. Market Capitalisation,* Profitability and Market Valuation of the 
Major European Banks 
Rank  
Nov 
2003 
Rank 
end 
2002 
Bank (country)  Market 
capitalisation 
November 2003 
(€ billion) 
Market 
capitalisation 
end 2002 
(€ billion) 
Price variation 
from 
1/01/2002 to 
31/12/2002 
(%) 
Rank 
end 
2001 
 
1 1  HSBC  (UK)  114.81  99.6  -  14.83  1 
2  2  RBoS Group (UK)  68.24  66.1  - 11.00  2 
3  3  UBS (Switzerland)  62.39  55.0  - 19.81  3 
4 4  Barclays  (UK)  47.67  38.9  -  32.31  5 
5  7  BNP Paribas (France)  42.21  34.8  - 22.73  4 
6   9  SCH (Spain)  39.91  31.2  - 30.50  9 
7   6  HBoS (UK)  38.92  38.1  - 17.71  10 
8  8  ING (NL)  37.91  31.4   - 43.65   6 
9 13  Crédit  Suisse  Group 
(Switzerland) 
35.01 24.6  -  57.63  12 
10  11  Deutsche Bank (Germany)  33.69  26.3  - 44.71  11 
11  5  Lloyds TSB Group (UK)  33.49  38.7  - 40.22  8 
12  10  BBVA (Spain)  31.96  29.1  - 34.39  14 
13  12  ABN Amro (NL)  29.83  24.7  - 13.88  7 
14  15  Société Générale (France)  28.60  23.8  - 11.69  18 
15 14  Unicredit  (Italy)  26.42  23.9  -  15.18  15 
16  18  Crédit Agricole SA (France)  24.80**  14.0  - 19.17  13 
17  16  Fortis (Belgium/NL)  20.07  21.8  - 42.37  na 
18   20  Banca Intesa (Italy)  17.42  13.2  - 28.55  23 
19    Standard Chartered (UK)   16.56      20 
20   Nordea  (Scandinavia)  15.90      19 
Source: Bloomberg (2003). 
 
Notes: * Calculated as the number of outstanding shares x share price. 
           ** Including Crédit Lyonnais. 
 
 
In 2003, the British institutions have ensured their top ranking position with four banks (HSBC, 
RBoS Group, Barclays and HBoS + Lloyds TSB, 11
th) in the European top ten of market 
capitalisation. The French institution, BNP Paribas, retains its position at the top of the euro 
zone.  
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Figure A4.1 Profitability and market valuation of the major European banks 
 
Source: Deutsche Bank (2003). 
Notes: 
ROE (Return on equity) = Net income/equity. 
P/BV (Price-to-book value) = Market capitalisation/equity. 
 
The banking institutions situated above the dashed line are less valued than the average of the 
market and vice versa. According to this figure, we can establish a diagnosis of undervalued vs. 
overvalued institutions among the major EU banks and thereby identify potential value 
anomalies. 
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Figure A4.2 Profitability and the importance of retail activities 
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Figure A4.3 Market valuation of retail banking activities   
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Figure A4.4 Identifying the value creators/destroyers in the European banking sector 
Source: Deutsche Bank (2003). 
Notes: Deutsche Bank’s analysts measure EVA (Economic Value Added) by comparing ROTE against COE. A bank 
is EVA positive if it earns returns (ROTE) above its cost of capital (COE); hence ROTE/COE > 1. The 
higher the ROTE/COE ratio, the more the bank is a value creator under the five-year period 2000-2004e. 
Because they are eliminating goodwill (i.e. they use tangible equity), most banking institutions in the 
Deutsche Bank universe are EVA positive. 
 
 
In the Deutsche Bank universe, retail-oriented banks operating in strong economies are the 
greatest value creators (RBoS, Lloyds TSB, Bank of Ireland, Popular and SCH). The two 
German banks considered (Commerzbank and HVB) are unable to meet their cost of equity. 
This highlights the amount of work these banks must perform in order to restore their core 
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Annex 5. Main Financial Activities in the EU Banking Sector 
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Annex 6. Cross-Shareholding Structures of Major European Financial Companies, end 2002 (in %) 
Who owns them    Who do they own 
   Aegon  
6.25 
Fortis  
6.15 
ABN AMRO  
5.1 
ING 
 
ABN AMRO 
11.6 
Piraeus Bank  
5.0 
      
     Swiss  Re   
1.1 
Fortis  ING  
6.2 
       
     ING   
11.6 
ABN AMRO  Capitalia  
6.6 
ING  
5.1 
Banco Comercial 
Portugues (BCP) 
5.0 
    
     BNP  Paribas   
3.9 
AXA  Crédit Lyonnais 
5.3 
Société Générale 
1.0 
BNP Paribas  
5.3 
    
     AXA   
5.3 
BNP Paribas  AXA  
3.9 
Crédit Lyonnais 
16.3 
      
    A v i v a    
5.0 
Allianz  
1.6 
Société 
Générale 
SCH  
2.9 
Crédit Lyonnais 
3.9 
      
       Crédit Agricole  IntesaBCI  
15.0 
Banco Espirito 
Santo  
24.0 
Crédit Lyonnais 
17.4 
Commercial 
Bank of Greece  
9.0 
  
 Allianz   
10.5 
AXA  
5.3 
BNP Paribas 
16.3 
Crédit Agricole 
17.4 
        
  Société Générale  
3.9 
BBVA  
3.6 
 
IntesaBCI  
3.7 
Commerzbank 
3.9 
 
 
Crédit Lyonnais         
     Munich  Re   
25.7 
HVB Group  Allianz  
4.6 
Munich Re 
13.3 
      
    Munich Re  
1.8 
Allianz  
4.2 
La Caixa  
4.0 
Deutsche Bank  Allianz  
3.2 
EFG Eurobank 
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9.3 
      
   Deutsche  Bank 
3.2 
HVB Group  
4.6 
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20.0 
AMB  
9.5 
AGF  
65.3 
BPI-SGPS  
8.6 
RAS  
55.4 
  
      
 
Allianz 
Banco Popular 
9.5 
Crédit Lyonnais 
10.5 
Munich Re  
24.5 
Deutsche Bank 
4.2 
  
   
 
Allianz  
24.5 
HVB Group  
13.3 
Munich Ré  Allianz  
20.0 
HVB Group  
25.7 
Commerzbank 
10.4 
Deutsche Bank 
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9.9 
IntesaBCI  
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1.6 
SCH  
3.7 
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10.4 
Commerzbank  Crédit Lyonnais 
3.9 
SCH  
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Erste Bank  
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4.2 
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1.4 
Mediobanca  
1.7 
    S C H    
6.4 
KBC  
0.9 
San Paolo-IMI  SCH  
2.9 
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< 2.0  < 2.0  10.4 
    Commerzbank 
1.4 
Mediobanca  
13.8 
Commerzbank 
9.9 
Unicredit  
< 2.0 
BNL  
7.1 
IntesaBCI  
5.0 
  
      
 
Generali 
Mediobanca  
2.0 
SCH  
1.0 
AMB  
64.0 
    
 BCP   
2.0 
Commerzbank 
4.2 
Crédit Agricole 
15.0 
Generali  
5.0 
IntesaBCI  Commerzbank 
2.0 
Crédit Lyonnais 
3.7 
BCP 
7.4 
    
     ABN  AMRO   
6.6 
Capitalia  Mediobanca  
8.6 
       
    Generali   
7.1 
BBVA  
14.8 
BNL          
 RAS   
2.0 
Generali  
2.0 
Unicredit  
2.0 
Capitalia  
8.5 
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13.8 
Commerzbank  
1.6 
      
RBoS Group 
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Commerzbank 
1.9 
Generali  
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2.9 
SCH  RBoS Group   
5.1 
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3.7 
San Paolo IMI 
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       BBVA  BNL  
14.8 
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3.6 
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de Depositos  
8.4 
Banco Sabadell 
3.4 
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IntesaBCI  
7.4 
ABN AMRO  
5.0 
BCP  IntesaBCI  
2.0 
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8.5 
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4.0 
    
     Swiss  Re   
5.0 
Crédit Suisse 
Group 
Swiss Life  
6.0 
       
     Crédit  Suisse 
Group  
6.0 
Swiss Life          
     S C H  
5.1 
RBoS Group  SCH  
2.9 
       
       Aviva  Société Générale 
5.0 
Unicredit  
< 2.0 
Munich Re  
3.6 
RBoS Group  
3.2 
  
Source: UBS Warburg (2003). 
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Annex 7. Internet Banking in Europe 
By the end of 2002, 39% of Internet users in Europe were conducting banking transactions on 
line, compared to 38% in the US. Their number has more than doubled in the past two years as 
banks have improved their sites and promoted e-banking.  
Among the major European markets, Germany leads the pack in online banking users with a 
total of 16 million at the end of 2002. The UK follows with 10.4 million users, while France has 
6.2 million users. However, in terms of penetration, the Nordic countries – Denmark, Finland, 
Norway and Sweden – continue to be the leaders, which is not surprising given that these are the 
regions where Personal Computer penetration is the highest and e-banking services the most 
advanced. Considerable national divergences remain at least for the time being (see Figure 
A7.1).  
Even though Southern Europe comes from a lower starting point, these countries saw the 
highest increase in internet banking in 2002. In Italy, online banking jumped by 88% (the 
fastest-growing market in Europe), as leading banks launch aggressive e-banking strategies to 
attack this relatively underdeveloped market.  
Penetration also increased in the Netherlands by more than 60% (as Dutch banks like ABN 
AMRO closed branches and heavily promoted online banking), however, growth in the Nordic 
countries, the UK, and Germany started to flatten out in 2002, pulling the average European 
banking growth rate down from 60% in 2001 to 40% in 2002. 
 
Figure A7.1 Online banking user penetration in European countries (in %)  
  
Source: Jupiter (2002). 
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Annex 8. Current Structure of National Supervision in the EU Countries 
Until the late 1990s, three banking supervision models co-existed within the EU countries: the 
Central bank model, the separate banking supervisory model and the ministry of finance model. 
Today, all the member states are characterised by one of the first two models since the ministry 
of finance model has disappeared. However, this classification would not dissimulate the 
fragmentation and the wide heterogeneity of the supervisory authorities in the EU (see Table 
A8.1). 
Table A8.1 Supervisors of banking, securities and insurance (beginning 2004)   
Country Banking  Securities  markets  Insurance 
Austria FSA  FSA  FSA 
Belgium FSA  FSA  FSA 
Denmark FSA  FSA  FSA 
Finland BS  BS  I 
France B/CB  S I 
Germany FSA  FSA  FSA 
Greece CB  S  I 
Ireland FSA  FSA  FSA 
Italy CB  S  I 
Luxembourg BS  BS  I 
The Netherlands*  CB  S  I 
Portugal CB  S I 
Spain CB  S  I 
Sweden FSA  FSA  FSA 
United Kingdom  FSA  FSA  FSA 
US  B/CB S  I 
Japan  FSA FSA  FSA 
* In the Netherlands, the national supervisory authorities are currently moving to a more integrated banking and 
insurance supervisor as a result of the planned integration of De Nederlansche Bank (DNB) and the Pensions and 
Insurance supervisory authority (PVK). 
Notes: CB = Central Bank, FSA = Single financial supervisory authority, BS = Banking and securities supervisor, 
B = Specialised banking supervisor, S = Specialised securities supervisor, I = Specialised insurance 
supervisor.  
 
In all the Southern European countries – Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain – and the 
Netherlands, banking supervision and regulation are an exclusive central bank responsibility 
(see Table A8.2). In the Southern European countries, the central bank plays an essential role in 
supervising the banking systems; its prerogatives range from the approval to the resolution of 
banking crises.  
However, a regular and gradual erosion of its involvement in banking supervision has recently 
been observed with the aim of focusing on the central goal of achieving price stability. But in all 
European countries, the central bank is solely responsible for maintaining financial stability (see 
Table A8.2).  
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Table A8.2 Role of the central bank in financial supervision in the EU (beginning 2004) 
Form of central bank involvement in banking supervision 
Central bank is not the banking supervisor 
Country Number  of 
public 
institutions 
responsible for 
supervision 
Central bank is 
responsible for 
financial 
stability 
Central bank is 
involved in 
banking 
supervision
a 
Central bank is 
the banking 
supervisor 
Central bank is involved 
in management of the 
banking supervisor
b 
Central bank is 
allocated specific tasks 
in banking 
supervision
c 
Central bank and 
banking supervisor 
share resources 
Austria 1  yes  yes  no  yes  yes  no 
Belgium 1  yes  yes  no  yes  no
  no
d 
Denmark 1  yes  no  no  no  no  no 
Finland 2 yes yes  no  yes  no  yes 
France 6
e  yes yes  no  yes  no  yes 
Germany 1  yes  yes  no  no  yes  yes 
Greece 3  yes  yes yes       
Ireland 1  yes  yes no  no  no  yes 
Italy 3  yes  yes  yes       
Luxembourg 2  yes  no  no  no  no  no 
Netherlands 3
f yes yes  yes       
Portugal 3  yes yes  yes       
Spain 3  yes  yes  yes       
Sweden 1 yes yes  no  yes  no  no
g 
UK 1  yes  yes  no  yes  no no
g 
a The Central bank is involved in banking supervision when it is the banking supervisor itself or, where this is not the case, involved in the management/oversight of the banking 
supervisor, contributes to supervisory policy-shaping, carries out tasks in line supervision, processes supervisory reporting or shares resources with the supervisory agency. 
b The Central bank is involved in the management of the banking supervisor if the former is represented in the management (e.g. management committee, secretary-general and chairman) 
or in the supervisory or oversight board of the latter. 
c The Central bank carries out off- and on-site monitoring in specific areas.   
d The law of the 2
nd August 2002 foresees a pooling of resources between the new CBFA and the Central bank. 
e After the “Loi de sécurité financière” was adopted in July 2003 (see Box A8.1).  
f In 2004, De Nederlansche Bank and the Pension and Insurance Supervisory authority are planning to merge. It is expected that the two bodies will operate as a single organisation from 
the 1
st of April 2004.  
g Under a specific MoU, supervisory agency and Central bank are obliged to share information in Sweden and UK. Moreover, the Bank of England and the FSA occasionally second staff 
to each other, which might be viewed as a form of sharing resources.         96 | AYADI & PUJALS 
 
In the separate banking supervisory model, the control mechanisms are primarily based on an 
independent and autonomous legal decision-making entity. In Europe, it is either represented as 
a specialist banking supervisor or an integrated financial supervisor (FSA).  
The first integrated financial supervisory authority in Europe was created at the end of the 1980s 
in the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Norway and Sweden), followed by the UK.
154 It was 
recently adopted by Germany,
155 Austria
156 and more recently in Ireland
157 and Belgium
158  
Controversially, this model is far from being uniform in all the EU countries. Indeed, the broad 
field of competencies of the Scandinavian, British and German subcommittees could not be 
applied to the Benelux countries and still less in France. French banking supervision is 
considered as still fragmented albeit the “Loi de sécurité financière” adopted in July 2003 which 
proposed the merger between the COB and the CMF (see Box A8.1). Despite a growing 
attention paid to the FSA model, the institutional convergence within the EU has remained 
moderate.  
 
 
                                                 
154 In 1997, the UK authorities decided to withdraw the supervisory functions from the Bank of England 
in order to assign them to an independent super-regulator – the Financial Services Authority (FSA) – 
which would exercise authority over all the financial services. To set up this institution, no less than nine 
regulators have merged (banking, insurance, securities…). After four years of organisation and planning, 
the FSA has been operational since 1 December 2001. 
155 Operational since May 2002.  
156 Operational since April 2002. 
157 The Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority (Financial Services Regulator) was established on 1 
May 2003. The Financial Services Regulator is responsible for the regulation of all financial services 
firms in Ireland. It also has an important role in the protection of consumers of financial services. 
158 The Commission Bancaire, Financière et des Assurances (CBFA) was established on the 1st of 
January 2004, after the merger between the Commission Bancaire et Financière (CBF) and the Office de 
Contrôle des Assurances (OCA). 
Box A8.1 The new organisation of financial regulators in France 
 
  Insurance Banking  Investment 
services 
Securities 
markets 
Asset 
management 
Regulation  Ministry of 
Finance 
Ministry of 
Finance  AMF AMF  AMF 
Prudential supervision  CCAMIP CB  CB  CB  AMF 
Agreement  CEA CECEI  CECEI  CECEI  AMF 
 
Notes:  
AMF: Autorité des marchés financiers  (COB + CMF + CDGF) 
CB: Commission bancaire 
CCAMIP: Commission de contrôle des assurances, des mutuelles et des institutions de prévoyance (before CCA: 
Commission de contrôle des assurances) 
CDGF: Conseil de discipline de la gestion financière 
CEA: Comité des entreprises d’assurance 
CECEI: Comité des entreprises de crédit et des entreprises d’investissement 
CMF: Conseil des marchés financiers 
COB: Commission des opérations de Bourse  
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